O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) It is the specific intent of the General Assembly that this article shall operate retroactively so as to apply to tort claims or causes of action which accrued on or after January 1, 1991. A tort claim or cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the loss was or should have been discovered. This article shall not apply to tort claims or causes of action which accrued prior to January 1, 1991. (b) For tort claims and causes of action which accrued between January 1, 1991, and July 1, 1992, any tort action brought pursuant to this article is forever barred unless it is commenced within two years after July 1, 1992. (c) For tort claims and causes of action which accrue on or after July 1, 1992, any tort action brought pursuant to this article is forever barred unless it is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered. (d) Statutes of ultimate repose and abrogation, as provided for elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to claims and actions brought pursuant to this article. (e) All provisions relating to the tolling of limitations of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought pursuant to this article.
History
Code 1981, § 50-21-27, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 1883, § 1.
Annotations
Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1992, ‘‘July 1,
1992’’ was substituted for ‘‘the effective date of this article’’ in two places in subsection (b) and once in subsection (c).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Expouse for federal civil rights violations. - Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., does not expand the state’s exposure for federal civil rights actions beyond that provided in
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Doe #102 v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 582, 492 S.E.2d 516 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047, 118 S. Ct. 1363, 140 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1998). Tolling of claims against municipal
corporations. - In a tort action brought by a passenger against a regional transportation authority, the reversal of the denial of the authority’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was upheld because, by its terms, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) permitted the tolling of the period of limitation only for claims against municipal corporations and it was not a municipal corporation. Foster v. Ga. Reg’l Transp. Auth., 297 Ga. 714, 777 S.E.2d 446 (2015). Statute not tolled when plaintiff could not establish lack of fault for delay. - Statute of limitations was not tolled on the plaintiff ’s state law claims when the plaintiff ’s failure to effect proper service in accordance with the Georgia Tort Claims Act for over a year after filing the plaintiff ’s complaint, knowing of the defendants’ attack on the sufficiency of service of process, precluded the plaintiff from establishing lack of fault for the delay. Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (S.D. Ga. 2015). Claim filed under the renewal statute. - Plaintiff ’s tort action against the Georgia Ports Authority complied with the statute of limitations and ante litem
notice statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-26(a)(4) and 50-21-27(c), and the plaintiff ’s second action was proper under the renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, but was dismissed for failure to timely attach the ante litem notice. The plaintiff ’s third action was improper because dismissal of the first action occurred outside the statute of limitations, so only one renewal was authorized. Burroughs v. Georgia Ports Authority, 339 Ga. App. 294, 793 S.E.2d 538 (2016). Trial court did not err by dismissing the plaintiff ’s personal injury lawsuit on statute-of-limitation grounds because the first lawsuit did not name the same defendant and the two lawsuits named entirely different instrumentalities of the state; thus, the instant lawsuit was not a valid renewal action. Aaron v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority, 348 Ga. App. 332, 822 S.E.2d 829 (2019). Cited in Datz v. Brinson, 208 Ga. App. 455, 430 S.E.2d 823 (1993); Sylvester v. DOT, 252 Ga. App. 31, 555 S.E.2d 740 (2001); Backensto v. Ga. DOT, 284 Ga. App. 41, 643 S.E.2d 302 (2007).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
30
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1992–2025 · leading case:
Bd. of Regents v. Canas, 672 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
Bd. of Regents v. Canas, 672 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 6× “OCGA § 50-21-27 (a) expressly provides that, under the Act, “[a] tort claim or cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the loss was or should have been discovered.”
Dep't of Pub. Saf. v. Ragsdale, 839 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 2020).
· cites it 6× “This conclusion is bolstered by OCGA § 50- 21-27 (c), which separately sets forth the Tort Claims Act’s statute of limitation: “[A]ny tort action brought pursuant to this article is forever barred unless it is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have…”
Dep't of Human Resources v. Phillips, 486 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. 1997).
· cites it 8× “OCGA § 50-21-27 (a) barred entry of a judgment in the amount of the verdict, and it was the trial court’s duty, when a party questioned the constitutionality of that statute, to exercise its inherent authority to modify the pretrial order to prevent manifest injustice by…”
Georgia Reg'l Transp. Auth. v. Foster, 764 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 25× “GRTA moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Foster’s lawsuit was time-barred because it had been filed after the running of the two-year statute of limitation applicable to tort claims brought against the State, OCGA § 50-21-27 (c).”
Georgia Dep't of Pub. Saf. v. Ragsdale., 821 S.E.2d 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 8× “The State argues that OCGA § 9-3-99 does not apply to the one-year ante litem notice requirement contained in OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) because the notice provision is not a statute of limitation, of which there is a separate two-year provision applicable in the GTCA pursuant to OCGA…”
Bd. of Regents v. Oglesby, 591 S.E.2d 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 4× “In its ruling, the trial court looked to OCGA § 50-21-27 (a), which states that “[a] tort claim or cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the loss was or should have been discovered.”
Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (S.D. Ga. 2015).
· cites it 2× “See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(c). When service is accomplished after the statute of limitation expires, as would be the case here, the timely-filed complaint tolls the statute only upon a showing that the plaintiff acted reasonably and diligently in effecting proper service as quickly…”
Foster v. Georgia Reg'l Transp. Auth., 777 S.E.2d 446 (Ga. 2015).
· cites it 6× “The Authority moved for judgment on the pleadings, noting that the period of limitation for a claim under the Tort Claims Act is two years, see OCGA § 50-21-27 (c), and Foster filed her lawsuit more than two years after she sustained the injuries in question.”
Hardin v. Phillips, 547 S.E.2d 565 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 50-21-27 (a). 8 Wang v. Moore, 247 Ga.”
DOE 102 v. Dep't of Corr., 492 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1997).
· cites it 4× “Contrary to Doe’s assertion, this is not changed by OCGA § 50-21-27 (b), 3 as its terms do not call for an extension of the period for filing § 1983 claims.”
Curtis v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 416 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1992).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 50-21-27 (a) (as amended 1992). By making the Georgia Tort Claims Act retroactive to apply to any cause of action that accrued on or after January 1,1991, the legislature demonstrated its intent not to leave a group of plaintiffs without a remedy.”
— 50-21-27(a) — 3 cases
Dep't of Human Resources v. Phillips, 486 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. 1997).
“OCGA § 50-21-27 (a) barred entry of a judgment in the amount of the verdict, and it was the trial court’s duty, when a party questioned the constitutionality of that statute, to exercise its inherent authority to modify the pretrial order to prevent manifest injustice by…”
— 50-21-27(c) — 1 case
Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (S.D. Ga. 2015).
“See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(c). When service is accomplished after the statute of limitation expires, as would be the case here, the timely-filed complaint tolls the statute only upon a showing that the plaintiff acted reasonably and diligently in effecting proper service as quickly…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.