MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM FILED: March 20, 2024

Anthony D. Heath (Licensee) appeals pro se from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court and County, respectively), which denied his “Ex Parte Pro Se Motion to the President Judge Seeking Leave of Court to Reinstate Pennsylvania Driver’s License 29554408” (Motion) as moot. See Original Record Docket Entry (OR Dkt. #) 12. The trial court found that Licensee appears to be ineligible for reinstatement of his operating privileges because he is currently serving a lifetime sentence for an unrelated crime. We affirm. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has summarized the relevant facts of this case1 as follows: life sentence because “a jury convicted Licensee of first-degree murder, receiving stolen property, access device fraud, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with or fabricating evidence.” Id. at 3, n.3. He was serving this sentence when he filed the Motion. Id.2 On appeal,3 Licensee argues that the trial court had a ministerial duty to notify DOT that he had completed his prison term for the underlying DUI offense giving rise to the suspension of his driving privileges. Licensee’s Brief at 6. In support of his position, Licensee directs our attention to “ACT 151” and the restoration requirements letter sent to him by DOT. Id. Licensee also contends that he is currently in compliance with Section 1541 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1541, but that the trial court has “unfairly [] obstructed in that process simply because the [trial] court makes mention of a[n] unrelated sentence deeming [his] request as moot, all of which . . . plays no legal or [c]onstitutional difference in the restoration process . . . .” Licensee’s Brief at 6-7. To that end, Licensee posits that his attempt to reinstate his driving privileges should not be prevented by an unrelated lifetime sentence, because he has matters pending in federal court which will result in his release from custody on that separate judgment of sentence. Id. at 5. However, Licensee’s Motion sought to compel, inter alia, the reinstatement of his driver’s license. Thus, “irrespective of [Licensee’s] nomenclature, [the instant matter] is a mandamus action, because it seeks court intervention to compel the performance of certain acts by government officials.” Campbell v. Rosenberger, 632 A.2d 1094, 1095 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). Moreover, this mandamus action is peculiar because Licensee initiated this matter by filing the Motion under the former criminal docket number for his DUI prosecution, rather than by filing a civil action against either the County’s Clerk of Courts or DOT directly seeking the reinstatement of his license. Indeed, as this Court has explained:

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is designed to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act or mandatory duty on the part of a public officer. In order to prevail in an action for mandamus, [Licensee] must establish that he has a clear legal right to the relief he requested, that respondents have a corresponding duty to perform a ministerial act or mandatory duty, and that no other adequate remedy is available at law. Campbell, 632 A.2d at 1096; see also Nason v. Commonwealth, 494 A.2d 499, 502 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (“Mandamus is an extraordinary writ which is granted only where there is a clear and specific legal right of [a] plaintiff, a correspondingly clear legal duty of [a] defendant and a want of any other adequate remedy. It is never granted in anticipation of an omission of duty.”) (citations omitted and emphasis in original); Sewell v. Solomon, 465 A.2d 130, 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (“The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure also state that in order for a [c]omplaint in mandamus to be sufficient it must allege, among other things, the want of any other adequate remedy at law.”) (footnote omitted). Here, Licensee failed to demonstrate that the trial court has a mandatory or ministerial duty to notify DOT of the completion of his DUI sentence or that he is entitled to the reinstatement of his license by DOT. For his contention that the trial court did in fact have such a duty, Licensee vaguely cites to “ACT 151.” Brief for Appellant at 6. Similarly, in its December 29, 2020 restoration requirements letter sent to Licensee, DOT referred to a “PRISON RELEASE REQUIREMENT (Act 151).” OR Dkt. #12, Ex. A at 2.4 In relevant part, the letter states that “[t]he [trial c]ourt has sentenced you to serve a prison term. . . . The [trial c]ourt must certify to [DOT] that your prison term is completed. [DOT] recommends that you CONTACT YOUR PROBATION OFFICER and/or the [trial c]ourt to ensure that [DOT] is properly notified.” Id. However, the Motion is unclear regarding what Act 151 specifically refers to and whether it actually charges the trial court or the County Clerk of Courts with a duty to notify DOT of the completion of Licensee’s term of imprisonment for his DUI conviction. Section 16 of the Act of December 28, 1998, P.L. 1126, No. 151 (Act 151), amended Section 1541 of the Vehicle Code by adding subsection (a.^[1]), 75 Pa. C.S. §1541(a.^[1]). In relevant part, Section 1541(a.^[1]) now states that “[c]redit toward serving the period of suspension or revocation imposed for [S]ection[] . . . 3802 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) . . . shall not commence until the date of the person’s release from prison.” In addition, Section 56 of Act 151 amended Section 6323(5) of the Vehicle Code, which now provides that “the record of judgment required to be sent to [DOT] by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall indicate if the court ordered the defendant to a term of prison.” 75 Pa. C.S. §6323(5). However, Section 6323 (1)(i) and (2) of the Vehicle Code states:

Subject to any inconsistent procedures and standards relating to reports and transmission of funds prescribed pursuant to [the Judicial Code]:

(1) The following shall apply:

(i) The clerks of any court of this Commonwealth, within 10 days after final judgment of conviction or acquittal or other disposition of charges under any of the provision of this title or under Section 13 of the [A]ct of April 14, 1972[, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §780-113], known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act [(Drug Act)], including an adjudication of delinquency or the granting of a consent decree, shall send to [DOT] a record of conviction, acquittal or other disposition.

