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2018 Georgia Code 50-21-27 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 50-21-27 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 50-21-27

TITLE 50 STATE GOVERNMENT

Section 21. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity as to Actions Ex Contractu; State Tort Claims, 50-21-1 through 50-21-37.

ARTICLE 2 STATE TORT CLAIMS

50-21-27. Retroactive operation; limitations of actions; applicability of other related statutes.

  1. It is the specific intent of the General Assembly that this article shall operate retroactively so as to apply to tort claims or causes of action which accrued on or after January 1, 1991.A tort claim or cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the loss was or should have been discovered.This article shall not apply to tort claims or causes of action which accrued prior to January 1, 1991.
  2. For tort claims and causes of action which accrued between January 1, 1991, and July 1, 1992, any tort action brought pursuant to this article is forever barred unless it is commenced within two years after July 1, 1992.
  3. For tort claims and causes of action which accrue on or after July 1, 1992, any tort action brought pursuant to this article is forever barred unless it is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered.
  4. Statutes of ultimate repose and abrogation, as provided for elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to claims and actions brought pursuant to this article.
  5. All provisions relating to the tolling of limitations of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought pursuant to this article.

(Code 1981, §50-21-27, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 1883, § 1.)

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1992, "July 1, 1992" was substituted for "the effective date of this article" in two places in subsection (b) and once in subsection (c).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Expouse for federal civil rights violations.

- Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., does not expand the state's exposure for federal civil rights actions beyond that provided in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Doe #102 v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 582, 492 S.E.2d 516 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047, 118 S. Ct. 1363, 140 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1998).

Construction with tolling provision of O.C.G.A.

§ 36-33-5(d). - The tolling provision of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) cannot be harmonized with the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq., and, thus, has no application to suits brought pursuant to the GTCA, notwithstanding the language of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(e). Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth. v. Foster, 329 Ga. App. 258, 764 S.E.2d 862 (2014).

In a suit against a state transit authority, the trial court erred by denying the authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings because the passenger's suit was time-barred since the suit was filed after the running of the two-year statute of limitation applicable to tort claims brought against the state pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq.; O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(c) and the tolling provision of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) could not be harmonized with the GTCA and, thus, had no application. Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth. v. Foster, 329 Ga. App. 258, 764 S.E.2d 862 (2014).

Tolling of claims against municipal corporations.

- In a tort action brought by a passenger against a regional transportation authority, the reversal of the denial of the authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings was upheld because, by its terms, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(d) permitted the tolling of the period of limitation only for claims against municipal corporations and it was not a municipal corporation. Foster v. Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 297 Ga. 714, 777 S.E.2d 446 (2015).

Statute not tolled when plaintiff could not establish lack of fault for delay.

- Statute of limitations was not tolled on the plaintiff's state law claims when the plaintiff's failure to effect proper service in accordance with the Georgia Tort Claims Act for over a year after filing the plaintiff's complaint, knowing of the defendants' attack on the sufficiency of service of process, precluded the plaintiff from establishing lack of fault for the delay. Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (S.D. Ga. 2015).

Claim filed under the renewal statute.

- Plaintiff's tort action against the Georgia Ports Authority complied with the statute of limitations and ante litem notice statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-26(a)(4) and50-21-27(c), and the plaintiff's second action was proper under the renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, but was dismissed for failure to timely attach the ante litem notice. The plaintiff's third action was improper because dismissal of the first action occurred outside the statute of limitations, so only one renewal was authorized. Burroughs v. Georgia Ports Authority, 339 Ga. App. 294, 793 S.E.2d 538 (2016).

Cited in Datz v. Brinson, 208 Ga. App. 455, 430 S.E.2d 823 (1993); Sylvester v. DOT, 252 Ga. App. 31, 555 S.E.2d 740 (2001); Backensto v. Ga. DOT, 284 Ga. App. 41, 643 S.E.2d 302 (2007).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Dep't of Human Resources v. Phillips, 486 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 56 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 16, 1997 | 268 Ga. 316, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 2581

...fore entering judgment. After all, the jury had concluded that DHR was responsible for Ms. Phillips' death, and that Ms. Phillips' estate and her mother had proven suffering and damage which justified compensation in the amount of $3.5 million. OCGA § 50-21-27(a) barred entry of a judgment in the amount of the verdict, and it was the trial court's duty, when a party questioned the constitutionality of that statute, to exercise its inherent authority to modify the pretrial order to prevent manifest injustice by permitting a legal discussion of the issue....
...I would suggest that if the pretrial order can be modified by the appellate court 21 months after the judgment was entered, surely the trial court had the power to modify the pretrial order nine days after the verdict and prior to entry of judgment. [33] OCGA § 50-21-27(a) provides that the Act, which became effective July 1, 1992, "shall operate retroactively so as to apply to tort claims or causes of action which accrued on or after January 1, 1991." This wrongful death action accrued on February 2, 1992, when Lisa Phillips died....
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Curtis v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 416 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1992).

