City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57 (1915). · Go Syfert
City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57 (1915). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
292 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 53 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1916 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1916 1971 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Cummins-Allison Corp. v. SBM CO., LTD.
E.D. Tex. · 2009 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
wjhat the owner is entitled to is the value of the property taken, and that means what it fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given for it in fact, - not what a tribunal at a later date may think a purchaser would have been wise to give...…
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Cummins-Allison Corp. v. SBM Co., Ltd.
E.D. Tex. · 2008 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
what the owner is entitled to is the value of the property taken, and that means what it fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given for it in fact,not what a tribunal at a later date may think a purchaser would have been wise to give....
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation Of Washington
9th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
And although the owner of the property was losing a valuable opportunity, "he [wa]s not being deprived of values which result from his expenditures or activities." Id. 78 Furthermore, the Government need not compensate "for any part of what it has added to the land." City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation (2×)
SCOTUS · 1998 · confidence medium
TVA v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 276 (1943) (no need to pay for value that the "power of eminent domain” itself creates); City of New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57, 61 (1915) (city need not pay for value added by unifying parcels where unification impracticable absent eminent domain); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U. S. 222, 228 (1956) (to require payment for value created by government "would be to create private claims in the public domain”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Katherine Amen, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. City of Dearborn, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees
6th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 [ 36 S.Ct. 25, 26 , 60 L.Ed. 143 ] [1915].
cited Cited as authority (rule) Borough of Fort Lee v. Invesco Holding Corp.
N.J. Tax Ct. · 1981 · confidence medium
New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 [ 36 S.Ct. 25, 26 , 60 L.Ed. 143 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re the Valuation Proceedings under Sections 303(c) & 306
Regl. Rail Reorg. Act · 1977 · confidence medium
New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 [ 36 S.Ct. 25 , 60 L.Ed. 143 ], It is common knowledge that public service corporations and others having that power frequently are actual or potential competitors, not only for tracts held in single ownership but also for rights of way, locations, sites and other areas requiring the union of numerous parcels held by different owners.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pete v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1976 · confidence medium
New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915) ; Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) ; United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver
D. Colo. · 1973 · confidence medium
New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 [ 36 S.Ct. 25, 26 , 60 L.Ed. 143 ], See also United States v. Reynolds, supra, [397 U.S.] at 16 [90 S.Ct. at 805] ; United States v. Miller, supra, [317 U.S.] at 374 [ 63 S.Ct. at 280 ].
cited Cited as authority (rule) City of Los Angeles v. Allen's Grocery Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1968 · confidence medium
River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 [ 25 L.Ed. 206, 208 ]; New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 [ 60 L.Ed. 143, 146 , 36 S.Ct. 25 ].
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. 116.00 Acres of Land
W.D. Ark. · 1964 · confidence medium
Boom Co. v. Patterson [ 8 Otto 403 ], 98 U.S. 403, 408 [ 25 L.Ed. 206 ]; [City of] New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 [ 36 S.Ct. 25 , 60 L.Ed. 143 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Red Lake, Pembina & White Earth Bands v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1964 · confidence medium
But while the test of valuation is “fair market value” used in the sense of “what it fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given for it * * *” N.Y. v. Sage 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915), there were few if any willing buyers for these lands in 1863.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co. (2×)
SCOTUS · 1949 · confidence medium
This Court there stated that the "highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use *406 affects the market value while the property is privately held." Mr. Justice Holmes had earlier warned that the prospective use may be considered "only so far as the public would have considered it"; the price was not to be "what a tribunal at a later date may think a purchaser would have been wise to g…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roberts v. New York City
SCOTUS · 1935 · confidence medium
New *284 York City v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57, 61 ; Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 256 . “ What the owner is entitled to is the value of the property taken, and that means what it fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given for it in fact — not what a tribunal at a later date may think a purchaser would have been wise to give, nor a proportion of the advance due to its union with other lots.” New York City v. Sage, supra, at p. 61.
examined Cited "see" Kraft, Inc. v. United States (3×)
Fed. Cl. · 1994 · signal: accord · confidence high
United States v. Miller, supra, [317 U.S.] at 374 [, 63 S.Ct. at 280 ]; accord, City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 [, 36 S.Ct. 25, 26 , 60 L.Ed. 143 ] (1915); United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 [, 81 S.Ct. 784, 790 , 5 L.Ed.2d 838 ] (1961); Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 [, 93 S.Ct. 791, 794 , 35 L.Ed.2d 1 ] (1973). ^ ^ ^ ^ But while the indemnity principle must yield to some extent before the need for a practical general rule, [the Supreme] Court has refused to designate market value as the sole measure of just…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. 564.54 Acres of Monroe and Pike County Land (2×)
SCOTUS · 1979 · signal: accord · confidence high
United States v. Miller, supra, at 374 ; accord, City of New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57, 61 (1915); United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U. S. 624, 633 (1961); Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 470, 474 (1973).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Commissioner v. Towpath Associates (3×)
Conn. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 , 36 S. Ct. 25 , 60 L.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission (3×)
Iowa · 1963 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also City of New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57, 61 , 36 S. Ct. 25, 26 , 60 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Buckles
Ill. · 1962 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57 , 69 L. ed. 143, where it was held that the value to the condemnor of a piece of land combined with other parcels cannot be used as a guide to the compensation to which the owner is entitled.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
City of New York
v.
Sage
34.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 8, 1915.
239 U.S. 57
Mr. Louis C. White and Mr. W. McM. Speer with whom Mr. Frank L. Polk was on the brief, for petitioner:, Mr. Edward A. Alexander for respondent:
Holmes.
Cited by 133 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 91%
Citer courts: E.D. Texas (2)
Me. Justice Holmes

