State v. Hinojosa (N.D. 2011). · Go Syfert
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State v. Hinojosa (N.D. 2011). Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: State v. Pulkrabek (nd, 2022-08-04)
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011 2018 2026
Under fire — who is questioning this case
Citations from separate opinions of courts that could overrule this case. This is a warning signal, not a treatment change. The flag color above is unaffected.
Concurrence State v. Watson (2019)
“State v. Hinojosa , 2011 ND 116 , ¶ 7, 798 N.W.2d 634 . [¶46] Section 29-19-02, N.D.C.C., authorizes the district court to allow a trial to begin later than 90 days after the arraignment for good cause.”
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Pulkrabek
N.D. · 2022 · confidence medium
Id.; Hinojosa, 2011 ND 116, ¶¶ 8, 10 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Pulkrabek
N.D. · 2022 · confidence medium
Id.; Hinojosa, 2011 ND 116, ¶¶ 8, 10 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lafromboise
N.D. · 2021 · confidence medium
Although differences exist between treatment of speedy trial demands and demands for disposition of detainers, we have referred to both with the label “speedy trial.” See State v. Mondragon, 2020 ND 21, ¶ 29 , 937 N.W.2d 531 (referring to “a 90 day statutory right to a speedy trial under N.D.C.C. § 29-33-03”); Hinojosa, 2011 ND 116, ¶ 7 (The Detainers Act “requires pending charges against an incarcerated prisoner be tried within 90 days of the court’s receipt of a request for speedy trial or be dismissed with prejudice,” but “the statute also allows the court, in its discret…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Watson (2×)
N.D. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hinojosa , 2011 ND 116 , ¶ 9, 798 N.W.2d 634 (in Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act case, delay of 54 days was not excessive given the severity of the drug delivery offense); Moore , at ¶ 7 (in another Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act case, delay of 38 days was minimal for the severity of the burglary, theft and criminal mischief offenses). [¶31] Here, the district court granted the continuances based on the unavailability of the primary witness.
discussed Cited "see" Hinojosa v. State
N.D. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hinojosa , 2011 ND 116, ¶¶ 1, 13, 21 , 798 N.W.2d 634 (affirming conviction; holding trial court did not abuse discretion in continuing trial beyond 90-day limit of Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainees Act and evidence was sufficient to support conviction).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
State
v.
Hinojosa
20100218.
North Dakota Supreme Court.
Jun 21, 2011.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

Filed 6/21/11 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2011 ND 102

In the Interest of C.L., a minor child

Natalie Anderson, Petitioner and Appellee

v.

C.L., minor child,

C.K., Mother,

C.L., Father,

Guardian Ad Litem Barb Oliger;

and the Executive Director of

Human Services Department of ND, Respondents

C.L., Father, Appellant

No. 20110111

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable Donald L. Jorgensen, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Bryan D. Denham (on brief), Assistant State’s Attorney, Courthouse, 514 East Thayer Avenue, Bismarck, N.D. 58501, for petitioner and appellee.

Kent M. Morrow (on brief), 411 North Fourth Street, P.O. Box 2155, Bismarck, N.D. 58502-2155, for appellant.

Interest of C.L.

No. 20110111

Per Curiam.

[¶1] C.L., father of the minor C.L., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights.  C.L. argues the juvenile court made insufficient findings and improperly considered excluded evidence.  The district court found that the minor C.L. was deprived and that he had been in foster care for over six hundred consecutive days.  These findings are not clearly erroneous, and we summarily affirm the district court’s judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).   See In re L.J. , 2007 ND 74, ¶ 2, 734 N.W.2d 342 (“a court may terminate parental rights solely on a finding of (1) deprivation and (2) that the child has been in foster care . . . for at least four hundred fifty out of the previous six hundred sixty nights”) (quotations omitted).

[¶2] Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Dale V. Sandstrom

Daniel J. Crothers

Mary Muehlen Maring

Carol Ronning Kapsner