Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1878). · Go Syfert
Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1878). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
365 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 101 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: WickFire v. Woodruff (ca5, 2021-03-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1900 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1900 1963 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WickFire v. Woodruff
5th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Novel as its claim may be, nothing suggests WickFire’s legal theory is so insubstantial or frivolous as to affect the district court’s authority to decide this case. 36 We thus conclude 32 See Fragumar Corp., N.V. v. Dunlap, 685 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Federal jurisdiction is determined not by the ultimate evidence but by the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.” (citing Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201-02 (1877))). 33 Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WickFire v. Woodruff
5th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Novel as its claim may be, nothing suggests WickFire’s legal theory is so insubstantial or frivolous as to affect the district court’s authority to decide this case. 36 We thus conclude the district court had jurisdiction over WickFire’s Lanham Act claim and, 32 See Fragumar Corp., N.V. v. Dunlap, 685 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Federal jurisdiction is determined not by the ultimate evidence but by the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.” (citing Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201-02 (1877))). 33 Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosa v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company SI
W.D. Wash. · 2020 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION 10 A. Defendant Provides No Valid Basis for Removal 11 Removal is a statutory right, and “[a] suit commenced in State court must remain there 12 until cause is shown under some act of Congress for its transfer.” Little York Gold Washing & 13 Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201 (1877).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrew Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court long ago settled that the notice of removal “performs the office of [a] pleading,” Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 202 (1877), that it “becomes a part of the record,” and that “[i]t should state facts, which, taken in connection with such as already appear, entitle [the petitioner] to the transfer,” Phoenix Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrew Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court long ago settled that the notice of removal “performs the office of [a] pleading,” Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 202 (1877), that it “becomes a part of the record,” and that “[i]t should state facts, which, taken in connection with such as already appear, entitle [the petitioner] to the transfer,” Phoenix Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrew Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court long ago settled that the notice of removal “performs the office of [a] pleading,” Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 202 (1877), that it “becomes a part of the record,” and that “[i]t should state facts, which, taken in connection with such as already appear, entitle [the petitioner] to the transfer,” Phoenix Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abrego v. the Dow Chemical Company
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 204 (1877) (discussing an 1875 statute providing for removal of cases “arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson (2×)
SCOTUS · 2002 · confidence medium
Co. v. Alexander, 246 U. S. 276, 280 (1918) (citing Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 201 (1878)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sirois v. Business Express, Inc.
D.N.H. · 1995 · confidence medium
"Well-Pleaded" Complaints and the Effect of Preemption A case arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States if "'its correct decision depends upon the construction of either.'" Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201 (1878) (guoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 , 379 (1821)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal.
SCOTUS · 1983 · confidence medium
See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 140 (1880); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 203-204 (1878).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
For the same reasons, we think the complaint before us satisfies the additional requirement formulated in some cases that the complaint reveal a "dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends." Shulthis v. McDougal, supra, at 569 ; Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 203 (1878). [12] Here, the Oneidas assert a present right to possession based in part on their aboriginal right of occupancy which was not terminable except by act of the United States. *678 Their claim is also asserted to arise…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) F & L DRUG CORP. v. American Central Insurance Co.
D. Conn. · 1961 · confidence medium
Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 202 [ 24 L.Ed. 656 ]; Carson v. Dunham, 121 U.S. 421, 426 [ 7 S.Ct. 1030 , 30 L.Ed. 992 ]; Crehore v. Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co., 131 U.S. 240, 244 [ 9 S.Ct. 692 , 33 L.Ed. 144 ]; Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 169 U.S. 92, 101 [ 18 S.Ct. 264 , 42 L.Ed. 673 ].” An absence of an allegation cannot be regarded as an allegation defective-in form.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WJR, the Goodwill Station, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1948 · confidence medium
Co., 1900; 178 U.S.. 239, 243, 244, 20 S.Ct. 867 , 44 L.Ed. 1052 ,-1054; Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 1878, 96 U.S. 199, 203 , 24 L.Ed. 656, 658, 659 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Enger v. Northern Finance Corporation
D. Minnesota · 1929 · confidence medium
As in other pleadings, there must be a statement of the facts relied upon, and not otherwise appearing, in order that the court may draw the proper conclusion from all the facts and that, in the event of a removal, the opposing party may take issue, by a motion to remand, with what is alleged in the petition” — citing Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 202 ( 24 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Quagon v. Biddle
8th Cir. · 1925 · confidence medium
Little York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 202, 203 , 24 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shellenbarger v. Fewel
Okla. · 1912 · confidence medium
Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 203 ( 24 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Anderson
E.D. Okla. · 1911 · confidence medium
In Gold Washing Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 203 [ 24 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Myrtle v. Nevada, C. & O. Ry. Co.
circtdnv · 1905 · confidence medium
As said by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 203 [ 24 L.
cited Cited "see" Bell v. Federal Deposit Insurance (In Re Collins Securities Corp.)
E.D. Ark. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gold Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 199, 24 L.Ed. 656 (1878).
discussed Cited "see" Norwood v. Slammons (2×)
W.D. Ark. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See, for historical perspective, Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 , 24 L.Ed. 656 (1878).
discussed Cited "see" Ned McDaniel Mary E. McDaniel and Robert A. Collier v. R. D. Painter, Dale Painter and Rhodes Danehower (2×)
10th Cir. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 , 24 L.Ed. 656 (1878); Wright, Federal Courts, § 18 (1963 ed.). 8 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brendan Holbein v. Baxter Chrysler Jeep, Inc.
8th Cir. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Removal is a “statutory right,” Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201 (1877), or “privilege,” Cont’l Cablevision of St.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bellaire v. Interstate Bridge Co. (2×)
4th Cir. · 1930 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Little York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 201 , 24 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." MacOn Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad (2×)
SCOTUS · 1910 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 201 ; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 ; White v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 307 ; Railroad Company v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 139 .” In Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 , the court said: “What constitutes a case thus arising was early defined’ in the case'cited from 6 Wheaton (Cohens v. Virginia), It is not merely one where a party comes into court to demand something conferred upon him by the Constitution or. by a law or treaty.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Patton v. Brady
SCOTUS · 1902 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Gold- Washing & Water Company v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 201 ; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 ; White v. Greenhow, Treasurer, 114 U. S. 307 ; Railroad Company v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 139 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." California Oil & Gas Co. of Arizona v. Miller
circtsdca · 1899 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199 ; Gibbs v. Crandall, 120 U. S. 106 , 7 Sup. Ct. 497; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 589 , 9 Sup. Ct. 173; City of New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 411 , 14 Sup. Ct. 905.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Gold-Washing and Water Company
v.
Keyes
19-5071.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Jan 28, 1878.
96 U.S. 199
Mr. S. M. Wilson for the plaintiffs in error., Mr. Montgomery Blair, contra.
Bradley, Waite.
to ' use the channels óf Bear River and its tributaries as a place of deposit for their said tailings

