Michael Stapleton Assocs., Ltd v. United States (Fed. Cl. 2022). · Go Syfert
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Michael Stapleton Associates, Ltd
v.
United States
22-573.
United States Court of Federal Claims.
Nov 30, 2022.
Ryan T. Holte.
Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 21%
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
Nos. 22-573, 22-620, 22-630
(Filed: 30 November 2022 *)

***************************************
MICHAEL STAPLETON ASSOCIATES, *
LTD, *
*
Plaintiff, *
*
v. * No. 22-573 * THE UNITED STATES, * Pre-Award Bid Protest; Organizational * Conflict of Interest; Mail; USPS; Defendant, * Resolicitation; Bid Protest; Patent * Ambiguities; Injunctive Relief; Arbitrary and * and Capricious; APA Rational Basis. * AMERICAN K-9 DETECTION * SERVICES, LLC, * * Defendant-Intervenor. * * *************************************** *************************************** GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION SERVICES, * LLC, * * Plaintiff, * * v. * No. 22-620 * THE UNITED STATES, * * Defendant. * * *************************************** *************************************** AMERICAN K-9 DETECTION * SERVICES, LLC, *

*
This opinion was originally filed under seal on 23 November 2022 pursuant to the protective order in this case. The Court provided the parties an opportunity to review this opinion for any proprietary, confidential, or other protected information and submit proposed redactions by 30 November 2022. The USPS, MSA, and GK9 proposed redactions on 30 November 2022. The Court accepts the parties’ proposed redactions and reissues the order, with a few minor, non-substantive corrections and redacted language replaced as follows: “[XXXXX].”

*
Plaintiff, *
*
v. * No. 22-630 * THE UNITED STATES, * * Defendant. * * ***************************************

Daniel J. Strouse, of Cordatis LLP, with whom was Joshua D. Schnell, both of Arlington, VA, for plaintiff American K-9 Detection Services, LLC.

W. Brad English, of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC, with whom were Jon D. Levin, Emily J. Chancey, Mary Ann Hanke, and Nicholas P. Greer, all of Huntsville, AL, for plaintiff Global K9 Protection Group, LLC.

Ryan C. Bradel, of Ward & Berry PLLC, with whom was P. Tyson Marx, both of Tysons, VA, for plaintiff Michael Stapleton Associates, Ltd.

John J. Todor, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, with whom were Reginald T. Blades Jr., Assistant Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice, and Shoshana O. Epstein, Attorney, United States Postal Service, all of Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

HOLTE, Judge.

Plaintiffs, Michael Stapleton Associates, Ltd. (“MSA”), Global K9 Protection Group, LLC (“GK9”), and American K-9 Detection Services, LLC (“AMK9”), bring three separate pre-award bid protests, consolidated on 13 June 2022, against the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) in which the USPS solicitated a contract for canine explosive detection and alarm resolution services under Solicitation No. 2B-20-A-0087. Pending before the Court are plaintiffs’ motions for judgment on the administrative record (“MJAR”), the government’s cross-MJAR, MSA’s motion for a stay or injunction pending appeal, MSA’s motion to expedite consideration of its motion for a stay or injunction pending appeal, and GK9’s and AMK9’s motions for a status conference.

For the multiple protests and remands related to this solicitation, the Court has formally issued 129 pages of opinions and orders—and USPS has written 117 pages of reports, decisions, and exhibits—documenting the potential for organizational conflicts of interest (“OCIs”) and problems with contracting. The Court continues adding to the page count, again addressing the government’s actions, the persisting OCIs, and the slew of other motions recently filed. All plaintiffs ask for injunctive relief: GK9 argues, the “USPS’s corrective action is irrational because it failed to adequately consider or evaluate MSA’s immitigable . . . OCIs that should have resulted in MSA being disqualified from the competition[,]” GK9’s MJAR at 7, ECF No. 53, while AMK9 contends, “MSA stands to potentially receive an award that USPS should prohibit MSA from receiving[,]” AMK9’s MJAR at 13, ECF No. 51. MSA previously asked the Court for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction; MSA requests the same relief here. Tr. of 21 Oct. 2022 OA on Cross-MJARs (“Tr.”) at 220:19–221:3.

[*2]

After extensive conversation at oral argument held 21 October 2022, see id., the Court determined it did “not have enough information to make [an equitable] determination.” 26 Oct. 2022 Order at 5, ECF No. 72. Accordingly, the Court issued an order “to seek USPS guidance on several reevaluation or resolicitation factors to craft an equitable remedy, if any, in [the present] order.” Id. at 2. While the Court found “the OCIs connected to the 2020 solicitations remained in the 2022 resolicitation process and are immitigable, which may prompt the need to disqualify MSA from participation in the 2022 resolicitation[,]” the Court “ask[ed] USPS to offer guidance on the prospect of resoliciting or reevaluating the 2022 resolicitation in the event the Court’s equitable remedy disqualifies MSA from participation in the 2022 resolicitation[.]” Id. at 4–5. The USPS filed two supplemental statements offering guidance and only plaintiff GK9 responded with its concerns. See Gov’t’s First Resp. to 26 Oct. 2022 Order, ECF No. 71; GK9’s Resp. to 26 Oct. 2022 Order, ECF No. 75. The Court now makes its equitable determination on the motions and generally agrees with the USPS’ proposed plans to phase-out MSA and disqualify MSA from future performance as a result of OCI-tainted solicitations.

For the following reasons, the Court grants AMK9’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, grants in part GK9’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, grants in part and denies in part the government’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, and denies MSA’s motion for judgment on the administrative record. The Court grants AMK9’s request for injunctive relief, grants in part GK9’s request for injunctive relief, and denies MSA’s request for injunctive relief. The Court has no choice but to enjoin MSA and ask the USPS to reevaluate the solicitation in a manner that does not violate its Supplying Principles and Practices. The Court finds as moot MSA’s motion for stay pending appeal, MSA’s motion to expedite, and GK9’s and AMK9’s motions for a status conference.

I. Factual Background

This case relates to another pending case before the Court, American K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020), which is a consolidated bid protest filed by disappointed offerors following the USPS’s decision to award a contract for canine explosive detection and alarm resolution services to MSA. See Notice of Directly Related Case, ECF No. 7; Compl. (“2020 Compl.”), ECF No. 1, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020); Order, ECF No. 59, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 21, 2021) (consolidating cases).

A. Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program Following the September 11th attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (“9/11 Commission”) issued a federal mandate to the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) requiring “100% screening of all air cargo on passenger airlines by 2020.” Admin. R. at 3 (USPS Supply Management Competitive Purchase Plan), ECF No. 23-2 (“2020 AR”), Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (“The Administrator of the [TSA] shall provide for the screening of all passengers and property, including United States mail, . . . that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft . . . .”). The USPS “is held to this mandate by the TSA/[Federal Aviation Administration] regulations under the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program . . . , which includes mail over sixteen (16) ounces, Military Mail, [and] registered mail[.]” 2020 AR at 3. Currently, local law enforcement, funded by the TSA, provides screening of mail delivered on airplanes. Id. at 4. Under this system, the USPS has “little, to no, oversight or ability to manage the screenings or the locations as the program is run directly by the TSA.” Id.

[*3]

To grant the USPS control over the package screening process and facilitate development of a program expanding the number of sites with screening capabilities, TSA is currently developing a policy to relieve TSA from package screening and “require the shift of the explosives detection screening to [the USPS].” Id. TSA has “regulatory authority under 49 CFR [§ 5144] . . . to modify the procedures for air cargo security[,] [a]nd using that regulatory authority for the purposes of this new contract, the [Third-Party Canine-Cargo (‘3PK9’ or 3PK9-C’)] program, for [the USPS] to conduct screening, part of that authority has set up procedures by which it would have the screening be permitted so that it could be part of the same overall screening process that goes onto airlines.” Tr. of 8 Feb. 2021 OA on Cross-MJARs (“2021 OA Tr.”) at 111:9–17 (quoting the government), ECF No. 44, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020).

B. The USPS Pilot Program

In 2019, the USPS developed a pilot program to test the 3PK9-C program to conduct screening for mail weighing more than 16 ounces for transport via air carriers at Phoenix Sky Harbor airport. 2020 AR at 1899–1901 (2–11 February 2021 Supplier Disagreement Resolution Official Questions to the Unites States Postal Inspection Serive (“USPIS”), and their responses via email), ECF No. 62-4, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020), 812 (USPS Supplier Disagreement Resolution No. SDR-21-CS-001), ECF No. 62-3, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020). The USPS conducted this pilot program jointly with MSA for three months through a noncompetitive (nonformal) contract to MSA. See id. at 816. On completion of the program, the USPIS distributed a presentation to airlines. 2020 AR at 1906–36. The 6 July 2020 presentation was entitled “USPIS-3PK9 Mail Daily Best Practices—Airlines.” Id. MSA was featured heavily in the presentation. Id. The USPIS Playbook sent to airlines did not identify any other TSA-certified 3PK9-C vendors, even though the USPS was aware other such companies existed, 2020 AR at 6–7 (USPS Supply Management Competitive Purchase Plan), ECF No. 23-2, Am. K- 9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020), such as GK9, which has provided the same or similar services to all major airlines and at all major airports for several years. Id. at 988 (GK9 Proposal Cover Letter).

[*4]

MSA’s role with the USPS program did not end with the pilot program. After the pilot program, MSA continued to consult with the USPS to develop the 3PK9 program. 2020 AR at 3678 (Contracting Officer (“CO”) Franklin’s Decision Following Second Remand), ECF No. 125-5, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020). After the pilot program, the USPS did not execute a formal contract with MSA for the consulting work. Id. Without a formal contract, the USPS did not include OCI restrictions or expectations for MSA. Id. Until at least July of 2020, MSA actively assisted the USPS in designing the entire USPS 3PK9 mail screening program, including preparing “internal quality control audit documents, program fundamentals documents, and what appears to be fairly extensive work on the playbook.” Id. The USPS described MSA as being “instrumental in program development[,]” essentially working as a consultant to develop the program as a whole. Id. MSA was “heavily involved in the designing of processes and procedures for the USPIS 3PK9 program.” Id. at 3682.

As it consulted with the USPS, MSA understood the USPS planned to enter a noncompetitive contract with MSA for expanded 3PK9 services across the country. 2020 AR at 3679. In its consulting role, MSA obtained a list of intended USPS locations, mail volumes, and required hours. Id. at 3678. Further, “concepts that MSA appears to have assisted the USPIS with developing appear in the [2020 Statement of Work (“SOW”)], including quality control concepts.” Id. at 3679–80.

On 14 August 2020, the USPS issued a request for information (“RFI”) inviting “vendors in the marketplace to register their interest in providing services to the USPS should the USPS decide to develop the [3PK9-C] program.” Id. at 24 (RFI). The RFI was sent to seven potential offerors “from TSA’s list of SAFETY Act certified and in-process SAFETY Act certified organizations[.]” Id. at 6–7 (USPS Supply Management Competitive Purchase Plan). In the RFI, the USPS stated it was “peppering the market” regarding the “potential and ability” for suppliers to “provide the USPS with the canines and program management necessary, should the USPS invest in and develop a 3PK9-C program to screen cargo and mail being transported on domestic and international passenger commercial air carriers on a nationwide basis.” Id. at 24 (RFI). If the 3PK9-C program were to be developed, the RFI stated the USPS would need “an Alarm Resolution protocol for instances when a canine alerts to a mail piece,” among other “detection, analysis, and interpretation technology” services. 2020 AR at 24. Anticipating its need for alarm resolution services, the RFI inquired about offerors’ “capabilities around Alarm Resolution” and “procedure for clearing Alarms[.]” Id. at 25.

