Expouse for federal civil rights violations.

- Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., does not expand the state's exposure for federal civil rights actions beyond that provided in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Doe #102 v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 582, 492 S.E.2d 516 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047, 118 S. Ct. 1363, 140 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1998).

Construction with tolling provision of O.C.G.A.

§ 36-33-5(d). - The tolling provision of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) cannot be harmonized with the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., and, thus, has no application to suits brought pursuant to the GTCA, notwithstanding the language of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(e). Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth. v. Foster, 329 Ga. App. 258, 764 S.E.2d 862 (2014).

In a suit against a state transit authority, the trial court erred by denying the authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings because the passenger's suit was time-barred since the suit was filed after the running of the two-year statute of limitation applicable to tort claims brought against the state pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq.; O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(c) and the tolling provision of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) could not be harmonized with the GTCA and, thus, had no application. Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth. v. Foster, 329 Ga. App. 258, 764 S.E.2d 862 (2014).

Tolling of claims against municipal corporations.

- In a tort action brought by a passenger against a regional transportation authority, the reversal of the denial of the authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings was upheld because, by its terms, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) permitted the tolling of the period of limitation only for claims against municipal corporations and it was not a municipal corporation. Foster v. Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 297 Ga. 714, 777 S.E.2d 446 (2015).

Statute not tolled when plaintiff could not establish lack of fault for delay.

- Statute of limitations was not tolled on the plaintiff's state law claims when the plaintiff's failure to effect proper service in accordance with the Georgia Tort Claims Act for over a year after filing the plaintiff's complaint, knowing of the defendants' attack on the sufficiency of service of process, precluded the plaintiff from establishing lack of fault for the delay. Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (S.D. Ga. 2015).

Claim filed under the renewal statute.

- Plaintiff's tort action against the Georgia Ports Authority complied with the statute of limitations and ante litem notice statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-26(a)(4) and50-21-27(c), and the plaintiff's second action was proper under the renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, but was dismissed for failure to timely attach the ante litem notice. The plaintiff's third action was improper because dismissal of the first action occurred outside the statute of limitations, so only one renewal was authorized. Burroughs v. Georgia Ports Authority, 339 Ga. App. 294, 793 S.E.2d 538 (2016).

Cited in Datz v. Brinson, 208 Ga. App. 455, 430 S.E.2d 823 (1993); Sylvester v. DOT, 252 Ga. App. 31, 555 S.E.2d 740 (2001); Backensto v. Ga. DOT, 284 Ga. App. 41, 643 S.E.2d 302 (2007).