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(2) A record of the judgment shall also be forwarded to [DOT] upon conviction or acquittal of a person of a felony, a misdemeanor of the first degree or a misdemeanor of the second degree in the commission of which the judge determines that a motor vehicle was essentially involved. 75 Pa. C.S. §6323(1)(i), (2).5 None of the above provisions create a purported “prison release requirement” to be sent by the trial court to DOT upon the completion of a DUI- related prison term. Rather, as indicated, the law relates to the report that must be sent within 10 days of a conviction, acquittal or disposition by a clerk of courts to DOT. See Section 81.4 of DOT’s regulations, 37 Pa. Code §81.4 (describing the content that the clerk of courts must include in a report to be sent to DOT under Section 6323 of the Vehicle Code, within 10 days of a conviction, acquittal or disposition); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 771 (“The clerk of courts shall report to [DOT] all dispositions of charges required by [Section] 6323 (relating to reports by courts). The report shall be sent by electronic transmission.”). In any event, Licensee did not file an appropriate civil action against either DOT or the County Clerk of Courts in his efforts to obtain a restoration of his driving privileges. Moreover, it is well settled that mandamus may not be used as a substitute for Licensee’s statutory remedies to contest either the validity of the license suspension or issues regarding credit to the suspension. See, e.g., Section 1516(d) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1516(d) (“Drivers wishing to have their record reviewed by [DOT] may make such a request in order that the record be brought up to date.”); Section 1541(a.^[1]) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1541(a.^[1]) (“Credit toward serving the period of suspension . . . for [violations of S]ection[] . . . 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) . . . shall not commence until the date of the person’s release from prison.”);6 Section 1550(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1550(a) (“Any person . . . whose operating privilege has been . . . suspended, . . . by [DOT] shall have the right to appeal to the court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to [the Judicial Code]. The appellant shall serve a copy of the petition for appeal, together with a copy of the notice of the action from which the appeal has been taken, upon [DOT’s] legal office.”); Section 491.4(d)(1)(iii) of DOT’s regulations, 67 Pa. Code §491.4(d)(1)(iii) (“Correspondence, pleadings, briefs, orders or other papers relating to the case shall be filed with the appropriate docket clerk at the following address: . . . Secretary of Transportation, Driver Licensing Docket Clerk, 1101 South Front [St.], 3rd [Fl.], Harrisburg, [PA] 17104-2516 . . . for matters involving: . . . Requests for record review under 75 Pa. C.S. §1516 (relating to [DOT] records).”); Department of Transportation v. McCafferty, 758 A.2d 1155, 1163 (Pa. 2000) (“If appellees wish to challenge the accuracy of their driving records . . . they may do so under [Section] 1516(d) (licensees may request that driving records be updated). Should they choose to do so, however, any amendment to the accuracy of the record will not result in the reinstatement of their driving privileges. Such an amendment

restoring a suspended license, being current on a payment plan shall be considered as a part of a successfully completed program. If a defendant fails to successfully complete the requirements of a treatment program, the suspension shall remain in effect until the defendant completes the program and is otherwise eligible for restoration of his operating privilege.

(Emphasis added.) The Motion alleges, in pertinent part, that “there is still an outstanding balance we wish to pay to the [C]lerk of this court to cover court cost and fines in the amount of $2,468.75,” and that “[w]e seek further leave of court to be able once we have secured employment to make a payment plan with the court[’]s [C]lerk[’]s [O]ffice to pay off the required fee and court costs . . . .” OR Dkt. #12 at 1, 2. Thus, the trial court could have denied the Motion on this basis as well. See Washington v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver’s Licensing, 301 A.3d 982, 985 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (“This Court may affirm a trial court’s order on any basis appearing in the record.”).

to the driver’s license record would simply clarify the record as to the specific nature of the suspension.”); Smires v. O’Shell, 126 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (“This de novo appeal before a court of law [under Section 1550(a)] is an appropriate and adequate remedy that can be used to raise any defense, whether constitutional or statutory. That precedent does not favor [the l]icensees does not mean that they may seek a writ of mandamus.”); Boyer v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 513 M.D. 2020, filed July 26, 2022), slip op. at 6 n.7 (“Likewise, ‘[o]ne who allows his statutory appeal rights to expire cannot at a later date successfully assert those appeal rights under the guise of a petition for writ of mandamus.’ Luke v. Cataldi, 883 A.2d 1114, 1120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).”).7 Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.^[8]

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania : : v. : No. 613 C.D. 2023 : Anthony D. Heath, : : Appellant :

PER CURIAM ORDER AND NOW, this 20th day of March, 2024, the order of the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas dated February 22, 2022, is AFFIRMED.