Cited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 21, 1992 | 262 Ga. 226, 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 757

...er January 1, 1991. A tort claim or cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the loss was or should have been discovered. This article shall not apply to tort claims or causes of action which accrued prior to January 1, 1991. OCGA § 50-21-27 (a) (as amended 1992)....
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Dep't of Pub. Saf. v. Ragsdale, 839 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 28, 2020 | 308 Ga. 210

...t Claims Act’s statute of limitation: “[A]ny tort action brought pursuant to this article is forever barred unless it is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered.” In the same Code section, OCGA § 50-21-27 (e) expressly provides that “[a]ll provisions relating to the tolling of limitations of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act].”4 OCGA § 50-21-26, on the other hand, contains no 4 OCGA § 50-21-27 (e) “means just what it says: statutory tolling provisions apply to claims under the Tort Claims Act in the same way, in the same manner, and to the same extent that those provisions would apply to claims not brought under the Tort Claims Act.” Foster v....
...544, 548 (2) (533 SE2d 109) (2000); Jacobs v. Littleton, 241 Ga. App. 403, 406 (3) (b) (525 SE2d 433) (1999). 10 actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code,” within the Code section setting forth its two-year statute of limitation, OCGA § 50-21-27, but not in its ante litem notice provision, OCGA § 50-21-26....
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DOE 102 v. Dep't of Corr., 492 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 3, 1997 | 268 Ga. 582, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 4006

...573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Giles v. Garwood, 853 F.2d 876 (11th Cir.1988); Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624 (11th Cir.1986). Contrary to Doe's assertion, this is not changed by OCGA § 50-21-27(b), [3] as its terms do not call for an extension of the period for filing § 1983 claims....
...Seckinger, Civil Action No. 84-313-1-MAC(CWH). [2] OCGA § 50-21-28 provides in relevant part, "[a]ll tort actions against the state under [the GTCA] shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred." [3] OCGA § 50-21-27(b) provides, "For tort claims and causes of action which accrued between January 1, 1991, and July 1, 1992, any tort action brought pursuant to this article is forever barred unless it is commenced within two years after July 1, 1992."
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Henderson v. Dep't of Transp., 475 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 9, 1996 | 267 Ga. 90, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3213

...The service provisions of the Act are contained in OCGA § 50-21-35, while the notice provisions are codified at OCGA § 50-21-26. [2] OCGA § 50-21-35. [3] OCGA § 50-21-35. [4] Id. [5] Under § 50-21-26, Henderson had twelve months from July 1, 1992, to notify the state of her claim. [6] Ga. L.1992, p. 1183, § 2. [7] OCGA § 50-21-27(a)....
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Foster v. Georgia Reg'l Transp. Auth., 297 Ga. 714 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 14, 2015 | 777 S.E.2d 446

...alleging that the Authority is liable in tort for injuries that she sustained while riding as a passenger on its bus. The Authority moved for judgment on the pleadings, noting that the period of limitation for a claim under the Tort Claims Act is two years, see OCGA § 50-21-27 (c), and Foster filed her lawsuit more than two years after she sustained the injuries in question.1 Foster, however, had given ante litem notice of her claim to the Authority and the Department of Administrative Services as required b...
...on was tolled for so long as her 1 Foster allegedly was injured on an Authority bus on August 16, 2011. She filed her lawsuit on September 18, 2013. notice of claim was pending.2 In support of this argument, Foster pointed to OCGA § 50-21-27 (e), which provides that “[a]ll provisions relating to the tolling of limitations of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act],” and OCGA § 36- 33-5 (d),...
...punctuation omitted), and so, “we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” FDIC v. Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579, 588 (2) (761 SE2d 332) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). According to OCGA § 50-21-27 (e), “[a]ll provisions relating to the tolling of limitations of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act].” (Emphasis supplied.) The statute means just w...