Dep't of Transp. v. Bishop, 453 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · Go Syfert
Dep't of Transp. v. Bishop, 453 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
31 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. JARVIE Et Al. (gactapp, 2014-11-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. JARVIE Et Al.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Here, the DOT’s relevant on-site conduct was monitoring the method of construction as previously approved. 15 Compare Magueur v. Dept. of Transp., 248 Ga. App. 575, 577 ( 547 SE2d 304 ) (2001) (DOT immune for negligently inspecting construction plans and construction site on county road project). 16 The plaintiffs raise no issue regarding the independent contractor status of Seaboard or its subcontractors. 17 (Punctuation omitted.) Sommers Oil Co. v. Ga. Dept. of Agriculture, 305 Ga. App. 330, 332 ( 699 SE2d 537 ) (2010) (State agency is immune from suit predicated on State employee’s coll…
cited Cited as authority (rule) City of Ila, Georgia v. Bobby L. Hagan
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Or, stated succinctly, “[t]he state is only liable in tort actions within the limitations of the [GTCA].” Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Bishop, 216 Ga. App. 57, 58 (1) ( 453 SE2d 478 ) (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hagan v. Georgia Department of Transportation
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Or, stated succinctly, “[t]he state is only liable in tort actions within the limitations of the [GTCA].” Dept. of Transp. v. Bishop, 216 Ga. App. 57, 58 (1) ( 453 SE2d 478 ) (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia Forestry Commission v. Canady
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Smith v. Dept. of Human Resources, 257 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) (b) ( 570 SE2d 337 ) (2002) (where complaint alleged Department was negligent in revoking an assisted living facility operator’s approval as a Medicaid provider, Department was entitled to summary judgment under the licensing exception to waiver of sovereign immunity); Lewis v. Dept. of Human Resources, 255 Ga. App. 805, 809-810 ( 567 SE2d 65 ) (2002) (where complaint alleged Department was negligent in failing to enforce regulations applicable to a personal care home where the decedent was fatally injured, Department was entitled to…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Department of Transportation v. Watts
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
We therefore limit our analysis to that Code section. 2 Bd. of Public Safety v. Jordan, 252 Ga. App. 577, 583 (1) ( 556 SE2d 837 ) (2001). 3 Id. 4 Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed.). 5 Long v. State, 202 Ga. 235, 237 ( 42 SE2d 729 ) (1947). 6 OCGA § 40-6-181 (b). 7 OCGA § 40-6-181 (c). 8 OCGA § 40-6-182. 9 See Long, supra. 10 See generally Dept. of Transp. v. Bishop, 216 Ga. App. 57, 58 (1) ( 453 SE2d 478 ) (1995) (trial court erred in denying summary judgment to Department which, under OCGA § 50-21-24 (9), could not be held liable for losses resulting from its approval of constructio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lewis v. Department of Human Resources
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Skelly, for appellee. 1 Dept. of Transp. v. Bishop, 216 Ga. App. 57, 58 (1) ( 453 SE2d 478 ) (1995). 2 Project Control Svcs. v. Reynolds, 247 Ga. App. 889, 891 (1) ( 545 SE2d 593 ) (2001). 3 Colvin v. United States of America, 153 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 267 SE2d 297 ) (1980). 4 Ridley v. Johns, 274 Ga. 241 ( 552 SE2d 853 ) (2001). 5 Ga. Ports Auth. v. Harris, 274 Ga. 146, 149 (2) ( 549 SE2d 95 ) (2001). 6 Bacon v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 241 Ga. App. 211, 212-213 ( 525 SE2d 115 ) (1999). 7 Magueur v. Dept. of Transp., 248 Ga. App. 575, 577 ( 547 SE2d 304 ) (2001). 8 Brown v. District Court &c., 23…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Furthermore, “[a] statute shall be construed so as to give full force and effect to all of its provisions and so as to reconcile any apparent conflicts.” (Punctuation omitted.) Dept. of Transp. v. Bishop, 216 Ga. App. 57, 58 ( 453 SE2d 478 ) (1994).
discussed Cited "see" Department of Transportation v. Kovalcik (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dept. of Transp. v. Bishop, 216 Ga. App. 57 ( 453 SE2d 478 ) (1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Reidling v. City of Gainesville (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Moran v. Kia Motors America, 276 Ga. App. 6, 97-98 (1) ( 622 SE2d 439 ) (2005). 11 Comanche Constr. v. Dept. of Transp., 272 Ga. App. 766, 769 (2) ( 613 SE2d 158 ) (2005). 12 Dept. of Transp. v. Bishop, 216 Ga. App. 57, 58 (1) ( 453 SE2d 478 ) (1994). 13 DeKalb County v. Orwig, 261 Ga. 137, 138 (1) ( 402 SE2d 513 ) (1991). 14 Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 433 (1) ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978). 15 Morris v. Douglas County Bd. of Health, 274 Ga. 898 (1) ( 561 SE2d 393 ) (2002). 16 Jones v. E.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Georgia State Board of Pardons & Paroles v. Finch (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. Bishop, 216 Ga. App. 57, 58 (1) ( 453 SE2d 478 ) (1995).
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
v.
BISHOP Et Al.
A94A2507.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Dec 13, 1994.
453 S.E.2d 478
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, George P. Shingler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cathy A. Cox-Brakefield, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant., Fuller & McKay, Kenneth C. Fuller, for appellees.
Blackburn, Birdsong, Ruffin.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
Blackburn, Judge.