The USPS’s Competitive Purchase Plan (“CPP”) explained its need for mail screening and resolution services. Id. at 3–4 (USPS Supply Management CPP). “Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic,” Air Transportation Operations predicted “a package shift in the global network of air carriers[,]” resulting in “a Peak Season shortfall on [the USPS]’s planned capacity with FedEx.” Id. at 3. The CPP described a preference for offerors who “have SAFETY Act certified technology and processes to provide Real-Time X-Ray analysis and interpretation by trained bomb technicians for alarm resolution[.]” Id. at 7. The government acknowledged requiring SAFETY Act certification would limit the number of offerors who could submit responsive proposals but determined “this will not preclude diversity in the types and sizes of offerors.” Id. The CPP reiterated such a contract “will allow [the USPS] to control the [mail] screening process[.]” Id. at 4.

[*5]

Although the USPS and MSA collaborated with the expectation MSA would receive a noncompetitive award, 2020 AR at 3678–79, other companies could compete (which several iterations of the USPS purchasing plans have subsequently acknowledged), and, with external pressure (i.e. the Alabama legislature, see Tr. at 123:20–124:19, ECF No. 74), the USPS held a competition. The USPS issued a solicitation in September of 2020 (“2020 solicitation”). Id. at 53–151 (2020 SOW, 2020 Solicitation Instructions and Evaluation Criteria, and 2020 Solicitation).

C. The Solicitation

On 22 September 2020, the USPS issued Solicitation No. 2B-20-A-0087 for “the procurement of Third-Party Canine-Mail Screening with Real-Time X-ray Analysis [and] Interpretation.” Id. at 118 (2020 Solicitation). The solicitation contemplated “a four-year base period award with two two-year renewal options.” Id. at 97 (2020 SOW). The pricing method for the contract contemplated: (1) a contract for 3PK9-C services; (2) a contract for alarm resolution services; or (3) a combined contract for both 3PK9-C services and alarm resolution. Id. The USPS specifically sought service contracts which included:

1. The services of a TSA-approved [3PK9-C teams] explosive detection canine team offeror to screen Priority Mail and mail weighing 16 ounces or greater transported on domestic and international passenger commercial air carriers on a nationwide basis. The offeror shall have the capability for 3PK9-C teams to respond at the request of a USPIS Postal Inspector on a nationwide basis . . . for investigative and preventative call-outs. [2]. Alarm Resolution protocols for instances when a canine alerts to a mail piece. [the USPS] requires a combined comprehensive improvised explosive device (IED) screening, detection, analysis and interpretation solution which includes technology used in conjunction with [the USPS] or air transportation offerors’ (air carriers) owned x-ray screening machines to facilitate remote alarm resolution analysis by FBI Hazardous Device School (HDS) or Naval School Explosive Ordinance Disposal (NAVSCOLEOD) certified bomb technicians.

Id. at 96–97.

Offerors would be evaluated under three factors: (1) capability (explosive detection canines (“EDC”) service); (2) capability (alarm resolution); and (3) past performance. 2020 AR at 112–13. The government instructed offerors to “respond to the evaluation factors that are only relevant to what they plan on bidding on (Evaluation Factor One or Evaluation Factor Two) in addition to Evaluation Factor Three, which all bidders must respond to.” Id. at 77 (2020 Solicitation Instructions and Evaluation Criteria). Under the first capability factor, EDC service, an offeror would be evaluated on its “ability to provide canine handler resources[,]” “ability to meet the required or proposed delivery schedules[,]” “management and staffing plan[,]” and its “ability to obtain the necessary certifications and security badges required at each location” “relative to the SAFETY Act . . . and Certificate of SAFETY Act Designation.” Id. at 78. The second capability factor, alarm resolution, would consider the “offeror’s alarm resolution plan,” the “offeror’s management and staffing plan for K9s and handlers,” and the “offeror’s quality assurance and performance tracking plans.” Id. (cleaned up). The evaluation of past performance would include, but would not be limited to: “demonstrated support for the execution of canine handler teams across the U.S., including the planning and administration of such a national level program”; “proven experience in developing national level canine handler programs”; and “offeror’s national roll-out canine support experience.” Id. (cleaned up).

[*6]

The intention of the procurement was “to award one or more contracts based on a best value determination.” Id. at 56 (2020 SOW), 96 (2020 Solicitation). The solicitation evaluation criteria noted the USPS’s “strong preference for awarding one award that will encompass all as [sic] requirements of the SOW[,]” although the USPS was “willing to consider multiple awards, if that were determined to provide best value.” 2020 AR at 113 (2020 Solicitation Instructions and Evaluation Criteria). First, the USPS would “make a preliminary best value decision among offerors who have proposed on the entire scope of work”; then, if satisfied with its first best value determination, the USPS would “proceed to award without further best value considerations.” Id. In making its best value determination, the USPS would consider “whether pricing is reasonable compared to internal cost estimates and whether it is satisfied with the overall technical abilities for the proposed awardee of the single award.” Id.

D. Contract Award

Each of the seven offerors submitted a proposal for combined 3PK9-C services and alarm resolution services, but MSA was recommended for the award as the CO determined MSA “provide[d] the best tradeoff between technical, risk, and price.” Id. at 805 (Award Recommendation). On 9 November 2020, the USPS informed AMK9 and GK9 it awarded the contract to MSA. See AMK9 2020 Am. Compl., Ex. [1] at 2 (Unsuccessful Offeror Notice), ECF No. 20-1, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020); GK9 2020 Am. and Restated Compl. at 5, ECF No. 82, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020).

E. AMK9’s Post-Award Administrative Dispute and Appeal

AMK9 filed a post-award business disagreement with the USPS on 27 November 2020, challenging the award of the contract to MSA. 2020 AR at 1976–90 (AMK9’s Post-Award Protest Before the CO). AMK9 alleged an “unreasonable and inconsistent” evaluation of its proposal and “clear [OCIs] that should have warranted MSA’s removal from consideration for award.” Id. at 1976. AMK9 further alleged the USPS used an “unstated evaluation factor” to evaluate AMK9’s proposal, assigned unreasonable weakness to AMK9’s proposal, “ignored portions of AMK9’s proposal[,]” conducted an unreasonable tradeoff analysis, and “failed to consider the [OCI].” Id. at 1981–90.

F. GK9’s Administrative Dispute and Appeal On 30 November 2020, GK9 filed a post-award business disagreement with the USPS. Id. at 1937–45 (GK9’s Post-Award Protest Before the CO). GK9 disputed USPS’s effective identification, and resolution, of an “obvious” OCI involving MSA. Id. at 1942–44. GK9 further alleged the USPS improperly evaluated technical aspects of its proposal, including aspects related to x-ray technology, the number of command center locations, past rollouts, and projected staffing to meet the rollout schedule. Id. at 1944.

[*7]

G. The USPS’s Second Pre-Award Investigation of MSA’s Potential OCI

The CO denied AMK9’s post-award business disagreement on 7 December 2020. 2020 AR at 1991–98 (CO’s Response to AMK9’s Post-Award Protest). On 17 December 2020, AMK9 appealed to the Supplier Disagreement Resolution Official (“SDRO”), who denied the appeal on 21 April 2021. Id. at 1999–2016 (AMK9’s Appeal to the SDRO), 2017–26 (SDRO’s Response to AMK9’s Appeal). The USPS CO denied GK9’s post-award business disagreement on 10 December 2020. Id. at 1946–51 (CO’s Response to GK9’s Post-Award Protest). On 17 December 2020, GK9 appealed the CO’s denial to the USPS SDRO. Id. at 1952–63 (GK9’s Appeal to the SDRO). On 13 April 2021, the SDRO denied GK9’s appeal. Id. at 1964–72 (SDRO’s Response to GK9’s Appeal).

H. American K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020)

The protesters disputed the USPS’s decision to combine several requirements into one procurement in a way that benefitted MSA, and the protestors further argued MSA had distinct advantages due to purported conflicts of interest. 2020 Compl. at 1. After briefing and oral argument, this Court twice remanded the case to the USPS to conduct a full OCI investigation. See Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614, 2021 WL 1086225 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 19, 2021); Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, 155 Fed. Cl. 248 (2021). After the second remand, the CO found MSA had OCIs involving unequal access to information and biased ground rules. See 2020 AR at 3665–84 (“CO Franklin’s Report”). The USPS took corrective action on 18 February 2022 to mitigate the OCI by shortening MSA’s contract by one year and cancelling all renewal options for the contract. Id. at 3682–83. The USPS also issued two new solicitations—one for Third-Party Canine Mail Screening (“Canine Screening”) services and one for Mail Screening Alarm Resolution (“Alarm Resolution”) services (collectively, “2022 resolicitation”). Admin. R. at 6806–6962 (Canine Screening Solicitation), ECF No. 48-4 (“2022 AR”); 2022 AR at 5877–5966 (Alarm Resolution Solicitation), ECF No. 44-5.

I. MSA’s Post-Award Business Disagreement Protest

MSA filed a business disagreement with the CO on 7 April 2022 arguing the services should remain bundled and alleging the 2022 solicitations contained patent ambiguities. See 2022 AR at 6525–34 (MSA’s Initial Disagreement), ECF No. 44-13. The CO denied MSA’s disagreement, stating the USPS learned “that a single award to one supplier was unnecessary[,]” and “separating the services would allow for more companies to compete . . . [and] this increased competition would better serve [the USPS]’s objective of obtaining best value.” Id. at 6535 (CO Baker’s Decision Letter to MSA). The CO also found MSA’s allegations of patent ambiguities in the solicitations were unfounded. Id. at 6537–38. MSA appealed the denial to the SDRO, who upheld the CO’s decision. See id. at 6597–6605 (SDRO’s Decision Letter to MSA), ECF No. 44-12.

[*8]

J. AMK9 and GK9’s Post-Award Business Disagreement Protests

Around the same time as MSA’s agency-level challenges, offerors GK9 and AMK9 submitted business disagreements; they argued the USPS’s 18 February 2022 corrective actions were insufficient because MSA was still allowed to compete despite allegedly having an unfair advantage. See 2022 AR at 6326–43 (AMK9’s Initial Business Disagreement), ECF No. 44-10, 6344–50 (GK9’s Initial Business Disagreement). The CO initially denied AMK9’s and GK9’s business disagreements. See id. at 6395–6402 (CO’s Decision Regarding AMK9’s Business Disagreement), 6403–11 (CO’s Decision Regarding GK9’s Business Disagreement). GK9 and AMK9 appealed, and the SDRO denied AMK9’s and GK9’s business disagreements in part and sustained them in part. See 2022 AR at 6412–28 (AMK9’s 2022 Appeal to the SDRO), 6455–63 (GK9’s 2022 Appeal to the SDRO), ECF No. 44-11, 6606–20 (“SDRO’s AMK9 Decision”), 6630–48 (“SDRO’s GK9 Decision”). The agency amended the 2022 resolicitation to mitigate MSA’s advantage as an incumbent but declined to exclude MSA from competing for awards under the 2022 resolicitation. Id. at 6619, 6646–47.

II. Procedural History

MSA filed this bid protest on 25 May 2022 and moved for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (“TRO”) the same day. See Compl., ECF No. 1; Pl.’s Mot. TRO & Prelim. Inj. On 25 July 2022, the Court denied MSA’s motion for a preliminary injunction and TRO. Michael Stapleton Assocs., Ltd v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 151 (2022). GK9 then filed its complaint and motion for preliminary injunction on 6 June 2022. See Compl., ECF No. 1, Global K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 22-620 (Fed. Cl. June 6, 2022); Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 5, Global K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 22-620 (Fed. Cl. June 6, 2022). The USPS responded to MSA’s preliminary injunction and TRO motion on 8 June 2022. See Def.’s Resp. Mot. TRO & Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 15. GK9 then filed a motion to withdraw its motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 38, after the parties agreed to an expedited briefing schedule on the parties’ MJARs. See id.

The Court held a status conference on 13 June 2022, in which the parties agreed to consolidate case numbers 22-620 and 22-630 with 22-573. See Order, ECF No. 17. The Court then consolidated the cases under Rule 42(a)(2) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), making this case the lead case. See Order at 2, ECF No. 19. The parties filed a joint status report (“JSR”) on 14 June 2022 in which the USPS agreed to delay its award date for the 2022 solicitations until after 30 June 2022, mooting MSA’s motion for a TRO. See JSR at 3–4, ECF No. 20. The next day, MSA filed a reply to the USPS’s response to MSA’s motion for a preliminary injunction as well as a supplemental motion for a preliminary injunction. See MSA’s Reply, ECF No. 24; MSA’s Suppl. Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 22. The USPS filed its response to MSA’s supplemental motion for preliminary injunction on 21 June 2022, see ECF No. 39, and MSA replied in support of its motion on 28 June 2022, see ECF No. 45. The Court then held oral argument on 29 June 2022. See Order, ECF No. 40.

[*9]

On 14 July 2022, AMK9, MSA, and GK9 filed their respective MJARs, ECF Nos. 51, 52, and 53. On 28 July 2022, the government filed its responses to the MJARs as well as its cross-MJAR, ECF No. 56. Subsequently, AMK9, GK9, and MSA filed their respective replies in support of their MJARs, ECF Nos. 59, 60, and 61. The government filed its reply in support of its cross-MJAR on 18 August 2022, ECF No. 62. On 9 September 2022, the USPS awarded Canine Screening contracts to MSA, AMK9, and a third-party service and the Alarm Resolution contract to MSA. See JSR, ECF No. 66.

The Court held oral argument on 21 October 2022 to address remaining pre-award challenges in relation to the cross-MJARs. [1] See 15 September 2022 Order at 1. At oral argument, the parties confirmed, for purposes of this order, their challenges are limited to pre-award protests notwithstanding the award of the contracts. See Tr. at 218:13–219:17. The Court thus limits its discussion in this case to protests challenging the terms of the USPS’s 2020 solicitation and 2022 resolicitation and does not address protests filed after the bid was awarded and contractors selected on 9 September 2022.

III. Legal Standard

A. Bid Protest Jurisdiction and APA Standard of Review

The Tucker Act grants this Court jurisdiction to “render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). To be an “interested party,” a protestor must show it is an “actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 907 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3551(2)(A)).

In rendering such judgment, courts “review the agency’s decision pursuant to the standards set forth in section 706 of title 5 [of the Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’)].” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4); see also Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 2 “Among the various APA standards of review in section

1 On 8 March 2022, the CO noted in his remand investigation analysis he conducted “a much more thorough review of the potential OCI” of Christopher Shelton, who served as the Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge of the TSA Canine Training Center before working at MSA, and concluded no OCI existed. 2020 AR at 1869 (CO Decision After Remand). At oral argument, the parties agreed they were no longer arguing about Mr. Shelton. Tr. at 19:19–20:12. 2 MSA previously argued the Court has jurisdiction under the APA according to Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See 2021 OA Tr. at 14:24–16:25. MSA now agrees this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act. See MSA’s Post-Award Cross-MJAR at 13, ECF No. 94, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020); Tr. of 22 June 2021 OA on Cross-MJARs at 81:15–17 (counsel for MSA agreeing MSA “no longer suggests the Scanwell jurisdiction[.]”), ECF No. 104, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020). As stated in the

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706, the proper standard to be applied in bid protest cases is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A): a reviewing court shall set aside the agency action if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Under this standard, “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). “Courts have found an agency’s decision to be arbitrary and capricious when the agency ‘entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [the decision] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43). “The arbitrary and capricious standard applicable here is highly deferential” and “requires a reviewing court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Advanced Data Concepts, 216 F.3d at 1058 (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)).

B. Judgment on the Administrative Record in a Bid Protest

“RCFC 52.1(c) provides for judgment on the administrative record.” Huntsville Times Co. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 100, 104 (2011) (Bush, J.); see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Rule 52.1(c) was “designed to provide for trial on a paper record, allowing fact-finding by the trial court.” Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1356.

This Court may set aside a contract award if: “(1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis; or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.” Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1332. “[D]e minimis errors do not require the overturning of an award.” Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted). “De minimis errors are those that are so insignificant when considered against the solicitation as a whole that they can safely be ignored and the main purposes of the contemplated contract will not be affected if they are.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Andersen Consulting v. United States, 959 F.2d 929, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). A bid protest plaintiff must establish alleged “errors in the procurement process significantly prejudiced” plaintiff by showing “there was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the contract award but for the errors[.]” Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1353 (quoting Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).

Moreover, “to prevail in a protest the protester must show not only a significant error in the procurement process, but also that the error prejudiced it.” Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, “a protester must demonstrate that but for the alleged error, there was a substantial chance that it would receive an award.” Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (cleaned up).

Court’s first remand order, “jurisdiction in this USPS bid protest [is] pursuant to the Tucker Act as amended by the [Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996], which ‘subsumed’ Scanwell APA jurisdiction.” Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, No. 20-1614, 2021 WL 1086225, at[*11] (Fed. Cl. Mar. 19, 2021) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1)).

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C. Organizational Conflict of Interest

Application of 5 U.S.C. § 706 to OCI investigations enables courts to determine whether an agency’s assessment lacked a rational basis. Courts deem an agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious when the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [the decision] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. Application of 5 U.S.C. § 706 does not substitute a court’s judgment for the agency’s judgment. Id.

Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) Subpart 9.5 governs OCIs in federal procurements. See FAR Subpart 9.5. Under FAR 2.101, an OCI is a situation where “a person is unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to the Government, or the person’s objectivity in performing the contract work is or might be otherwise impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage.” FAR 2.101. Contracting officers are required to “[i]dentify and evaluate potential [OCIs] as early in the acquisition process as possible” and “[a]void, neutralize, or mitigate significant potential conflicts before contract award.” FAR 9.504(a). There are three situations leading to an OCI: “biased ground rules,” “unequal access to information,” and “impaired objectivity.” ARINC Eng’g Servs., LLC v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 196, 202 (2007) (Allegra, J.) (citations omitted).

Congress specified “no Federal law dealing with public or Federal contracts [or] property . . . shall apply to the exercise of the powers of the [USPS].” 39 U.S.C. § 410(a). Neither the Competition in Contracting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3553, nor the FAR are identified as applying to the USPS. See id.; see also Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1071, 1079 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2001). There are a number of laws governing purchasing and material management at the USPS: “Some of those laws are mandated in 39 CFR either as enacted or since amended, and others are applied to the [USPS] by its own terms.” Supplying Principles and Practices (“SP&Ps”) § 7-7. To supplement the USPS’s purchasing regulations contained in 39 C.F.R. Part 601, “[t]he Supplying Principles [of the SP&Ps] are the overarching business principles which the [USPS] will follow in its [supply chain management] efforts” by its own terms. The USPS, Introduction to the Postal Service Supplying Principles and Practices (Rev. Sept. [1], 2022). “It is the policy of the [USPS] and in the interest of suppliers to resolve supplier business disagreements at the contracting officer . . . level.” SP&Ps § 7-4.

“This court will not overturn a contracting officer’s determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law.” PAI Corp. v. United States, 614 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “To demonstrate that such a determination is arbitrary or capricious, a protester must identify ‘hard facts’; a mere inference or suspicion of an actual or apparent conflict is not enough.” Id. (citing C.A.C.I., Inc.-Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Filtration Dev. Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 371, 380 (2004) (holding the disappointed bidder failed to provide “any factual basis” to establish the existence of an OCI)).

- 12 - “Hard facts” and “concreteness” are necessary to show a CO’s OCI determination lacked a rational basis under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard; “sufficient alignment of interests[,]” “vague allegations[,]” and “mere suspicion and innuendo” are not enough. Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 645 F.3d 1377, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Hard facts do not need to show an actual conflict—a potential conflict can be sufficient.” Id. at 1387 (cleaned up). Mitigation actions contemplated by the SP&Ps “may include, but are not limited to”: (a) developing a solicitation provision restricting competition to offerors without conflicts of interest, (b) including a contract clause limiting the supplier’s eligibility for future contracts and subcontracts, and (c) the adoption of other measures to ensure as fair a competition as possible. Any limit on future contracts must be for a reasonable period sufficient to avoid unfair competitive advantage or potential bias. SP&Ps 7-15.2.1. The SP&Ps further guide: If it becomes apparent when proposals are received that participation by a particular offeror could lead to an [OCI] and unfair competition, the offeror may be disqualified and its proposal rejected. The [CO] may take actions necessary and in the interest of the [USPS] and the offerors, to avoid, neutralize or mitigate the potential or apparent conflict of interest. Id. “A CO’s post-award evaluation can clear the air of any OCI taint by showing that no significant OCI existed. If, however, the CO’s post-award evaluation shows that a significant potential OCI did exist and went unmitigated . . . then serious remedial actions are appropriate.” Turner Constr. Co., 645 F.3d at 1386. D. Permanent Injunction When deciding whether a permanent injunction is warranted, a court considers: (1) whether, as it must, the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits of the case; (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the court withholds injunctive relief; (3) whether the balance of hardships to the respective parties favors the grant of injunctive relief; and (4) whether it is in the public interest to grant injunctive relief. PGBA, LLC v. United States, 389 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). IV. The Parties’ Arguments A. AMK9’s Arguments - 13 - AMK9 moves for judgment on the administrative record on four primary grounds, all supporting AMK9’s request for injunctive relief. See AMK9’s MJAR. First, the AMK9 alleges “[t]he corrective action imposed by the SDRO is not rationally related to the 2022 [r]esolicitation’s defects and does not reasonably alleviate the problem.” Id. at 13. AMK9 states, “T]he SDRO sustained AMK9’s protest finding that the procurement had a defect based on MSA’s tainted incumbent advantages[,]” but the subsequent “corrective action [taken by the USPS] does not sufficiently resolve the defects found by the SDRO.” Id. at 14–15. Second, AMK9 argues the “USPS acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law by not disqualifying MSA from the competition[,]” and “[t]he SDRO’s justification of allowing MSA to submit a proposal for the sake of ‘competition’ is irrational.” Id. at 19–20. Third, AMK9 contends the “USPS’s conclusion that MSA did not have a biased ground rules OCI . . . is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.” Id. at 25. AMK9 finds evidentiary support for this claim by asserting: (1) “MSA played a direct role in crafting documents that are part of the 2022 [r]esolicitation”; (2) “CO Baker’s finding that MSA did not have a biased rules OCI because it performed ‘development and design’ work subject to an exception under the FAR is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law”; (3) “CO Baker’s reversal of CO Franklin’s decision has no rational basis and is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law”; and (4) “CO Baker’s reliance on changes between the 2020 [s]olicitation and 2022 [r]esolicitation is insufficient to support a finding that MSA no longer has a biased ground rules OCI.” Id. at 25–30. Fourth, AMK9 considers the “USPS[’s] continued inclusion of [XXXXX] in the 2022 [r]esolicitation [to be] unreasonable.” AMK9’s MJAR at 31. AMK9 claims these actions, findings, and inclusions resulted in “irreparable harm” to the company, and “the balance of hardships and the public interest” support the Court entering an injunction. See id. at 32–34 (emphasis omitted). B. GK9’s Arguments GK9 moves for judgment on the administrative record on similar grounds to AMK9’s arguments. See GK9’s MJAR. First, GK9 contends “MSA has immitigable OCIs[,]” and the appropriate “remedy is exclusion from competition.” Id. at 9. The “USPS acknowledged that MSA worked on the development and design of the program,” and GK9 lists a multitude of alleged “entanglement[s] between USPS and MSA[,]” resulting in the “USPS: (1) adopt[ing] lessons learned from MSA; (2) ma[king] changes to the 2022 [s]olicitation [that] do not alter the most important factors; [and] (3) continu[ing] to use a substantial portion of the documents MSA developed.” GK9’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 2–4. As a result of these entanglements, GK9 purports “[t]he balance of hardships weighs in GK9’s favor[,]” and GK9 states it “will suffer irreparable harm if MSA is allowed to compete for [the] award[.]” GK9’s MJAR at 18; GK9’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 6. In addition, GK9 claims the “public’s interest in a fair competition free from OCIs” requires the Court to enter an injunction. GK9’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 6. C. MSA’s Arguments In MSA’s MJAR, MSA raises four arguments, similar to those raised in its motion for a preliminary injunction and TRO, 3 regarding the USPS’s 2022 resolicitation. See MSA’s MJAR 3 MSA moved for judgment on the administrative record on the same four grounds as its motion for a preliminary injunction and TRO. See MSA’s MJAR; MSA’s Mot. TRO & Prelim. Inj. In its motion for a preliminary injunction, MSA first asserted the USPS’s “2022 [re]solicitation w[as] arbitrary and capricious and lacked a rational - 14 - at 1. First, MSA contends the USPS’s “decision to conduct separate solicitations for 3PK9 and Alarm Resolution services was arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 30 (cleaned up). To this point, MSA indicates a lack of “evidence in the record that explains, from a technical perspective,” why the two services were unbundled. Id. at 33. Second, MSA contends that the 2022 resolicitation contains patent ambiguities. MSA’s MJAR at 35. MSA argues the 2022 resolicitation is ambiguous because it requires the 3PK9 and Alarm Resolution service providers to interact, but “provide[s] no further instruction as to expected protocols or chain of command for these required interactions.” Id. Without “further instructions and guidance,” MSA explains, “offerors will likely submit proposals that take a number of divergent approaches to screening the mail and thus make fair comparison of proposals improbable.” MSA’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 7. Third, MSA contends USPS’s mitigation strategies were inadequate both in reducing the look-back period from thirty-six to twenty-four months and treating mail and cargo screening experience equally. MSA’s MJAR at 37–41. The goal of this reduction in the look-back period was to deemphasize “the past performance MSA accrued as incumbent on the 2020 Contract[,]” MSA argues; however, this mitigation is not rational because it is not related to MSA’s past performance. Id. at 37–38. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting AR at 6647). MSA explains that it “was not performing the 2020 Contract 36 or even 24 months ago.” Id. at 39. The goal of treating mail and cargo screening experience equally was also to deemphasize MSA’s past performance for mail screening under the 2020 contract. Id. at 40. MSA argues this is not a rational mitigation strategy, because “the agency neglected to consider ‘an important aspect of the problem.’” Id. (citing Ala. Aircraft Indus. v. United States, 586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). MSA explains the quicker pace in mail screening stems from the requirement to screen more items than in a cargo operation. MSA’s MJAR at 40. MSA also explains mail and cargo screening involve different protocols and requirements for when a dog hits on a bag. Id. Fourth, MSA argues that it should not be disqualified from competition, because the USPS’s “determination that MSA is eligible is rational and well-supported by the record.” Id. at 41. MSA argues the USPS’s mitigation efforts following the unequal access to information OCI were sufficient and rational. Id. at 43. Any OCI related to past performance of the 2020 basis.” Michael Stapleton Assocs., Ltd. v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 151, 158–59 (2022). Specifically, MSA argued: “(1) the decision to unbundle the contracts for Canine Screening from the Alarm Resolution was arbitrary; (2) the 2022 [re]solicitation[] contained patent ambiguities as to how the two potential awardees would interact; (3) the decision to decrease the look-back period from thirty-six months to twenty-four months was arbitrary; and (4) the decision to consider past cargo screening experience to be equivalent to past mail screening experience was arbitrary.” Id. at 159. Regarding MSA’s contract unbundling claim, the Court reasoned “USPS provided a reasonable explanation sufficiently detailed to follow its reasoning . . . [so] MSA is unlikely to demonstrate USPS’s decision to carry out separate solicitations for Canine Screening and Alarm Resolution services was arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 162. Regarding the patent ambiguities claim, the Court found “MSA is unlikely to succeed in proving the 2022 [re]solicitation[ is] so ambiguous as to be arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 163. For MSA’s claim regarding the look-back period, the Court reasoned MSA is “unlikely to prove USPS lacks a rational basis for reducing the look-back period . . . to mitigate MSA’s purported incumbency advantage and promote fair competition.” Id. at 164. The Court further explained the “reduction in the look-back period . . . is roughly proportional to the period of MSA’s incumbency.” Id. For MSA’s cargo and mail screening equivalency claim, the Court reasoned “MSA is . . . unlikely to prove USPS’s decision to evaluate cargo screening experience and mail screening experience equivalently was arbitrary and capricious[,]” because “a reasonable method of mitigating MSA’s unfair advantage regarding mail-screening experience would be to evaluate other offerors’ cargo-screening experience equivalently.” Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 164–65. The Court ultimately held MSA’s claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits and, as a result, denied MSA’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. The Court also denied as moot MSA’s motion for a TRO. Id. at 166; see supra Section II. - 15 - contract, MSA argues, has been neutralized and therefore should not disqualify MSA’s participation in the 2022 procurements. Id. at 49. D. The Government’s Arguments The government argues three main points: (1) “the Court should deny MSA’s” MJAR; (2) “the Court should deny GK9’s and AMK9’s” MJARs; and (3) “the Court should deny plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief.” Gov’t’s Cross-MJAR & Resp. at i–ii (cleaned up).


1 Irreparable Harm To succeed on irreparable harm, a plaintiff must demonstrate “[a]bsent injunctive relief . . . it would be irreparably damaged.” Bilfinger Berger AG Sede Secondaria Italiana v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 389, 392 (2010). An irreparable injury is one for which there is no adequate legal remedy. Magellan Corp. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 446, 447 (1993) (Bruggink, J.). All parties claim irreparable harm. AMK9 and GK9 contend they have been irreparably harmed because the USPS’s actions have prevented them from “fairly competing for the contract.” AMK9’s MJAR at 32; see GK9’s MJAR at 18. GK9 specifies it “will suffer irreparable harm if MSA is allowed to compete for award under a program it built with USPS, to other bidders’ competitive detriment.” GK9’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 6. AMK9 articulates it “cannot compete fairly because it is being left to compete against MSA, an entity with tainted incumbent advantages and a continued OCI that cannot be reasonably rectified.” AMK9’s MJAR at 33. GK9 adds, absent an injunction disqualifying MSA, it will lose the opportunity to fairly compete and “enjoy the resulting benefits” of a contract award. GK9’s MJAR at 18–19. The government claims AMK9 and GK9 have not demonstrated irreparable harm because lost 21 CO Franklin originally determined “the best course of action would be for the [USPS] to end the MSA contract early[,]” so the contract now expires on 6 November 2023 instead of 6 November 2024. CO Franklin’s Report at 3682–83. 22 MSA’s request for injunctive relief is addressed infra Section IX. This section primarily addresses AMK9’s and GK9’s request for permanent injunctive relief enjoining MSA from participating in the competition. - 52 - profits from a future contract is speculative, and, as non-incumbent offerors, AMK9 and GK9 do not stand to lose any business under the current 3PK9 contract, only the possibility of the award under a new contract. Gov’t’s MJAR at 45–46. The government argues, “The only potential harm arising from this competition . . . would be lost profits from an anticipated future contract award.” Id. at 45. The government contends “lost profits” do not constitute irreparable harm to the protester, but that potential “lost savings” to the government constitute irreparable harm. 23 In its MJAR, the government highlights the USPS would potentially be harmed by injunctive relief because it would “prevent . . . operational and financial gains [from the roll-out] from progressing.” Id. at 46. MSA claims its irreparable harm “manifest[s] in the form of employee layoffs and financial hardship.” MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 9. “The Court of Federal Claims has repeatedly held that a protester suffers irreparable harm if it is deprived of the opportunity to compete fairly for a contract.” CW Gov’t Travel, Inc., v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 462, 494 (2013) (Sweeney, J.) (citing CRAssociates, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 357, 390–91 (2010) (Allegra, J.)); see also Glob. Dynamics, LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 207, 211 (2018) (Campbell-Smith, J.); Fed. Acquisition Servs. Team, LLC v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 690, 708 (2016) (Wolski, J.); Macaulay-Brown, Inc. v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 591, 606 (2016) (Firestone, J.); Akal Sec., Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 311, 319 (2009) (Hewitt, J.); Serco Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 463, 502 (2008) (Allegra, J.); Hosp. Klean of Tex., Inc., 65 Fed. Cl. at 624. Loss of profit stemming from a lost opportunity to compete on a level playing field has been found sufficient to constitute irreparable harm. United Payors & United Providers Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 323, 333 (2003) 23 Concerning irreparable injury, the 2011 MORI Associates, Inc. v. United States case similarly issued an injunction halting a procurement contract. 102 Fed. Cl. 503 (2011) (Wolski, J.). In MORI, Judge Wolski cited more than ten orders from this court and its predecessors recognizing the lost potential profits of bid protesters cannot be recovered in an action at law and thus, by their very nature, constitute irreparable injury. Id. at 552; see, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 350, 369–70 (2004) (Miller, J.); Vanguard Sec. Inc. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 90, 112 (1990) (Nettesheim, J.); Hospital Klean of Tex., Inc. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 618, 624 (2005) (Williams, J.); Cardinal Maint. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 98, 110 (2004) (Firestone, J.). Judge Wolski further distinguished an opinion in which the protester was alleging other financial harms, but not lost profits. MORI Assocs., 102 Fed. Cl. at 552; see Sierra Mil. Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 573, 582 (2003) (Merow, J.) (distinguishing cases involving lost profits because “[i]n this case, [plaintiff] will not lose business and profit on the . . . contract” and “will still have the opportunity to obtain the contract”). The defendant in MORI Associates attempted to distinguish Judge Wolski’s cited authorities as involving protests where plaintiffs were denied level playing fields, not ones in which a procurement was cancelled as was the case in MORI Associates. 102 Fed. Cl. at 552. To the extent resolicitation is necessary, Judge Wolski suggested there will always be some element of arbitrary distinction between cancelling an improper solicitation and awarding a “tainted” contract. Id. In other words, no matter the catalyst to a bid protest—an unlevel playing field or the arbitrary cancellation of a contract—the outcome is the same: the underlying contract should be canceled. See id. Judge Wolski, therefore, explained the Court of Federal Claims has found lost profits due to an arbitrary solicitation cancellation or an unequal competitive edge constitute irreparable injury. See id.; Wetsel-Oviatt Lumber Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 748, 753 (1999) (Margolis, J.). MORI Associates accordingly supports an injunction in this case, as plaintiffs here were denied a level playing field. See 102 Fed. Cl. at 552–53. A later decision by Judge Wolski, the 2018 ARxIUM, Inc. v. United States case, discussed the alternative to granting an injunction: recovery of bid preparation and litigation costs. 136 Fed. Cl. 188 (2018) (Wolski, J.). In ARxIUM, the solicitation and award were arbitrary and capricious, so an injunction was necessary because recovering bid preparation and litigation costs would not make plaintiff whole. See id. at 208. Judge Wolski explicitly held “[t]he alternative to a permanent injunction—recovery of bid preparation and litigation costs—does not redress the loss of the opportunity to compete on a level playing field for a valuable business contract.” Id. - 53 - (Margolis, J.) (citations omitted); see MORI Assocs., Inc., 102 Fed. Cl. at 552 (holding lost profits “constitute irreparable injury” because “the lost potential profits of bid protesters cannot be recovered in an action at law.”); Hawaiian Dredging Constr. Co. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 305, 317 (2004) (Miller, J.); Overstreet Elec. Co., v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 728, 744 (2000) (Allegra, J.). “The loss of the contract represents not only irreparable injury in terms of lost potential profit, but also in terms of lost experience and opportunity to work” on an important and profitable procurement. Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 218, 291 (2016) (Horn, J.), aff’d, 904 F.3d 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). When assessing irreparable injury, “[t]he relevant inquiry . . . is whether plaintiff has an adequate remedy in the absence of an injunction.” Magellan Corp., 27 Fed. Cl. at 447; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971) (noting “the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence [is] that courts of equity should not act . . . when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief”). Without an injunction, MSA will continue providing services in the near term. AMK9 and GK9, however, deserve to bid on a contract not “tainted” by OCIs. LABAT-Anderson, Inc. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 570, 582 (2005) (Hodges, J.) (“[T]here is an overriding public interest in preserving the integrity of the procurement process by requiring government officials to follow procurement statutes and regulations.”). MSA received the contract when it should have been barred from receiving it. As a result, MSA has received and will continue to receive millions of dollars. See 2020 AR at 97 (The solicitation contemplated a “four-year base period award with two two-year renewal options.”); Civil Cover Letter at 179, ECF No. 1-2 (Civil Cover Sheet noting approximate dollar amount of procurement at issue for four-year base period is $77,000,000). MSA will receive about a million dollars of additional work as a result of the “peak season” on the current contract. Tr. at 19:3–4. Absent an injunction, AMK9 and GK9 continue to lose profits from a 26-month contract worth up $154,000,000 with renewals. See 2020 AR at 97 (“The solicitation contemplated a four-year base period award with two two-year renewal options.”); Civil Cover Letter at 179 (Civil Cover Sheet noting approximate dollar amount of procurement at issue [four- year base period] is $77,000,000). With an injunction, MSA will not be able to compete for the follow-on contract—a contract MSA should not have originally been able to compete for because its “unfair competitive advantage so tainted the procurement process that the integrity of the process had been damaged.” NFK Eng’g, Inc. v. United States, 805 F.2d 372, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see supra Section VII. The Court finds, absent injunctive relief, AMK9 and GK9 will suffer irreparable harm; the second factor weighs in favor of AMK9 and GK9. See Acetris Health, LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 579, 604–05 (2018) (Sweeney, J.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 949 F.3d 719 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
2 Balance of Hardship In considering whether the third factor, balance of the hardships, a court must balance the potential harm to the plaintiff of not granting the injunction against the potential harm to both the government and the awardee should the injunction be granted. ES–KO v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 429, 435 (1999) (Bruggink, J.); see PGBA, LLC, 389 F.3d at 1228–29. The parties assert they will be harmed. AMK9 argues MSA still benefits from immitigable biased ground rules OCIs, making the solicitations unfair if an injunction is not - 54 - granted. AMK9’s MJAR at 33. GK9’s harm stems from opportunity loss “to fairly compete for a contract award and enjoy the resulting benefits . . . because of the Agency’s irrational, arbitrary, and unlawful decision-making.” GK9’s MJAR at 18–19. The USPS claims it would be harmed by injunctive relief because of the “adverse[] [e]ffect on USPS’s progress under the new solicitation.” Gov’t’s MJAR Reply at 18. MSA purports the balance of hardships warrants denial of the injunction. Mr. Shelton, an MSA employee, claims in his declaration supporting MSA’s motion for a stay or injunction pending appeal “any change over from one canine explosive detection contractor to another inherently creates risk of performance failures and also increases cost.” 24 Decl. of Chris Shelton ¶ 3. Mr. Shelton argues, “There is a certain comfort level with the mission and knowledge about the particular location that is lost every time contractors change out.” Id. ¶ 4. Mr. Shelton insinuates the balance of hardship weighs against an injunction because “[e]ach time a new company takes over inevitably it will need to create new explosive detection teams and it will take at least 60 days and possibly in excess of 90 days to get these new teams fully trained and certified to begin work.” Id. ¶ 8. In the USPS’s revised roll-out proposal, supra Section IX.A, the USPS does not mention any of the transitional issues opined on by Mr. Shelton. See Decl. of Jeremiah D. Baker. The USPS explains, “[W]e are confident that we will be able to issue replacement awards from the offers received.” Id. ¶ 9. Indeed, the USPS presented a revised roll-out schedule accounting for training timelines and providing a path to transition without any of the logistical harm raised by Mr. Shelton. See id. The USPS appeared to account for transitional issues and determined the issues MSA raised were not insurmountable; the Court can only assume the USPS knows best on this level of program detail and operational nuance. See Input/Output Tech., Inc., 44 Fed. Cl. at 72 n.9 (“[T]his court’s role is not to second guess what the [procuring agency] has determined to be its needs.”); Office Design Grp. v. United States, 951 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The harm to AMK9 and GK9 and the systemic, long-term interest in the integrity of the procurement process must be weighed against the “the harm that injunctive relief would impose on the government.” Transatlantic Lines LLC v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 48, 57 (2005) (Hodges, J.) (citing Overstreet Elec. Co., Inc., 47 Fed. Cl. at 744). AMK9 and GK9 have expended significant funds pursuing protests since November of 2020, ultimately learning their pre-award protests raised in 2020 should have resulted in MSA’s disqualification. See AMK9’s MJAR at 22. Now, two years later, AMK9 and GK9 “continue[] to have the same fight, but this time all parties know the facts MSA and USPS failed to previously disclose.” See AMK9’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 15. GK9 highlights the USPS “could have forestalled this controversy by appropriately considering OCIs.” GK9’s MJAR at 19; see, e.g., Anham FZCO v. United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 697, 724 (2019) (Campbell-Smith, J.) (“The irreparable harm plaintiff would suffer absent an injunction weighs heavily against defendant’s hardships that are, to some degree, of its own making.”). AMK9’s and GK9’s inability to fairly compete continues without injunctive relief. If injunctive relief is granted, the Court can fashion an injunctive remedy to 24 On 16 November 2022, MSA filed a motion for stay or an injunction pending appeal of the Court’s 26 October 2022. The motion was supported by a declaration by MSA’s Vice President of Air Cargo, Christopher Shelton (an employee who was voluntarily walled off in October 2019 “to avoid any possibility or appearance of a conflict of interest” due to his previous government employment). 2020 AR at 1773; See MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 21–25. - 55 - minimize the USPS’s alleged harm with de minimis interruption in the program. See supra Section IX.B. Accordingly, the harms posited by the government and MSA are outweighed by the harm to AMK9 and GK9, so the third factor favors AMK9 and GK9. See Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (articulating the exercise of “common sense, good judgment, and sound discretion” is required in both the decision on whether a significant potential conflict exists and, if it does, the development of an appropriate means for resolving it).
3 Public Interest The final factor contemplates whether an injunction serves the public interest. When “employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction,” a court “should pay particular regard for the public consequences” of doing so. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). The parties offer incompatible public interests. AMK9 claims “[t]he American taxpayer has funded an improper award for the last two years” because MSA failed to disclose the extent of the information it learned from the USPS. AMK9’s MJAR at 33. GK9 argues enhancing competition by “[r]equiring [the USPS] to remediate an organizational conflict of interest and . . . solicit bids on a level playing field” are in the public interest. GK9’s MJAR at 19. The USPS argues “progress of the new solicitations [with MSA] will serve the public interest by enabling USPS to achieve its statutory mandate of delivering the mail more efficiently and improving USPS’s financial stability.” Gov’t’s MJAR at 47. On the public interest factor, the Court first appreciates the national security implications of the USPS’s 3PK9 program and notes the initial concerns surrounding public security for the implementation of airport screening are no longer present. The Tucker Act requires the Court consider the interest of national security in its bid protest decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(3) (“In exercising jurisdiction under this subsection, the courts shall give due regard to the interests of national defense and national security . . . .”). In 2021, the government highlighted the national security concerns surrounding the solicitation, and, in fact, GK9 withdrew its motion for a preliminary injunction due to the need for new airport screenings to continue opening because of national security. See Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, 155 Fed. Cl. 248, 311 (2021) (“The Court appreciates the national security and public safety concerns the government discussed in its HSD filings and at the 16 February 2021 status conference, and the Court notes AMK9’s counsel agreed at the 16 February status conference with the validity of these concerns.”); 16 Feb. 2021 Status Conference Tr. at 60:11–15, ECF No. 47, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, Case No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020); GK9’s Mot. Withdraw Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Without Prejudice, ECF No. 38, Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. United States, Case No. 20-1614 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2020). In 2022, those same concerns are no longer present. See Tr. at 79:7 (MSA claimed it is “just here trying to help national security” while no other party raised national security issues). Given the absence of national security issues, the Court takes “the interests of national defense and national security” under consideration but finds them adequately accounted for in the 2022-2023 timeframe. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(3). The Court determines whether other public interests weigh in favor of injunctive relief. While “there is a countervailing public interest in minimizing disruption” to the procuring - 56 - agency, the USPS would be able to continue the roll-out—just without MSA. 25 See Heritage of Am., LLC v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 66, 80 (2007) (Miller, J.). Progress on the resolicitation, therefore, will not be forestalled simply because a “tainted” incumbent is barred from competing. Further, “[t]here is an overriding public interest in preserving the integrity of the procurement process by requiring government officials to follow procurement statutes and regulations.” LABAT-Anderson, Inc., 65 Fed. Cl. at 582. The Court recognizes generally the public interest is served by ensuring fair and open competition in the procurement process. Cincom Sys. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 266, 269 (1997) (Futey, J.) (citing Magellan Corp., 27 Fed. Cl. at 448). The USPS’s need for alleged cost savings does not outweigh the public’s interest in a fair competition free from conflicts of interest. The Court, accordingly, finds the fourth and final factor weighs in favor of AMK9 and GK9. See Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 586, 597 (2010), aff’d, 645 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 4. Conclusion The injunction factors favor injunctive relief for AMK9 and GK9. In addition to prevailing on the merits of the protest, AMK9 and GK9 establish they will suffer irreparable harm if the Court withholds injunctive relief. The balance of hardships tips in AMK9’s and GK9’s favor and an award of injunctive relief is in the public interest. Accordingly, the issuance of a permanent injunction is warranted. In issuing a permanent injunction, the Court tailors relief, so any harm to the government, private parties, and the public interest is minimized. See, e.g., Heritage of Am., LLC, 77 Fed. Cl. at 79. In this case, the “appearance of and potential for an unfair competitive advantage so tainted the procurement process that the integrity of the process had been damaged” and necessitates a remedy. NFK Eng’g, Inc., 805 F.2d at 375 (emphasis omitted) (finding contracting officer’s decision to disqualify low bidder for government contract based on appearance of impropriety was not irrational or unreasonable); see also Impresa Construzioni from. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “Cost savings” to the USPS do not outweigh the integrity of its solicitations. A permanent injunction will promote full and open competition in the procurement process and will preserve confidence in the fairness of government contract awards. See Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 617, 645 (2002) (noting the twin goals of preserving “public confidence and competition in the federal procurement process”); SAGAM Securite Senegal v. United States, 154 Fed. Cl. 653, 673 (2021) (“[T]he court imposes an injunction that will safeguard fundamental fairness principles”); NFK Eng’g, Inc., 805 F.2d at 379 (focused on “protect[ing] the integrity of the procurement process”). Having considered GK9 and the USPS’s recommendations as to the terms of the permanent injunction, see supra Section IX.B, the Court imposes an injunction that will safeguard fundamental fairness principles. In balancing the best value to the USPS and fairness in the procurement process, and after “giv[ing] due regard to the interests of national defense and national security” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(3), the Court grants AMK9’s and GK9’s requests for injunctive relief barring MSA from competing in the 3PK9 procurement process. See Palantir USG, Inc., 129 Fed. Cl. at 25 At oral argument, MSA commented, “I think most of the parties here also have teams that are performing work for commercial entities, such as FedEx, . . . DHL, and UPS.” Tr. at 14:6–9. GK9 confirmed it “has a significant footprint and contracts with all the airlines, so [it] ha[s] personnel in virtually every one of the[] airports . . . working on commercial contracts with the airlines.” Id. at 15:7–11. - 57 - 291 (granting the plaintiff’s request for permanent injunctive relief enjoining agency from issuing a solicitation with national security implications until making changes to the solicitation). The Court approves the government’s revised resolicitation effort espoused in the government’s 31 October response to the Court’s 26 October Order, which moves contracts awarded to non-MSA offerors to the top of the schedule to allow new sites not awarded to MSA to be implemented first. See supra Section IX.A; Decl. of Jeremiah D. Baker; Am. Decl. of Jeremiah D. Baker. While the Court approves the proposal from the USPS’s 31 October supplemental statement at this time, the Court will further evaluate the transition timeline following additional briefing. As discussed supra Section IX.B, the Court requests additional information through follow-up briefing to craft a more comprehensive reevaluation remedy timeline. Considering the USPS must repeat the evaluation, any current post-award protests appear to be moot; however, “this court’s role is not to second guess what the [procuring agency] has determined to be its needs” and defers to the agency’s determination. Input/Output Tech., Inc., 44 Fed. Cl. at 72 n.9; see Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.3d 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018). X. Whether the Court Should Grant MSA’s MJAR In its MJAR, MSA argues in regard to the 2022 resolicitation: (1) “the Agency failed to provide a rational basis for its decision to hold separate procurements”; (2) if the procurements are unbundled, there are “patent ambiguities with respect to the interaction that will be needed between the two service providers”; and (3) the agency provided “no rational basis for changing [the] technical requirements to the solicitations,” mainly the reduction of the look-back period and the equal treatment of mail and cargo screening. MSA’s MJAR at 3–4. The Court addresses the look-back period and equal treatment of mail and cargo screening separately. Additionally, MSA asserts the agency’s determination MSA is eligible to participate in the 2022 resolicitation is correct. Id. MSA asks the Court to order the USPS to combine the solicitations, or in the alternative, clarify the interaction required from the separate service providers. Id. MSA also urges the Court find the USPS had “no rational basis” for reducing the look-back period and treating mail and cargo screening equally. Id. The Court previously examined MSA’s three arguments in its decision denying MSA’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See Michael Stapleton Assocs., Ltd v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 151 (2022). MSA agrees the relief requested in its MJAR is the same as requested in its motion for a preliminary injunction. Tr. at 220:19–221:3. MSA also agrees the administrative record has not changed since the Court issued its decision denying the preliminary injunction. Id. Therefore, the Court adopts the reasoning and analysis used in its decision denying MSA’s preliminary injunction and expands on any new arguments raised by the parties. A. Whether the Government’s Decision to Unbundle the Services Was Arbitrary or Capricious MSA first argues the government’s decision to unbundle the services was arbitrary and capricious. MSA disagrees with the Court’s assessment characterizing the unbundling as “a question of subjective ability, not technical specifications.” MSA’s MJAR Reply at 4 (citing Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 161). While MSA agrees splitting “is within an agency’s discretion to change its position as to whether to bundle or separate services,” MSA - 58 - contends the unbundling of the services amounts to a technical change; under a 1997 Court of Federal Claims case, Redland, detailed infra, “the technical requirement changes must be supported by a rational basis and present in the administrative record in order for the Court to provide judicial review of the agency’s decision.” Id. at 5; see MSA’s MJAR at 31 (quoting Redland Genstar, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 220, 234 (1997)); Tr. at 222:20–25 (“[MSA]: [W]e do think that the Redland case stands for the proposition that when there has been a . . . big reversal treating similar situations differently, that the scrutiny is heightened, and that some documentation would certainly satisfy that heightened scrutiny.”). The record, according to MSA, does not contain facts allowing “the Court to review the rationality of the Agency’s decision.” MSA’s MJAR at 33. The government maintains the unbundling was rationally based and supported by the record. The government disagrees the change was a technical one and asserts “[t]he change in preference from a single supplier to separate solicitations reflected USPS’s experience under the current contract with its ability to manage the rollout and contract management, not a change in the technical specifications[.]” Gov’t’s MJAR Reply at 6. Further, the government argues the SOW does not describe the solicitations as part of a “unified process,” and, therefore, cannot be a technical change. Id. at 5. Regardless of whether the unbundling of services is a question of technical change or subjective ability, the government contends an agency must only prove a rational basis for the decision, and the record here supports the basis. See Tr. at 223:2–3 (“[THE GOVERNMENT]: Well, we think the standard is rational basis no matter what the situation.”). The Court’s reading of Redland and its application to this case has not changed since denying MSA’s motion for preliminary injunction on 25 July 2022. In Redland Genstar, Inc. v. United States, the agency changed the solicitation criteria related to technical specifications of a tangible product (i.e., changing the quality standards an offeror’s stone must meet to be eligible for a government contract), and the court in Redland required “expressed reasons for judgment.” 39 Fed. Cl. at 331. In the USPS’s solicitation here, the change was related to the number of contractors the agency could effectively manage and collaborate with to administer the 3PK9 program. Lessons Learned Consultation Email at 6593. Unbundling the services was not a technical change, as MSA asserts; the decision to unbundle the solicitations did not change the criteria of the solicitation or the quality of the services provided. The agency, accordingly, did not need “expressed reasons for judgment” but rather a rational basis for the change. See Redland Genstar, Inc., 39 Fed. Cl. at 331. Even if the USPS’s decision had technical implications, the Federal Circuit instructed in its 2001 decision in Impresa Constuzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States every government solicitation is different, and what is necessary to provide a rational basis for a change regarding technical requirements may not be necessary for the evaluation of subject services. 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Court, based on the change related to the USPS’s subjective ability to manage its mail screening program, therefore, must determine whether the record supports a rational basis for the unbundling of the solicitations. See id. To show an agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious, the plaintiff must demonstrate “either: (1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis; or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.” Id. at 1332. The rational basis test requires the Court to ask “whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable - 59 - explanation of its exercise of discretion.” Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). As a preliminary matter, MSA agreed the facts and the administrative record have not changed since the Court denied MSA’s preliminary injunction. Tr. at 220:19–221:3 (“THE COURT: . . . [H]as anything in the administrative record or any facts changed since the Court denied the preliminary injunction? [MSA]: . . . [N]o, the facts have not changed. . . . [T]he administrative record has not changed since that time.”). In denying MSA’s preliminary injunction, the Court found “MSA is unlikely to demonstrate USPS’s decision to carry out separate solicitations for Canine Screening and Alarm Services was arbitrary and capricious.” Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 162. The Court’s decision was based on the USPS’s market research, meaningful discussions with key personnel involved in the program under the 2020 contract and other senior leadership, and the USPS’s determination the alarm resolution service provider and the canine screening provider did not interact under the 2020 contract and therefore could be separated. Id. at 6–10; see Lessons Learned Consultation Email at 6592–93; Gov’t’s MJAR at 16; 2022 AR at 6537 (CO Baker’s Decision Letter to MSA), 6600–01 (SDRO’s Decision Letter to MSA). The USPS conferred with USPS stakeholders to determine whether a single supplier was necessary. Lessons Learned Consultation Email at 6594. The CO also conducted market research assess whether increased competition would save costs for the USPS. Id. at 6592–93. At the conclusion of discussions with stakeholders, analyses of market research, and conversations with internal personnel, the USPS determined logistics of the contracts, cost savings, and increased competition favored unbundling the solicitations. Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 159–62; see Lessons Learned Consultation Email at 6592–93; Gov’t’s MJAR at 16; 2022 AR at 6537 (CO Baker’s Decision Letter to MSA), 600–01 (SDRO’s Decision Letter to MSA). MSA complains the USPS “failed to consider how the split in services would affect several technical requirements of the 2022 contracts.” MSA’s MJAR at 33. The 2022 SOW does not, however, require a single process between the contracts. See Lessons Learned Consultation Email at 6592–94. Additionally, Federal Circuit precedent does not require the USPS to document the particular facts it relies upon in every decision; rather the USPS is only required to show a rational basis for its choice. See e.g., Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1332. The record here supports a rational basis for unbundling the services, as it did when the Court denied MSA’s preliminary injunction; the administrative record and facts have not changed since that time. See Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 159–62; Tr. at 220:19–221:3. The Court finds the administrative record supports a rational basis for unbundling the solicitations. See Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1332; Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 992. The USPS “provided a coherent and reasonable explanation,” and therefore the unbundling of the solicitations is not arbitrary and capricious. See Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1332; Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 992; Turner Constr. Co., 645 F.3d at 1381; Lessons Learned Consultation Email at 6592–93; 2022 AR at 6537 (CO Baker’s Decision Letter to MSA), 600–01 (SDRO’s Decision Letter to MSA). B. Whether the 2022 Resolicitation Contains Patent Ambiguities MSA contends if the 2022 resolicitation remains unbundled, the resolicitation contains patent ambiguities. Repeating its argument in support of its preliminary injunction, MSA again argues the 2022 resolicitation is ambiguous because it requires the 3PK9 and alarm resolution service providers interact, but “provide[s] no further instruction as to expected protocols or chain of command for these required interactions.” MSA’s MJAR at 35; see Michael Stapleton - 60 - Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 162. While MSA agrees with the Court concerning the agency’s responsibility to resolve disputes “after the awards have been made,” MSA argues the 2022 resolicitation does not “provide the offerors with much guidance in how to structure and present their offers to the Agency.” MSA’s MJAR Reply at 6. In particular, MSA argues the 2022 resolicitation makes it unclear “what level of effort must be put forth to constitute full cooperation and to ensure mission success.” Id. at 7. Without “further instructions and guidance, then offerors will likely submit proposals that take a number of divergent approaches to screening the mail and thus make fair comparison of proposals improbable.” Id. at 7. The government contends “MSA’s allegations of patent ambiguities involving the need for coordination” between the two service providers are “unfounded and moot” because the “USPS addressed these issues in Amendment 0001 to the [2022] [re]solicitation and MSA did not challenge the amendment in its business disagreement before the SDRO, thus waiving any argument with respect to the revised language.” Gov’t’s MJAR at 10. Additionally, contractors “are required to cooperate fully with USPS to resolve any contract administration issues”; there is no requirement for parties to resolve issues amongst each other. Gov’t’s MJAR Reply at 7. The solicitations act independently of the others and any coordination is placed squarely with the agency. Id. MSA’s argument, according to the government, is not “which contractor should perform a given function, but rather . . . how to perform [functions].” Gov’t’s MJAR at 21. The government asserts MSA’s complaints do not amount to patent ambiguities but rather issues “experienced contractors should be expected to perform with USPS explaining every possible aspect of the anticipated coordination in advance.” Gov’t’s MJAR Reply at 7–8. “The hypothetical examples of coordination . . . do not represent patent ambiguities, but rather differences between the canine detection and alarm resolution functions that do not create patent ambiguities in the respective solicitations.” Id. The Court previously determined the 2022 resolicitation likely contained no ambiguities. Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 162–63. MSA previously argued, as it does now, the solicitations “require the service providers to interact but do not provide ‘expected protocols or chain of command’ for those interactions. Id. at 162. The Court finds sophisticated, experienced contractors, like MSA and the other offerors, are able to “coordinate with another contractor on ancillary work without more specific instructions.” Id. at 163. The Court finds the government does not “need to spell out exactly how two contractors should collaborate . . . as hired experts[,]” and therefore no ambiguities exist. Id. The Court also determines “the solicitations are not ambiguous because they place ultimate responsibility for the program with the Agency.” MSA’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 6; see Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 163. The 2022 resolicitation implies the USPS is responsible for the overall program and as such, will resolve any dispute between the awardees, if any. See 2022 AR at 6870 (3PK9 SOW) (requiring the contractor to “[c]ollaborate with USPS, USPIS and alarm resolution provider prior to launch in creating a 3PK9 script and playbook to be used in the event of an alert.”). The Court’s determination in its 25 July 2022 decision denying MSA’s motion for preliminary injunction remains unwavering, as nothing in the unchanged administrative record or MJAR briefing is persuasive to show patent ambiguities exist. See Tr. at 220:19–221:3; Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 162–63. Accordingly, the Court finds the MSA has not demonstrated patent ambiguities “of significance” rising to the level of arbitrary and capricious agency action. - 61 - E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc. v. England, 379 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 5 U.S.C. § 706; see Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1332. C. Whether the Reduction in the Look-Back Period and Equal Treatment of Mail Screening and Cargo Screening Was Arbitrary and Capricious MSA contends the “USPS provides no rational justification” for reducing the look-back period from 36 to 24 months because the change is not “rationally related to the harm the USPS seeks to mitigate.” MSA’s Resp. & MJAR Reply at 8–9; MSA’s MJAR at 38–39. MSA asserts reduction in the look-back period deprives the USPS of months of test/audit information from offerors which could prove useful in making its decision. MSA’s MJAR at 38. “All companies that are TSA certified cargo screeners must submit to regular TSA audits[,]” and, as a result, a reduction in the look-back period was not a rational strategy to mitigate possible advantages from MSA’s past performance. Id. at 39; MSA’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 8. MSA asserts the Court’s determination in its denial of MSA’s preliminary injunction “did not rely on evidence in the administrative record.” MSA’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 9. MSA further argues the reduction in the lookback period evaluates “the ability of an offeror to meet the TSA’s safety standards” which “is a technical specification that the Agency now eliminates without any rational basis.” Id. at 8. A technical change, according to MSA, requires a heightened standard of rationality and the “USPS provide[d] no rational justification” to the technical change. Id. at 9. The government argues an agency has “broad discretion in how to mitigate potential OCIs” and the agency did mitigate to “deemphasize the past performance that MSA accrued as incumbent.” Gov’t’s MJAR at 23–24. The USPS considered MSA’s incumbent advantage without the implemented changes, so the measure had a rational basis. Id. at 11. The government disagrees with MSA’s assertion the factors were “technical weighting factor[s]” and argues even if they were, the changes “were warranted to remedy the OCI connected with MSA’s additional past performance as the incumbent.” Id. at 25. An agency must only “provide a reasonable corrective action and adequately explain its reasoning for doing so.” Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 998 (citation omitted). When mitigating OCIs, the agency need only provide a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974). As the Court determined in its denial of MSA’s preliminary injunction, the record supports a rational basis. See Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 163–64. The USPS awarded the 2020 contract to MSA in November 2020, and because proposals for the 2022 resolicitation were due in April 2022, MSA accrued more than twelve months of past performance under the 2020 contract. Id. (citing 2022 AR at 6968 (Amendment to Canine Screening Solicitation), ECF No. 48-5; 2022 AR at 5968 (Amendment to Alarm Clearing Solicitation)). The reduction in the look-back period, therefore, is roughly proportional to the period of MSA’s incumbency. Id. By reducing the look-back period, the government sought to encourage additional offerors who did not have more than 24 months past performance to participate without being penalized. Gov’t’s MJAR Reply at 8–9. The change, therefore, was not only focused on minimizing “tainted” incumbent advantage but encouraging competition. Id. No facts in the administrative record have changed since the Court issued its opinion and order - 62 - denying the preliminary injunction. See Tr. at 220:19–221:3. The Court finds the USPS provided a rational basis from the administrative record for reducing the look-back period from 36 months to 24 months to mitigate MSA’s incumbency advantage and promote fair competition. 26 See Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 998; Bowman, 419 U.S. at 285. D. Whether USPS’s Treatment of Mail and Cargo Screening Was Arbitrary and Capricious MSA contends the USPS’s second mitigation strategy in which the CO, under the SDRO’s supervision, “revise[d] the 2022 [re]solicitation[] to clarify that past performance involving mail screening would be evaluated as equal to past performance for cargo screening” is not a rational mitigation strategy. See MSA’s MJAR at 40. MSA asserts “the agency neglected to consider ‘an important aspect of the problem,’” mainly mail and cargo are not the same. Id. (citing Ala. Aircraft, 586 F.3d at 1375). MSA further argues the decision to mitigate MSA’s incumbent advantage by treating mail and cargo equally is not supported by the administrative record, and the Court did not consider the administrative record when it issued its decision denying MSA’s motion for a preliminary injunction. MSA’s MJAR Resp. & Reply at 11. MSA asserts “the Court relied on a statement from counsel for the [g]overnment in which he stated it was his understanding that mail and cargo screening differ only in name.” Id. (citing Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 164). The government argues an agency has “broad discretion” to mitigate the advantage an offeror accrued as an incumbent. Gov’t’s MJAR at 23–24. The USPS addressed the incumbent advantage by treating mail and cargo screening equally. Id. at 11. The government disagrees the changes were “technical weighting factors[,]” as MSA claims, and argues the changes only needed a rational basis. Id. at 25. The USPS’s actions “were warranted to remedy the OCI connected with MSA’s additional past performance as the incumbent” and therefore the USPS had a rational basis for the change. Id. All that is required from an agency is it “provide a reasonable corrective action and adequately explain its reasoning for doing so.” Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 998 (citation omitted). As part of the reasoning, the agency must articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Bowman Transp., Inc., 419 U.S. at 285. The record, which has not changed since the Court determined MSA was “unlikely to prove USPS’s decision to evaluate cargo screening experience and mail screening experience equivalently was arbitrary and capricious,” still supports a rational basis on the part of the USPS. Michael Stapleton Assocs., 161 Fed. Cl. at 164–65; Tr. at 220:19–221:3. The administrative record discusses the distinction between cargo and mail screens. See CO Franklin’s Report at 3673 (“TSA has set the standards for screening using canine that applies whether the canine is used for screening cargo or mail. The certification process for canine and its handler is the same under the TSA 3PK9 program. The only difference is those 3PK9 teams that screen mail need to be trained in the particular configurations agreed upon between TSA and the USPS.”). Accordingly, the USPS found because MSA was the only offeror with mail screening experience due to its incumbency, mail 26 The Court, however, finds supra Section VI.C, despite the connection articulated by USPS, reducing the lookback period only 12 months was insufficient to remove the “taint” of MSA’s incumbent advantage. See Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1332 (finding the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis and was thus arbitrary and capricious). - 63 - and cargo should be treated the same. Gov’t’s MJAR at 37. The USPS’s explanation meets the rational basis standard as it provides an explanation for the corrective action and connects the facts found with the choice made. See Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 998; Bowman, 419 U.S. at 285. MSA did not prove the USPS’s decision to evaluate cargo screening experience and mail screening experience equivalently to be arbitrary and capricious. See Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 998; Bowman, 419 U.S. at 285. MSA requests the same relief it did in its request for preliminary relief, yet the administrative record has not changed since the Court denied MSA’s preliminary injunction. Tr. at 220:19–221:3. The Court’s analysis concerning success on the merits of the same arguments accordingly does not yield different results. E. Whether MSA Is Eligible to Participate in the 2022 Resolicitation MSA also contends it should not be disqualified from the competition for the 2022 resolicitation because the USPS’s “determination that MSA is eligible is rational and well-supported by the record.” MSA’s MJAR at 41. MSA argues the USPS correctly concluded MSA could compete in the 2022 resolicitation because the USPS completed a thorough review to determine what “OCIs potentially existed after the 2020 procurements and analyzed whether those OCIs still existed with respect to the 2022 procurements.” Id. at 43. MSA argues the mitigation actions, supra Section VI.C, were sufficient and rational. Id. MSA also argues the USPS “properly mitigated MSA’s OCI stemming from unequal access to information” and “took extensive steps to mitigate any advantage that MSA might have tenuously had in helping to establish program elements and program documents.” Id. at 45, 49. The Court, supra Section VI, extensively evaluated whether the USPS adequately mitigated MSA’s incumbent advantage. The Court finds while the USPS could have further mitigated remaining unequal access to information issues favoring MSA, the USPS could not have removed MSA’s advantage stemming from biased ground rules OCIs, and therefore, MSA cannot participate in the 2022 resolicitation. See supra Section IX. XI. MSA’s Various Motions After the Court’s 26 October 2022 Order At the conclusion of oral argument held 21 October 2022, the Court stated it “strives to get a full order out before probably the middle of November” but may need additional information from the USPS to guide its ultimate holding. Tr. at 224:5–6. The Court, accordingly, issued a short order asking the “USPS to offer guidance on the prospect of resoliciting or reevaluating the 2022 resolicitation in the event the Court’s equitable remedy disqualifies MSA from participation[.]” 