cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Garland Arnoldt, United States of America v. Garland Arnoldt, A/K/A Shagg Id. 111 S.Ct. at 791-93.

discussed Cited "see" United States v. Mozella Baskin-Bey and Doris Groth See United States v. Kucik, 909 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1070 , 111 S.Ct. 791 , 112 L.Ed.2d 853 (1991) (holding that defendant may not implicitly agree to government’s request to exclude time and later ask to count time against speedy trial calculation).

discussed Cited "see" United States v. Scott David Lattany (2×) See United States v. Kucik, 909 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir.1990) (where defendant actively participates in obtaining continuance, he may not rely on that period to support dismissal), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 791 , 112 L.Ed.2d 853 (1991). 103 Nevertheless, we strongly urge district courts hereafter not to wait and rely on counsel to inform them when defendants are ready to go to trial, but instead to set deadlines.

discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Oberoi Id. at 360-61; see also United States v. Kucik, 909 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir.1990) (“Where a defendant actively participates in a continuance ... he cannot then ‘sand-bag’ the court and the government by counting that time in a speedy trial motion”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1070 , 111 S.Ct. 791 , 112 L.Ed.2d 853 (1991); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 434-35 (1st Cir.1984) (exception necessary to prevent defendants from “working] both sides of the street, lulling the court and prosecution into a false sense of security only to turn around later and use the waiver-induced leisure…