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a proceeding for the taking of land for the Ashokan reservoir, similar to the one before us in McGovern v. New York, 229 U. S. 363. After Commissioners were appointed to ascertain the compensation to be paid the case was removed to the Circuit Court, diverse citizenship being alleged. There was a motion to remand which was overruled and subsequently the Commissioners reported that “the sum of $7,624.45 for land and buildings and the further, sum of $4,324.45 for reservoir availability and adaptability being a grand total of the sum of $11,948.90 is the sum ascertained and determined by us . . . to be paid to the owners of and all persons interested in said land for the taking of the fee thereof, designated ... as Parcel 733.” They also recommended the allowance of five per cent, on the above award for legal fees and expenses, and of $1,372.31 to named witnesses in specified sums. The report was confirmed by the Circuit Judge, 190 Fed. Rep. 413, and afterwards by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 206 Fed. Rep. 369. 124 C. C. A. 251.

Upon an inspection of the record it appears to us, as the language of the Commissioners on its face suggests, that their report does not mean that the claimant’s land had a[*61] market value of $11,948.90 — that it would have brought that sum at a fair sale — but that they considered the value of the reservoir as a whole and allowed what they thought a fair proportion of the increase, over and above the market value of the lot, to the owner of the land, subject to the opinion of the court upon the point of law thus raised. Upon that point we are of opinion that they were wrong.

The decisions appear to us to have made the principles plain. No doubt when this class of questions first arose it was said in a general way that adaptability to the purposes for which the land could be used most profitably was to be considered; and that is true. But it is to be considered only so far as the public would have considered it if the land had been offered for sale in the absence of the City’s exercise of the power of eminent domain.. The fact that the most profitable use' could be made only in connection with other land is not conclusive against its being taken into account, if the union of properties necessary is so practicable that the possibility would affect the market price. But what the owner is entitled to is the value of the property taken, and that means what it fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given for it in fact — not what a tribunal at a later date may think a purchaser would have been wise to give, nor a proportion of the advance due to its union with other lots. The City is not to be made to pay for any part of what it has added to the land by thus uniting it with other lots, if that union would not have been practicable or have been attempted except by the intervention of eminent domain. Any rise in value before the taking, not caused by the expectation of that event, is to be allowed, but we repeat, it must be a rise in what a purchaser might be expected to give.

It is said that in this case there was testimony that the lot was worth more than the total allowed. But the only[*62] explanation of the separation of items by the Commissioners is that they were not prepared to say that the market value of the lot was $11,948.90, seeing that the claimant bought it a few days before for $4,500, but that they thought the additional value gained by thé City’s act should be taken into account and shared between the City and the owner of the land — a proposition to which we cannot assent. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 451. McGovern v. New York, 229 U. S. 363, 372.

The motion to remand was made on the ground that Sage bought after the condemnation, proceedings were commenced and therefore was not entitled to remove the suit to the Circuit Court. The maps showing the parcels of real estate to be taken had been filed and notices had been posted on the property before the conveyance to Sage, but the petition for the appointment of Commissioners was not filed until after it had been made. We see no reason to differ from the opinion of the Judges below that the proceeding was not commenced at the date when Sage took.

Decree reversed.