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“bsent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim”
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Perry v. Spencer
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
dministrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Eason v. Puckett
bsent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. Spinks
Whether such a reasonable relation exists is “peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of correction officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, the courts should ordinarily defer to their judgment in such matters.” Id. at n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). “[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim”…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Devaney v. Blankenship
Butler v. Porter, 999 F.3d 287 , 296 (5th Cir. 2021); Moody v. Baker, 857 F.2d 256 , 257–58 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Carmouche v. Hooper
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d at 194 (finding no liberty interest where, inter alia, prisoner’s custodial status was reviewed every ninety days); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (same).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Welsh v. Lubbock County
Id. 4 Case: 22-10382 Document: 00516789005 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/15/2023 No. 22-10382 c/w No. 22-11049 Welsh’s claim because of this court’s holding that “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Houston v. Ezell
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that “administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995)); Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 563 (5th Cir. 2008).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Passman v. LeBlanc
Absent a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,” being placed in administrative segregation standing alone “will never be a ground for a constitutional claim” because it “does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.” Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612-12 (5th Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Estrada v. Nehls
Again, Estrada has not established that the district court erred in its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of these claims because “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation . . . , being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Welsh v. Lubbock County
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that ‘absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim” because it “simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (Sth Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Timothy Dean Stone, TDCJ 1177762 v. Warden Furr
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996); Moody v. Baker, 857 F.2d 256 , 257–58 (5th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Budney, 976 6 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992) (“A prison inmate does not have a protectable liberty or property interest in his custodial classification.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Estrada v. Nehls
Further, “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim” because it “simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612-613 (Sth Cir. 1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Durden v. Guevara
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Denby v. Director, TDCJ-CID
Thus, “administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Whitsett v. Cannon
Cf., e.g., Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 589 (2d Cir.1999) (101 day administrative segregation was not atypical and did not amount to significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life); Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir.1996) (neither 12 day solitary confinement nor 11 month close supervision confinement were dramatically different from conditions of general confinement); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir.1997) (15 month administrative custody was not deprivation of liberty); Beverati, 120 F.3d 500 (six month administrative confinement was not a dep…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert Bonner v. Bob Alford
With regard to his claim regarding his placement in administrative segregation, this court has held that “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Pi-chardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612-13 (5th Cir.1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert Wilkerson v. Richard Stalder
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
We have stated that, “absent extraordinary circumstances,” administrative segregation that is merely “incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner” is not grounds for a constitutional claim, because it simply “does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.” Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612-13 (5th Cir.1996); see also Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir.1995) (“administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Juan Enriquez v. Oliver Bell, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996); Moody v. Baker, 857 F.2d 256 , 257–58 (5th Cir. 1988).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Covarrubias v. Wallace
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996); Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 959 (5th Cir.2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Wayne Ernest Barker v. Thomas Hutt
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996); Moody v. Baker, 857 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1988).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jesus Jimenez v. Leticia McQueen
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996); Fultz v. Collins, No. 92-5214, 1993 WL 347283, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug.20, 1993) (per curiam); see also 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
John Allums v. Lance Phillips
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir.1998); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir.1996); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir.1995); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 , 96 S.Ct. 2532 , 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kirby Tate v. Earnestine Starks
(2×)
To the extent that the summary judgment disposition of this case relied upon such cases, particularly Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 563-64 (5th Cir.2008) and Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612-13 (5th Cir.1996), the district court erred in not considering Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005), which constitutes a crucial exception to the general rule that a prisoner has no liberty interest in his classification: that is, when the prisoner is incarcerated in super-maximum security conditions, as was Tate.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kenneth Hill v. Michael Stephens, Charles Britt, Domingo Carrillo, and Abel Leal
We conclude that Hill has failed to allege a cognizable section 1983 claim. [4] See Pichardo v. Kinker , 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996) (finding that inmate’s claim under section 1983 had no arguable basis in law because “administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest”); Franco v. State, No. 03-09-00008-CV, 2009 WL 2195586 *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Jul. 24, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Julian Cruz v. Billye Forrest
See Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 562-64 (5th Cir.2008); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir.1998); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612-13 (5th Cir.1996); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir.1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Martin T. Franco, Jr. v. State
Among other things, “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim.” Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (labeling such claim “frivolous”); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that inmate’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had no arguable basis in law because “administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Martin T. Franco, Jr. v. State
Among other things, "absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim." Martin v. Scott , 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (labeling such claim "frivolous"); Pichardo v. Kinker , 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that inmate's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had no arguable basis in law because "administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest").