Lead Opinion

Me. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion .of the court.

It is well settled that in the courts of the United States the special facts necessary for jurisdiction must in some form appear in the record of every suit, and that the right of removal from the State courts to the United States courts is statutory. A suit commenced in a State court must remain there until cause is shown under some act of Congress for its transfer. The record in the State court, which includes the petition for removal, should be in such a condition when the removal takes place as to show jurisdiction in the court to which it goes. If it is ñot, and the omission is not afterwards supplied, the suit must be remanded'.

The attempt to transfer this cause was made under that part of sect. 2 of the act of 1875 which provides for the removal of suits “ arising under the Constitution or laws of the United. States." In the language of Chief Justice Marshall, a case “ may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States whenever its correct decision depends upon the construction of either ” ( Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 379); or when “ the title or right set up by the party may be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or law of the United' States, or sustained by the opposite construction ” (Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 9 id. 822).

The question of jurisdiction was submitted to the Circuit Court, upon the record sent from the State court. Upon the[*202] pleadings alone, it is clear the defendants - had not brought themselves within the statute. The complaint simply set forth the ownership by Keyes of his property, and the acts of the'de-fendants which, it was claimed, created a private nuisance. -No rights were asserted under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and nothing was stated from which it could in any manner be inferredthat the defendants sought to justify the acts complained of by reason of any such.authority. The defendants, in their demurrer, which set forth specifically the grounds relied upon, presented no question of Federal law. The validity of the judgment of the Circuit Court, therefore, depends upon the sufficiency of the facts set forth in the.petition for removal.

