Eakes v. South Dakota, 414 U.S. 1017 (1973). · Go Syfert
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Eakes v. South Dakota, 414 U.S. 1017 (1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
30 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hajro v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (cand, 2011-10-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see" Hajro v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services
N.D. Cal. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Docket No. 47 at 13-14 (citing Commonwealth of Pa. v. United States, 361 F.Supp. 208 (M.D.Pa.1973), aff'd per curiam, 414 U.S. 1017 , 94 S.Ct. 440 , 38 L.Ed.2d 310 (1973) (mem.)). .
discussed Cited "see" Richard A. Batterton, Secretary of Employment & Social Services of the State of Maryland v. F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor
D.C. Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. United States, 361 F.Supp. 208, 221 (M.D.Pa.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1017 , 94 S.Ct. 440 , 38 L.Ed.2d 310 (1973) (unlike criteria in Pharmaceutical Mfrs.
cited Cited "see" People of the State of Illinois v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, Intervening
7th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. United States, 361 F.Supp. 208 (M.D.Pa.), aff’d, 414 U.S. 1017 , 94 S.Ct. 440 , 38 L.Ed.2d 310 (1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Woodland Private Study Group v. State (2×)
N.J. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
Some courts have phrased the question, in part, in terms of whether the action “substantially affects the rights of those over whom the agency exercises authority.” Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C.Cir.1974); see also Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. United States, 361 F.Supp. 208 (M.D.Pa.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1017 , 94 S.Ct. 440 , 38 L.Ed.2d 310 (1973) (since law on discontinuance of carrier service has not been substantively changed, APA procedures are not required).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Eakes
v.
South Dakota
No. 73-270.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 12, 1973.
414 U.S. 1017
Amendments, Being, Brennan, Certiorari, Conviction, Douglas, Fourteenth, Marshall, Prohibited, Regulation, Slaton, Stewart, Theatre, Whom.
Published

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U. S. 115[*1018] (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496 (1973); and Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U. S. 836 (1973).

Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that state obscenity regulation is prohibited by the Fourteenth and First Amendments (see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70 (Douglas, J., dissenting))., would grant certiorari in this case and reverse the judgment of conviction.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,

dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted on charges of possessing with intent to exhibit an obscene film in violation of S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-2L-12 (Supp. 1973), which provides as follows:

“Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, by any means, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state, prepares, writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, offers to sell, keeps for sale, exhibits, makes, distributes, offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute, or to exhibit or to offer to exhibit, any obscene matter, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Obscenity for purposes of § 22-24-12 is defined by § 22-24-11 (1) as

“that which, by contemporary standards as hereinafter set forth, considered as a whole, has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to prurient interest.”

It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribu[*1019] tion to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 22-24-12, in conjunction with § 22-24-11 (1), is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with my dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the questions presented in the petition merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).