discussed Cited "see" Sepulveda v. United States However, the Hill Court specifically held that where the collateral challenge is to a plea of guilty rather than a trial verdict, the “prejudice” prong requires the petitioner to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id.; see Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Hill), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1058 , 116 S.Ct. 734 , 133 L.Ed.2d 684 (1996).

discussed Cited "see" Brown v. United States In Hill , the Supreme Court held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea is subject to the same standard of attorney competence set forth in the first prong of the Strickland test, and that in order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366 ; see Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1058 , 116 S.Ct. 734 , 133 …

cited Cited "see" State v. Ross See Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 116-17 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 116 S.Ct. 734 , 133 L.Ed.2d 684 (1996).

cited Cited "see" State v. Ross See Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 734 (1996).