This is an appeal from the denial of the Georgia Department of Transportation’s (DOT) motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death action.

The appellees, Lynn Hill Bishop and Donnie Hill (the Hills), the surviving parents of Judith Hill, filed the instant action against the DOT pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act. A DOT engineer approved the construction of a brick decorative wall on top of an existing concrete retaining wall at the intersection of State Route 20 and Horseleg Creek Road in Floyd County. On April 20, 1991, the brick wall allegedly obstructed the decedent’s vision and hearing when she proceeded into the intersection and her vehicle was struck by a police vehicle responding to an emergency call. The engineer was not named as a party to the action.

In its motion for summary judgment, DOT asserted that this action was barred by the licensing function or the discretionary function exceptions to the Georgia Tort Claims Act. In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that a jury question remained as to whether DOT acted in good faith in approving the construction of the brick wall, considering its violations of the federal and state standards on sight distances, and violations of the department’s regulations. The court further concluded that whether the engineer’s approval of the construction of the retaining wall involved a discretionary or ministerial function was a matter for jury resolution.

1. The Georgia Tort Claims Act became effective July 1, 1992, but applies retroactively to tort claims or causes of actions, such as the present action, which accrued on or after January 1, 1991. OCGA § 50-21-27 (a). See also Collier v. Whitworth, 205 Ga. App. 758 (423 SE2d 440) (1992). “[T]he Act provides for a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity for torts of state officers and employees while acting[*58] within the scope of their official duties or employment, OCGA § 50-21-23 (a), unless the alleged tortious act falls within one of the exceptions set forth in OCGA § 50-21-24.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 759. See also Howard v. Burch, 210 Ga. App. 515 (436 SE2d 573) (1993).

Decided December 13, 1994 Reconsideration denied January 12, 1995 Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, George P. Shingler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cathy A. Cox-Brakefield, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Fuller & McKay, Kenneth C. Fuller, for appellees.

OCGA § 50-21-24 (9) specifically provides that the state shall have no liability for losses resulting from “ [licensing powers or functions, including, but not limited to, the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.” This statutory exclusion is not limited to those licensing functions deemed discretionary in nature in view of the entire legislative scheme of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, which contains a separate exclusion for discretionary functions. To so limit the application of this exclusion would render the entire provision meaningless, which is contrary to the general rules of statutory construction. Cf. Malloy v. State of New Jersey, 388 A2d 622 (N.J. 1978) (the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to limit its licensing exception to its Tort Claims Act and render the provision surplusage in view of a preceding section in the Act which immunized a public entity from liability for discretionary activities). “[A] statute shall be construed so as to give full force and effect to all of its provisions and so as to reconcile any apparent conflicts. [Cits.]” Head v. H. J. Russell Constr. Co., 152 Ga. App. 864, 865 (264 SE2d 313) (1980).

The state is only liable in tort actions within the limitations of the Georgia Tort Claims Act. OCGA § 50-21-21 (a). Since the Hills’ lawsuit arises from the state’s approval of a permit for the construction of the decorative wall, and this claim is specifically excluded by the Act, the DOT was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Collier, supra. Cf. Mosier v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 213 Ga. App. 545 (445 SE2d 535) (1994); Howard, supra.

2. The DOT’s remaining enumeration of error concerning the application of the discretionary function exception to the Tort Claims Act is rendered moot in light of our opinion in Division 1.

Judgment reversed.

Birdsong, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur.