¹ Whether the trial court, in its [o]rder dated March 1, 2023, docketed on March 3, 2023, erred as a matter of law by denying Mother’s petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights in reliance on [M.R.D.], when said case is factually distinguishable[?]

² Whether the trial court, in its [o]rder dated March 1, 2023, docketed on March 3, 2023, erred as a matter of law by denying Mother’s petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights and finding [§] 2901 of the Adoption Act inapplicable

³ Whether the trial court, in its [o]rder dated March 1, 2023, docketed on March 3, 2023, erred as a matter of law by denying Mother’s petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights when the trial court found that Mother satisfied her burden under [§ 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b)], and that termination of Father’s parental rights would serve the child’s best interests[?] K.E.G.’s brief at 6-7. We will begin by addressing Mother’s arguments. The constitutional challenges advanced by Mother present questions of law, over which our scope of review is plenary. See Interest of Y.W.-B., 265 A.3d 602, 615 (Pa. 2021). Our standard of review in this context is de novo. See Interest of A.D.-G., 263 A.3d 21, 27 (Pa.Super. 2021). Mother’s arguments implicate § 2512(a)-(b), which provides as follows: § 2512. Petition for involuntary termination (a) Who may file.--A petition to terminate parental rights with respect to a child under the age of 18 years may be filed by any of the following: (1) Either parent when termination is sought with respect to the other parent. (2) An agency. (3) The individual having custody or standing in loco parentis to the child and who has filed a report of intention to adopt required by section 2531 (relating to report of intention to adopt). (4) An attorney representing a child or a [GAL] representing a child who has been adjudicated dependent under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c) (relating to adjudication). (b) Contents.--The following apply: ____________________________________________ 5 In apparent contravention of this case law, the trial court here saw fit to issue findings regarding the merits of Mother’s termination petition despite concluding that the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b) were neither satisfied nor excused in this case. We note that “[a]n advisory opinion is one which is unnecessary to decide the issue before the court” and that “the courts of this Commonwealth are precluded from issuing” such determinations. Sedat, Inc. v. Fisher, 617 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 1992). Moreover, such superfluous findings have no appreciable legal effect under Pennsylvania law. See Okkerse v. Howe, 556 A.2d 827, 833 (Pa. 1989). 6 To the extent that Mother’s brief contains discussion of Interest of Z.E., 3577 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711 (Pa.Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision) and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901, we will address these arguments in our consideration of the identical issues raised by K.E.G. in her separate brief. ____________________________________________ 7 While we reference Pa.R.C.P. 235 in our discussion, insofar as the instant termination of parental rights case was governed by the Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rules, which lack an express requirement to notify the Attorney General of constitutional challenges, our waiver finding is founded upon the notice requirement outlined in Pa.R.A.P. 521(a). - 11 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 We now turn to K.E.G.’s arguments. Although stated as separate matters, K.E.G.’s first two claims for relief essentially present the same thesis: the trial court erred by determining that Mother had not established cause to excuse her noncompliance with § 2512(b) pursuant to § 2901. See K.E.G.’s brief at 26 (“[T]he trial court erred in failing to apply the ‘cause shown’ provision of Section 2901 and dispensing with the contemplated adoption requirement under the narrow circumstances of this case.”). Our standard of review over a trial court’s findings pursuant to § 2901 is de novo and our scope of review in this context is plenary. See M.E.L., supra at 124. Section 2901 provides as follows: Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated, the investigation required by section 2535 (relating to investigation) has been completed, the report of the intermediary has been filed pursuant to section 2533 (relating to report of intermediary) and all other legal requirements have been met. If all legal requirements have been met, the court may enter a decree of adoption at any time. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901. The phrase “cause shown” is not defined in the Adoption Act. M.E.L., supra at 122. Our Supreme Court’s “reasonable construction” of the statute provides that the “cause shown” language in § 2901 “‘permits a petitioner to demonstrate why, in a particular case, he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements’” of the Adoption Act. M.E.L., supra at 127 (quoting In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1201-02 (Pa. 2002)). The petitioner must establish cause by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Thus, it is within the trial court’s “discretion” to determine whether the - 12 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 “relinquishment of parental rights requirement will be otherwise fulfilled or is unnecessary under the particular circumstances.” Id. As detailed above, Mother invoked § 2901 in the trial court, claiming that she should be excused from the adoption requirement at § 2512(b) pursuant to this Court’s non-precedential holding Interest of Z.E., 3577 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711 (Pa.Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision). In Z.E., a mother filed a petition seeking to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of a biological father who had “raped” her on “a daily basis for nearly twenty years,” which had resulted in the birth of several children. Id. at *1. Her termination petition, however, did not aver that an adoption of these children was contemplated and the trial court denied it pursuant to § 2512(b). Id. at *5. On appeal, this Court reversed, reasoning as follows: Applying [§] 2512(b)’s contemplated adoption requirement to the unique facts of this case creates an absurd result where [m]other, a capable and fit single parent who has been the tragic victim of rape committed at Father’s hand for decades, cannot remain [the c]hildren’s legal [m]other and seek termination of Father’s, her rapist’s, parental rights.[8] ____________________________________________ 8 This Court also noted that this mother’s circumstances was a “widespread” plight facing parents throughout the United States, i.e., the inability of victims to terminate the parental rights of their rapists. Z.E., supra at *6. Accordingly, this Court, was “mindful to limit the holding of this case to its facts so that the exercise of such discretion does not open the door to terminating the parental rights of one parent by another parent when adoption is not contemplated, and to ensure we do not open the floodgates to . . . gamesmanship.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added). Following Z.E., however, our General Assembly enacted 23 Pa.C.S. § 2514, which by its terms applies to all termination petitions filed after December 28, (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 13 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 Id. at *6 (emphasis added). Instantly, Mother and K.E.G. have both attempted to draw a direct parallel between the horrific facts of Z.E. and Father’s troubling criminal behavior in the instant case. See Mother’s brief in 12 (“Akin to the mother in [Z.E.], [Mother] has suffered abuse by her ex-partner[.]”); K.E.G.’s brief at 24 (“While Z.E. is non-precedential and limited to its facts, the same reasoning in that case is appropriate here given the factual similarities.”). Given the explicit factual limitation that this Court placed upon the holding in Z.E. and the absence of any analogous sexual assault allegations in the instant case, we do not find Z.E. to be persuasive or apposite. At best, we believe that Z.E. supports the general notion that a party may seek relief from the adoption requirement at § 2512(b) by raising the applicability of § 2901. During the pendency of this appeal, our Supreme Court’s holding in M.E.L. opined upon the application of § 2901, which informs and controls our resolution of these arguments. In M.E.L., a mother sought to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the father to the parties’ biological child, ____________________________________________ 2020. In pertinent part, this statute provides that a petitioner seeking to involuntarily terminate another individual’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(7) (relating to “a child conceived as a result of rape or incest”) need not aver that an adoption of the child is contemplated. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2514(1)(ii). Thus, the specific concern that animated this Court’s holding in Z.E. has largely been addressed by the Pennsylvania legislature. Instantly, Mother did not seek termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(7) and there is no allegation that K.E.G. was conceived as a result of either incest or rape. - 14 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 M.E.L. See M.E.L., supra at 120. The mother was in a stable, long-term relationship with another partner, but the couple were not married and had no plans to wed in the future. Nonetheless, in conjunction with the termination petition, the mother’s partner filed notice of his intent to adopt M.E.L. The trial court granted the mother’s petition. See id. On appeal, this Court vacated after concluding that the mother had failed to strictly comply with the statutory requirements of the Adoption Act. See id. at 123. Specifically, since the involuntary termination of parental rights “must occur in the context of an anticipated adoption,” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711 of the Adoption Act “requires the parent seeking termination to consent to the adoption, which entails relinquishing his or her own parental rights.” Id. at 121. Despite this requirement, the mother in M.E.L. had not relinquished her parental rights. See id. at 122. Although 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903 permits a parent consenting to the adoption of their biological child by a “spouse” to retain their parental rights, this exception did not apply since the mother and her partner were not married. See id. at 123. This Court determined the trial court had failed to consider the applicability of § 2901 and remanded for a determination in that regard. See id. at 123-24. Our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal with respect to the interpretation of § 2901, and clarified the statutory requirements as follows: [T]o satisfy the cause exception to relinquishment under [§] 2901 two things must be established. A party must first show why he or she cannot meet the statutory requirements for adoption. . . . Upon this showing, the party may then appeal to the court’s - 15 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 discretion by demonstrating with clear and convincing evidence why the purpose of the [statutory requirement] would nevertheless be fulfilled or unnecessary in their case, despite the parties’ inability to fulfill the statutory requirements. Id. at 127 (emphasis in original). Thus, the High Court reiterated that a petitioner seeking relief from the Adoption Act’s relinquishment requirements under § 2901 must first demonstrate why they are legally unable to meet the statutory requirements of the Adoption Act from which they seek relief, before then justifying their lack of statutory compliance. See id. at 128. The Supreme Court opined: Permitting a parent, such as [the mother], to simply waive the relinquishment requirement in circumstances where she offers her long-term partner as an adoptive resource, but does not first demonstrate why they cannot marry, would allow the “cause shown” exception to swallow the rule, as that parent could proceed with the adoption even if there were no legal impediment to marrying the prospective adoptive parent, rendering the spousal requirements effectively optional, and the stepparent exception to relinquishment under [§] 2903 largely unnecessary. Id. However, the High Court ultimately agreed that the trial court had “precipitously terminated [the father’s] parental rights without first evaluating whether [the mother] established cause under [§] 2901.” Id. at 129. Since the mother in M.E.L. had “not provided evidence pertaining to this ‘cause’ analysis,” the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding remanding to the trial court for consideration of § 2901. Id. The issue in the above-captioned case is analogous to that of the petitioning parent in M.E.L., who was similarly seeking to involuntarily terminate the rights of the other parent without relinquishing her parental - 16 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 rights. See M.E.L., supra at 121-23. Although M.E.L. implicated the relinquishment requirements at § 2711 and Mother has directed her arguments to the adoption requirement at § 2512(b), their positions relative to § 2901 are essentially the same: the parties were requesting termination with respect to another parent without relinquishing their parental rights as mandated by the Adoption Act. However, unlike the petitioner in M.E.L., an adoption is not contemplated with respect to K.E.G. at all. Rather, Mother wishes to be able to secure termination of Father’s parental rights without ceding her parental rights or permitting the adoption of K.E.G. by another individual. We find the following passage from M.E.L. generally instructive on this position: [T]he relinquishment requirement for adoption and termination of another parent’s rights over a child may be seen by some as anachronistic in this day and age, particularly given the changing notion of what it means to be “family.” No longer is society’s concept of family limited to a mother, father, and their children, as was commonplace at the time the Adoption Act was originally enacted. Today, it is not unusual to see multigenerational families, single-parent families, or . . . families where the parents are live-in partners, rather than spouses. Moreover, our Court is sensitive to the plight of single parents who receive no assistance or benefit from an absent parent, but are precluded from seeking termination of the rights of that parent because they do not have a spouse. Nevertheless, regardless of the wisdom of the . . . relinquishment requirements, the General Assembly has not revisited these provisions, and they remain the law. M.E.L., supra at 129. Thus, we read M.E.L. as reaffirming the strict nature of the adoption and relinquishment requirements. - 17 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 In light of our Supreme Court’s guidance in M.E.L., we find the arguments presented concerning “cause” pursuant to § 2901 in this case to be lacking. Specifically, K.E.G. contends that “Mother should not have to get married or relinquish her parental rights, and force a large and unnecessary change upon K.E.G. in order to terminate Father’s parental rights[.]” K.E.G.’s brief at 25-26. However, neither K.E.G. nor Mother have offered any argument explaining why Mother is legally incapable of offering K.E.G. up for adoption or relinquishing her parental rights. See M.E.L., supra at 128 (indicating that before a petitioner may submit argument that the purpose of the Adoption Act will be achieved in the absence of strict statutory compliance, she must “explain why she is unable to meet the statutory requirements for adoption”). Thus, Mother has put “the proverbial cart before the horse” by arguing that adoption and relinquishment are unnecessary in her case. Id. Pursuant to M.E.L. and the cases cited therein, the relevant initial inquiry pursuant to § 2901 is whether a petitioner is unable to comply with the at- issue statute, i.e., there must be a legal impediment to the party’s strict fulfillment of the Adoption Act’s statutory requirements. Mother’s own arguments reveal that she is fully able, but remains unwilling, to place K.E.G. up for adoption and relinquish her parental rights. See Mother’s brief at 13-14 (conceding that Mother could “give another individual the fundamental right to the direct control, care, and custody of K.E.G.” by adoption and “relinquish all of her fundamental rights” in order to - 18 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 secure termination of Father’s parental rights). Rather, Mother’s objections are purely ethical in nature. See id. at 14 (“Requiring a single parent to relinquish their fundamental rights in order to protect their children is . . . morally incorrect.” (emphasis added)). Understandable though Mother’s objections may be, it is clear from the certified record that there is no legal obstruction that would preclude her from choosing adoption and relinquishment. This distinction readily separates this appeal from the cases holding that petitioners were “unable” to meet various statutory requirements for the purposes of § 2901. Cf. In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1128-30 (Pa. 2016) (holding that the parties seeking to adopt were legally unable to marry and, thus, could not satisfy the Adoption Act’s marriage requirement); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2002) (same). Furthermore, unlike in M.E.L., Mother provided both testimonial evidence and extensive argument concerning the application of § 2901 in the trial court. See Petition to Terminate, 3/16/22, at ¶¶ 35-47; N.T., 7/7/22, at 3-24; N.T., 3/1/23, at 7-21. Moreover, as noted above, the trial court evaluated and rejected this claim pursuant to § 2901 on its merits. Accordingly, remand to the trial court is not necessary. Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the trial court properly denied Mother’s termination petition as non-cognizable pursuant to § 2512(b). No adoption of K.E.G. is contemplated in the instant case and Mother has failed - 19 - J-S27028-23 J-S27029-23 to articulate an appropriate legal basis that precludes her from complying with the statutory requirements of the Adoption Act. Thus, she is not entitled to the benefit of § 2901. See, e.g., M.E.L., supra at 127-28. Order affirmed. Date: 10/11/2023 - 20 -