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Decker v. Dunbar
Pi-chardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996); Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 959 (5th Cir.2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hernandez v. Velasquez
And in the specific context of administrative lockdown, we have clearly held that “absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim.” E.g., Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612-13 (5th Cir.1996) (affirming dismissal of claim that lockdown for suspected gang affiliation violated due process). 9 Only when a prisoner demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances” may he maintain a due process challenge to a change in his custodial classification.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodriguez v. LaFlore
See Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir.2003); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir.1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Herrera v. Villalobos
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 , 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Martin v. Scott, 156 *416 F.3d 578, 579 (5th Cir.1998); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jordan v. Federal Bureau
Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d at 812-13 (6th Cir.) (upholding administrative segregation over 900 days was not “atypical” under the Due Process Clause, given confinement was not much different than experienced by other inmates in segregation); Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997) (determining six-month placement in administrative segregation was not atypical compared with the general prison population even though officials kept inmates in their cells except for three to four times each week; denied them outside recreation, educational, and religious services; warm or large porti…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jordan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d at 812-13 (6th Cir.) (upholding administrative segregation over 900 days was not "atypical” under the Due Process Clause, given confinement was not much different than experienced by other inmates in segregation); Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir.1997) (determining six-month placement in administrative segregation was not atypical compared with the general prison population even though officials kept inmates in their cells except for three to four times each week; denied them outside recreation, educational, and religious services; warm or large portions…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hill v. Fleming
See, e.g., Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d at 812-13 (6th Cir.) (upholding administrative *671 segregation over 900 days as not “atypical” under the Due Process Clause, given confinement was not much different than experienced by other inmates in segregation); Griffin, 112 F.3d at 706-09 (3d Cir.) (concluding fifteen-month administrative segregation was within the “expected parameters of the sentence imposed on him” and that the Pennsylvania regulations on such confinement did not deprive him of a liberty interest or entitlement to procedural due process); Beverati, 120 F.3d at 504 (4th Cir.)…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. Williams
Brown’s due process challenge to his disciplinary penalties is frivolous because those penalties did not amount to an “atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir.1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ramirez v. McQueen
First, Ramirez has failed to allege a protected liberty interest that was violated by his placement in administrative segregation due to classification as a gang member, see Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996), by the failure of officials to remove information about his gang affiliation from his prison records, see Velasquez, 329 F.3d at 421-22 , or by any possible delays in Ramirez being considered for release on parole or mandatory supervision.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Colgrove v. Williams
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 , 115 S.Ct. 2293 , 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 435-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 432 , 157 L.Ed.2d 310 (2003); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir.1996); see also Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir.2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Tamez v. Buentello
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Eric Woodruff v. TDOC
See also Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-08 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that fifteen months confinement in administrative segregation did not deprive the inmate of a liberty interest under Sandin); Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that “Almost 6 percent of the nation’s prison inmates are in segregation and it appears that the great majority of these are not in disciplinary segregation; so even a prisoner who had committed a white-collar crime and had been assigned to the lowest security prison in the state’s system might find himself in segregation for a non…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
August v. Payne
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612-23 (5th Cir. 1996); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995). 8 Adams, 729 F.2d at 368 -69 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). 7 him prior to his hearing.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Carr v. Fancher
See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fraise v. Barbo
See Griffin, 112 F.3d at 706-08 (15 months in administrative segregation not atypical and significant hardship); see also, e.g., Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 1998)(confinement in administrative segregation for two and one-half years is not "atypical and significant" hardship); Pichardo v. Kinker , 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996)(rejecting as frivolous a claim that classification as gang member and placement in administrative segregation unit deprived inmate of a protected liberty interest).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jael Fraise v. Jack Terhune, Commissioner. Alexander Kettles v. James Barbo Howard Beyer. John Harris v. James Barbo Howard Beyer
(2×)