For the purposes of the transfer of a- -cause, the petition for removal, which the statute requires, performs the office of pleading. Upon its statements; in connection with the other parts of the record, the courts mitet act in 'declaring the law upon - the question it presents. It should, therefore, set forth the essential facts, not otherwise appearing in the case, which the law has made conditions precedent to the change of jurisdiction. If it fails in this, it is defective in substance, and must be treated accordingly. Thus, in Insurance Company v. Pechner (95 U. S. 183), we decided that a petition for removal, oh account of the citizenship of the parties, did not divest the State court of its power to proceed; because, when taken in connection with the pleadings and process in the cause, it failed to show such citizenship at the time of the commencement of the action as would give the Circuit Court jurisdiction. And in Amory v. Amory (id. 186) we held to-the same effect in reference to a petition which failed to set forth the personal citizen-, ship of the parties.-

The office of pleading is to-state facts, not conclusions of law. It is the duty of the court to declare the conclusions, and of the parties to state the premises.

In this petition, the defendants set forth their ownership, by title derived under the laws of the" United States, of certain valuable, mines that can only be worked by the hydraulic process,-. which necessarily requires the use of the channels of the river and .its tributaries in -the manner complained of; and they allege that they claim th$ right to this use under the provisions[*203] of certain specified acts of Congress; They also allege that the action arises under, and that its determination will necessarily, involve and require the' construction of, the laws of the United States specifically'enumerated, as well as the pre-emption laws, i They state no facts to- show the right they claim, or to enable the court to see whether it necessarily depends upon the construction of the statutes.

Certainly, 'an answer or plea, containing only the statements of the petition, would not be sufficient for the presentation of a defence to the action' under the provisions of the statutes relied, upon. The1 immunities of the statutes are, in effect, conclusions of law from the existence of particular facts. Protection is not afforded to all under all circumstances. In pleading the statute, therefore, the facts must be stated which call it into operation. The averment that it is in operation will not be enough;'for that is the precise question the court is'called upon, to determine.

The statutes referred to contain many provisions; but the particular provision relied upon is nowhere indicated. Á cause cannot be removed from a State court simply because, in the progress of the litigation, it may become necessary to give a construction to the Constitution or laws of the United States. The decision of the case must depend upon that construction. The suit must, in part at least, arise out of a controversy be-' tween the parties in regard to the operation and effect of the Constitution or laws upon the facts involved. That this was the intention of Congress is apparent, from sect; 5 of the act of 1875, which requires the Circuit Court to'dismiss the cause, or remand it to the State court, if .it shall- appear, “ at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really or substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said Circuit .Court'”

Before, therefore, a circuit court can be required to retain a cause under this jurisdiction, it'must in some form appear upon the record, by a: statement of facts, “ in legal and logical form,” such as is required in good pleading (1 Chit. Pl. 213), that the suit is one which “ really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy ” as to a right which depends upon the con[*204] struction or effect of the Constitution, or some law Or treaty of the United States. If these facts sufficiently appear in the pleadings, the petition for removal need not restate them; but, if they do not, the omission must be supplied in some form, either by the petition or otherwise. Under the application of this rule, we think that the record in this case is insufficient, and that the Circuit Court did not err in remanding the cause.

The act of 1875 has made some radical changes in the law regulating removals. Important questions of practice are likely to arise under it, which, until the statute has been longer in operation, it will not be easy to decide in advance, For the present, therefore, we think it best to confine ourselves to the determination of the precise question presented in any particular case, and not to anticipate any that may arise in the future. Under these circumstances, the present case is not to be considered as conclusive upon any question except the one directly involved and decided.

Judgment affirmed.

Dissent

•Mb. Justice Bradley,

dissenting.

The question intended to be raised in this case is, whether the grants made by the United States of placer mines, as such, involve the right to discharge the refuse earth and gravel produced by working said mines, called “ tailings,” into the neighboring streams, in this case Bear River, inasmuch as the mines cannot be worked except by means of a discharge of the streams of water loaded with such refuse. This question depends upon' the construction of the titles given by the United States. When the government determined to sell mining property as such, and placer mines eo nomine, did it, or did it not, intend to confer a, right of working them in the only way in which they could be worked ? It seems to me that the question is clearly raised by the’ allegations of the petition in this case; and the claim of, the right is clearly made. Whether it can be maintained as against the occupants of inferior lands in the vallej^s which may be injured thereby is another question, not now before us. I think the parties were entitled to a removal of the cause.