6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 * * * 9 ALI SHAHROKI, Case No. 2:21-cv-02251-RFB-VCF 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 JAMES W. HARDESTY, 13 Defendant. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 This case is one of many that Plaintiff has brought in this district, challenging the actions 17 taken by Nevada judicial officers in Plaintiff’s state-court child custody proceedings.1 See 18 Shahroki v. Throne et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-00001-JAD-NJK; Shahroki v. Harter, et al., Case No. 19 2:21-cv-01126-RFB-NJK; Shahrokhi v. Harter, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00557-APG- 20 BNW; Phillips, et al. v. Ochoa, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00483-APG-NJK; Phillips, et al. v. Truby, 21 et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00358-KJD-EJY; Shahrokhi v. Tao, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-02346-GMN- 22 VCF; Phillips, et al. v. Duckworth, et al., 2:20-cv-02345-RFB-NJK; Shahrokhi v. Harter, et al., 23 Case No. 2:20-cv-01623-JAD-NJK; Shahrokhi v. Harter, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-01019-APG- 24 VCF. 25 Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) and Plaintiff’s Motion 26 27 1 On July 18, 2022, Judge Dorsey entered an order deeming Plaintiff a vexatious litigant in the 28 District of Nevada and issuing a prefiling injunction against him. See Shahroki v. Throne et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-00001-JAD-NJK, ECF No. 21. 1 to Strike (ECF No. 8). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED 2 and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is DENIED. 3

4 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 5 On December 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Complaint. ECF No. 1. On January 12, 2022, 6 Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 6. On January 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed the 7 instant Motion to Strike. ECF No. 8. On February 7, 2022, Defendant filed a Response to the 8 Motion to Strike. ECF No. 9. On February 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Reply to the Motion to Strike. 9 ECF No. 10. 10

11 III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 12 Plaintiff is a resident of Nevada. Defendant resides in Nevada and is employed as a Nevada 13 Supreme Court Justice. 14 Plaintiff has been involved in child custody proceedings in the Nevada family courts, which 15 resulted in his child being removed from his custody and care. On December 16, 2021, Plaintiff 16 filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus before the state supreme court. The petition alleged that the 17 Nevada family courts violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. A Nevada Supreme Court panel 18 comprised of Defendant and two other justices denied Plaintiff’s petition. 19 Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Nevada Supreme Court’s 20 order denying his petition violates the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also 21 alleges state law claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff 22 seeks a total of $200 million in compensatory and punitive damages. 23

24 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 25 An initial pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 26 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The court may dismiss a complaint for lack of 27 subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The court may also dismiss a complaint for 28 1 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a 2 motion to dismiss, “[a]ll well-pleaded allegations of material fact in the complaint are accepted as 3 true and are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Faulkner v. ADT Sec. 4 Services, Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 5 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” 6 but it must do more than assert “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements 7 of a cause of action . . . .” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. 8 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, a claim will not be dismissed if it contains 9 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” 10 meaning that the court can reasonably infer “that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 11 alleged.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit, in elaborating on 12 the pleading standard described in Twombly and Iqbal, has held that for a complaint to survive 13 dismissal, the plaintiff must allege non-conclusory facts that, together with reasonable inferences 14 from those facts, are “plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. 15 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 16

17 V. DISCUSSION 18 Defendant argues that the claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are barred by absolute 19 judicial immunity. Defendant argues that the Nevada Supreme Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s 20 petition for mandamus relief constitutes a “prototypical judicial act,” issued in the normal course 21 by the court. Defendant emphasizes that the underlying controversy “surrounded a normal writ 22 proceeding where the Nevada Supreme Court possessed original jurisdiction,” that the decision to 23 deny Plaintiff’s writ – which was a “request for extraordinary relief” – is a typical use of judicial 24 discretion that absolute judicial immunity is designed to protect, and that the issue arose directly 25 out of an original proceeding before the Nevada Supreme Court. Furthermore, Defendant contends 26 that absolute judicial immunity covers both state law tort claims and claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 27 § 1983. 28 1 Plaintiff did not directly oppose Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on the merits, but instead 2 filed a Motion to Strike the dispositive motion under FRCP 11(a) and FRCP 12(f). Plaintiff argues 3 that defense counsel Shevorski’s representation of Defendant Hardesty violates the state 4 constitution’s recognition of separation of powers, and that Shevorski – an attorney employed by 5 the Nevada Office of the Attorney General – “cannot sign [the motion] on behalf of the judicial 6 department.” 7 As a preliminary matter, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. FRCP 11(a) requires 8 courts to strike unsigned filings, and FRCP 12(f) allows courts to “strike from a pleading an 9 insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. 10 P. 11(a); 12(f). Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is not properly brought under either rule, as the Motion 11 to Dismiss is not a “pleading,” and it was also properly signed by defense counsel. The Court also 12 rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the Shevorski cannot lawfully sign the motion because doing so 13 violates separation of powers. The Nevada Constitution provides that “no persons charged with 14 the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, 15 appertaining to either of the others . . . .” Nev. Const. art. III, § 1. Plaintiff does not explain how 16 the Attorney General representing a Nevada judicial officer would constitute an exercise of a 17 judicial function by the executive branch, nor does Plaintiff point to any caselaw that would 18 support such an argument. Further, the Court recognizes that by the will of the Nevada Legislature, 19 the Attorney General is empowered to represent state judicial officers. See N.R.S. § 41.0339(1) 20 (stating that the attorney general “shall provide for the defense, including the defense of cross- 21 claims and counterclaims, of any present or former local judicial officer, state judicial officer, 22 officer or employee of the State or a political subdivision”). 23 Moving to the Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by 24 judicial immunity. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity for “judicial acts taken within the 25 jurisdiction of their courts.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). The scope of 26 the immunity is construed broadly and applies even when it is alleged that a judge engaged in 27 offenses like bribery and conspiracy. Id. at 1077-78. Immunity will not apply where a judge 28 “performs an act that is not judicial in nature” or acts in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 1075. The test for whether an alleged act is judicial in nature considers if: “(1) the precise act is a 3 normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and ° immediately out of a confrontation with a judge in his or her official capacity.” Id. These factors 6 “are to be construed generously in favor of the judge and in light of the policies underlying judicial immunity.” Id. at 1076. 8 The Court finds that Defendant is entitled to judicial immunity. Among other things, 7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant — in denying Plaintiffs state court petition — failed to hold the state 10 to its “burden of proof,” improperly exercised “unlimited judicial discretion,’ and violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights. While Plaintiff is not clear about the specific conduct alleged to be unconstitutional and tortious, it is evident that he challenges Defendant Hardesty’s ruling on his IS Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Thus, Plaintiff challenges actions undertaken in Defendant’s 4 official capacity as a judge. Because the conduct challenged is quintessentially judicial in nature, judicial immunity precludes all claims against Defendant. 16 The Court accordingly grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and dismisses the Complaint in its entirety.

VI. CONCLUSION IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the [6] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the | [8] Motion to Strike is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close this case.

DATED: August 18, 2022 < S RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28