See Griffin, 112 F.3d at 706-08 (15 months in administrative segregation not atypical and significant hardship); see also, e.g., Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir.1998) (confinement in administrative segregation for two and one-half years is not “atypical and significant” hardship); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1996)(rejecting as frivolous a claim that classification as gang member and placement in administrative segregation unit deprived inmate of a protected liberty interest).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Roth v. Johnson
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lewis v. Smith
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cain v. Terry
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Colgrove v. Grant
As for the first, third, sixth, and seventh claims: Colgrove’s first and third lacked an arguable basis in law, see Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1196 (1996), as did his sixth, see 3 Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996); and the seventh lacked an arguable basis in fact.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Eckels v. Johnson
See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Buford Anthony Dupuy,petitioner-Appellant v. Burl Cain, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary
Schneider, 73 F.3d at 612. 6.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Christianson v. Clarke
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Although Christianson alleges that his placement in administrative segregation resulted in the revocation of certain *1183 privileges such as “free access to the law library, circulating library, yard, central dining, canteen and basic other freedoms shared by the inmate population as a whole” (filing 7, ¶ 19) the temporary denial of these privileges do not present the “type of atypical, significant deprivations in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2301 ; See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 460 , 103 S.Ct. at 864 (“[A]dministrative segreg…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rolando PICHARDO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
H.E. KINKER, M.W. Moore, W. Scott, J.A. Collins, S.O. Woods and S. Buentello, Defendants-Appellees
v.
H.E. KINKER, M.W. Moore, W. Scott, J.A. Collins, S.O. Woods and S. Buentello, Defendants-Appellees
95-40413.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jan 31, 1996.
Rolando Pichardo, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Tennessee Colony, TX, pro se.
Jolly, Davis, Garza.
Cited by 93 opinions | Published
Citer courts: First Circuit (1) · Fifth Circuit (1)
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Rolando Pichardo appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissing as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 his claim that his confinement in administrative segregation violates his due process rights. We hold that absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life as a prisoner, will never be a ground for a constitutional claim, and therefore affirm.
[*613] Pichardo, an inmate at Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various TDCJ officials and employees at the Coffield and Hobby Units. Pichardo challenged the determination, made while he was at the Hobby Unit, that he was affiliated with the Texas Syndicate, a prison gang, a determination that resulted in his classification as a gang member and his placement in administrative segregation at the Coffield Unit. The magistrate judge assigned to the matter severed the claims and allegations concerning the initial determination of Pichardo’s gang affiliation and transferred those claims to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
The magistrate judge conducted a Spears [1] hearing to flesh out the factual allegations concerning Pichardo’s claim of a due process violation arising from his continued confinement in administrative segregation. At the hearing, Pichardo testified that he had consistently denied any gang affiliation and that he had received periodic review by the Cof-field Unit’s classification committee concerning his gang classification. Prison Warden Kinker explained the procedures utilized in classifying an inmate as a gang member, with placement in administrative segregation, and noted that review occurs every ninety days to determine whether the inmate continues as an active member of the gang.
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Pichardo’s complaint as frivolous, concluding that Pichardo had not shown an abuse of the prison officials’ discretion in continuing to classify Pichardo as a gang member; thus, no due process violation had occurred. The district court conducted a de novo review of the record, adopted the magistrate judge’s report, and dismissed Pichar-do’s complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This timely appeal followed.
II
Pichardo argues that the TDCJ policies covering an inmate’s placement and continued confinement in administrative segregation create a protectable liberty interest. [2] Because this contention lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, we hold that his complaint was properly dismissed as frivolous. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1732-33, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992).
The Supreme Court recently held that a prisoner’s liberty interest is “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, ... nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418, 430 (1995) (citations omitted). In Sandin, the Court held that the petitioner’s “discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. In the wake of Sandin, as we recently have held, “administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.” Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d at 193.
III
Because Pichardo has not alleged a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest, his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action has no arguable basis in law. His complaint was therefore properly dismissed as frivolous.
AFFIRMED.
1
. Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1985).
2
. Unlike the plaintiff in the recent and nearly identical case of Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam), Pichardo does not contend that he lost the opportunity to earn good-time credits, and that that loss constitutes a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. He claims instead that the mere placement in administrative segregation deprives him of a liberty interest.