26 Oct. Order 2022 at 5 (emphasis added); see supra Section IX.A. The 26 October 2022 Order does not grant or deny a party’s MJAR, order the USPS to act in a certain way, or otherwise impose injunctive relief. See id. Rather, as the order expressly states, the Court sought “guidance” “in the event” MSA was disqualified. Id. at 5. While the Court asked the USPS for “guidance on several reevaluation or resolicitation factors to craft an equitable remedy, if any, in the forthcoming, more detailed order,” it also allowed any plaintiff an equal opportunity to respond to the USPS’s guidance with its own - 64 - concerns on a prospective resolicitation or reevaluation of the 2022 resolicitation. See id. at 1. The USPS filed its supplemental statement with a declaration from CO Baker detailing how the contracts would move forward “in the event” MSA was disqualified. Id. at 5; Gov’t’s First Resp. to 26 Oct. 2022 Order; Decl. of Jeremiah D. Baker. GK9 filed its response expressing its concerns with the USPS’s proposed plan. GK9’s Resp. to 26 Oct. 2022 Order; see supra Section IX.A. MSA did not file a response to the USPS’s supplemental statement. On 4 November 2022, MSA filed a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit “from the Court’s October 26, 2022 Order (ECF No. 69) denying the [MJARs] filed by MSA and . . . the United States, and granting the [MJARs] of [AMK9 and GK9].” Notice of Appeal at 2, ECF No. 76. On 16 November 2022, MSA filed a motion for a stay or injunction pending appeal under RCFC 62(d), which states: “While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, continues, modified, refuses, dissolves, or refuses to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.” MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal (citing RCFC 62(d)) (emphasis added). MSA also filed a motion to expedite consideration of its motion for stay pending appeal, ECF No. 80. GK9 and AMK9, confused by the procedural morass, filed motions for a status conference on 17 November 2022, ECF No. 81, and 22 November 2022, ECF No. 84, respectively. The procedural confusion is founded in MSA’s assertion the Court’s 26 October 2022 Order prescribes injunctive relief or renders final judgment. See MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 5. The Court did not issue injunctive relief or final judgment on 26 October 2022 extricating MSA from the contracts. 26 October Order 2022 at 5. MSA, citing Abbott v. Perez, claims the order amounts to an injunction. MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 6. Abbott v. Perez relates to “orders of a three-judge court . . . effectively directing the State not to conduct this year’s elections using districting plans that the court itself adopted some years earlier.” 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313 (2008). In other words, the lower court stopped an election districting plan before election day. In contrast, the Court’s order, as quoted by MSA, “potentially may disqualify MSA from participation in USPS’s . . . 2022 Solicitation.” MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 5 (emphasis added). MSA confuses “may” with “shall” and “guidance” with “binding authority.” Perez is inapposite as the certainty and magnitude of harm is not comparable. 138 S. Ct. at 2313. The Court’s 26 October 2022 Order is not a final judgment. See Weed v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 571 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting an order is final when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment) (citing Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263–64 (2009) (“The final judgment rule . . . helps preserve the respect due trial judges by minimizing appellate-court interferences . . . [and] reduces the ability of litigates to harass opponents and to clog the courts”)). MSA misconstrues the Court’s statements at oral argument and the Court’s 26 October Order to characterize the 26 October 2022 Order as a final judgment. For example, MSA contends, citing the oral argument transcript, “The Court apparently believes that USPS’s communications with MSA during the pilot program and immediately following (when a sole source award was contemplated) in part give rise to an unequal access to information OCI.” MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 11 (citing Tr. at 128:14–17 (“THE COURT: - 65 - For rollout responsiveness, it’s certainly an incumbent advantage to already have canines spread out across the country in the exact locations, correct?”), 131:4–6 (“THE COURT: Is this level of bias that would always focus them not one of the reasons why they should be inherently disqualified?”)). MSA interprets questions from the Court as its holding. This conjecture is tenuous at best. MSA also contends, “[T]he Order appears to apply a de novo review[,]” when the Court never stated it will review de novo. Id. at 12. Indeed, the Court states in its reasoning, the UPSP’s decisions were “arbitrary and capricious.” 26 Oct. 2022 Order at 5 (“The continued inclusion of [XXXXX] . . . was arbitrary and capricious.”). MSA also asserts “the Court seems to believe that a biased ground rules OCI exists notwithstanding the fact that the USPS, when it conducted its OCI investigation found that none existed.” MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 12. MSA cites the Court asking during oral argument, “If MSA worked in the pilot program in order to create the mail screening program, is that not inherently baked into the [SOW]?” Tr. at 148:3–6. This question from the Court does not give any insight into whether or not the Court would conclude biased ground rules OCIs still existed, but, rather, was the Court seeking to understand the nuisances of the parties’ arguments. MSA also postulates, “[t]he Court apparently believes that the mandatory disqualification provision in FAR 9.505-2 applies to this case.” MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 12. MSA cites a portion of oral argument where the Court is comparing the language of the FAR to the SP&Ps. Id. (citing Tr. 84:15–86:21 (“THE COURT: Okay, so what does that mean if the FAR were to apply here? . . . And then how does that read into a provision of the SP&P that should be treated the same?”)). MSA’s support for a stay pending appeal draws from imaginary holdings concocted from questions at oral argument and a short order requesting additional information from the USPS. MSA cannot infer the Court’s mindset from questions asked to the parties for the purpose of understanding the parties’ arguments. The questions from the Court were in a hypothetical world to determine what the USPS would prefer for next steps, if the Court were to exclude MSA in a future decision. Tr. at 193:22–194:2 (emphases added) (“THE COURT: . . . [W]hat is the process and timeline going forward in order to ensure operations, but then if the Court finds to remedy these issues in order to complete a solicitation that does not include MSA?”), 195:24–196:2 (“THE COURT: So to the extent that the outcome is that MSA should not have been on the 2022 contract allowed to bid, what would that mean for the 2022 contract, a complete stop?”). The government asked for guidance so the USPS could proceed with operations without significant harm given the tight timeline and certain treaty obligations. Tr. at 215:3–8 (“THE COURT: Would it be helpful to have a short advisory opinion related to where we’re going prior to a detailed order? [THE GOVERNMENT]: Yeah, if it’s guidance, then we, of course, you know, accept whatever guidance the Court is giving.”), 216:20–24 (“[THE GOVERNMENT]: [I]f you issued [a short order], we could come back and we can consult with the clients and find out what time frame we need and what are the complicating factors and, you know, how much time we estimate it will take and what we could do.”). The Court’s questions were directed at understanding the parties’ concerns. The Court issued its short order to fully understand the “complicating factors” for all parties and tailor its injunctive relief issued supra Section IX.C.4 accordingly. Tr. at 216:23. MSA asserts the 26 October 2022 Order has the “practical effect” of an injunction because the USPS “has already begun to implement the strictures of the Order by modifying MSA’s contract to amend the rollout schedule.” MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal - 66 - at 6. The USPS, acting on its own accord when the Court did not prescribe any injunctive relief, cannot turn a non-final order into a final judgment. The USPS itself acknowledges “[t]he Court’s order requested information in the event it disqualified MSA from the 2022 competition[.]” Decl. of Jeremiah D. Baker ¶ 3 (emphasis added); see id. ¶¶ 10 (“We estimate that we could issue[] awards . . . .”) (emphasis added), 13 (“At all times MSA would need to continue to provide . . . .”) (emphasis added); Tr. at 225:11–16 (“[THE GOVERNMENT]: . . . [T]he Court will provide guidance as to how MSA should be excluded from that evaluation or whatever you want us to do, and then we’ll have to look at what options are best to be able to address the Court’s concerns and, you know, extricate MSA if that is what is needed.”). The USPS acted in its own interest to reduce risk in the event the Court did exclude MSA from participation. It is not the Court’s role to micromanage how an agency adapts its contracts to reduce risk. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n., 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); see also Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1071, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2001). As of today, MSA is still included in the rollout schedule, but MSA complains the USPS’s amended rollout schedule, which “moves all of MSA’s rollouts to the back of the line . . . , depriv[es] MSA of revenue and require[es] layoffs.” Decl. of Claudia P. Angel at 4–5, ECF No. 83-1; MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 16. This is the first time MSA complains of the harm the USPS’s plan would inflict. MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 3 (“MSA will be irreparably harmed because . . . it will likely be locked out of the 2022 solicitations for good and certainly will be deprived the revenue . . . which will negatively impact its workforce.”). MSA’s parade of complaints could have been expressed earlier. Indeed, the Court asked the parties to respond to the USPS’s plan; MSA did not do so. See 26 Oct. 2022 Order at 5. Now, MSA complains of lost revenue. See MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 3. MSA’s complaints contradict earlier statements made in 2021 when asked if losing the contract would impact MSA: “[MSA]: In terms of lost profits, . . . [i]t would be minimal.” See 2021 Tr. at 108:1–2. Now, MSA claims it will lose “[XXXXX] in revenue” and “lay off approximately [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX]” and demands a stay pending appeal. MSA’s Mot. for a Stay or Inj. Pending Appeal at 24. MSA presumes to read the Court’s mind to deduce the holdings of a future final judgment without one being issued. Id. at 11 (“The Court apparently believes . . .”), 12 (“[T]he Order appears to apply a de novo review . . . .”; “[T]he Court apparently believes that the mandatory disqualification provision in FAR 9.505-2 applies in this case . . . .”). MSA had the opportunity to voice any concerns with the USPS’s proposal by submitting a supplemental statement to the Court. See 26 Oct. 2022 Order at 5. MSA did not but instead waited weeks until the eve of the Court’s final decision to complain about harm in its request to stay the Court from issuing its actual injunctive relief. Id. at 3. MSA weighs down the Court with numerous motions and creates a procedural web from an order that was not a final judgment. See Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 263–64. Given MSA’s motion requests to stay an injunction that was not yet issued, the Court finds the motion moot. See id.; Weed, 571 F.3d at 1361. Further, the Court finds as moot the motion to expedite reconsideration of MSA’s motion for a stay pending appeal. As the motion for stay seeks to delay the injunctive relief the Court issues today, the motion to expedite is moot. Further, GK9’s and AMK9’s motions for a status conference are moot as MSA’s purported appeal is likely baseless at this time as no injunctive relief or final judgment - 67 - have been made and therefore jurisdiction remains with this Court. See Flanagan, 465 U.S. 259 at 263–64 (“The final judgment rule . . . helps preserve the respect due trial judges by minimizing appellate-court interferences . . . [and] reduces the ability of litigates to harass opponents and to clog the courts”). XII. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS AMK9’s motions for judgment on the administrative record, ECF No. 51, GRANTS IN PART GK9’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, ECF No. 53, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the government’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, ECF No. 56, and DENIES MSA’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, ECF No. 52. The Court GRANTS AMK9’s request for injunctive relief, GRANTS IN PART GK9’s request for injunctive relief, and DENIES MSA’s request for injunctive relief. The Court FINDS as MOOT MSA’s motion for stay pending appeal, ECF No. 79, MSA’s motion to expedite, ECF No. 80, and GK9’s and AMK9’s motions for a status conference, ECF Nos. 81 and 84. The government SHALL FILE additional briefing on or before 30 November 2022 concerning the reevaluation issues noted supra Section IX.B. If desired, any plaintiff may respond on or before 7 December 2022. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Ryan T. Holte RYAN T. HOLTE Judge - 68 -