State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993). · Go Syfert
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State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2004–2024 · …or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process. at p. 3 ✓
310 citation events (84 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: City of Miami Beach v. Adalberto Cosme (fladistctapp, 2024-02-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) City of Miami Beach v. Adalberto Cosme
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Cabrera v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Scott v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
nce reenacted as a portion of the florida statutes, a chapter law is no longer subject to challenge on the grounds that it violates the single subject requirement of article iii.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Van Lent v. the Everglades Foundation, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“For an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.” Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 1994) (quoting State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) HEART OF ADOPTIONS, INC. v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
This delay did not amount to a fundamental error that is "basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process." See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WILLIE JAMES SIMPSON vs STATE OF FLORIDA (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
See Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 568 (Fla. 2008); State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JUAN CARLOS GONZALEZ v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Order No. AOSC20-23, Amend. 5 (Aug. 12, 2020). 3 Fundamental error is error “so prejudicial to the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial that reversal is required even absent a contemporaneous objection.” Louidor v. State, 162 So. 3d 305, 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). “[F]or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.” Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 1994) (quoting State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993)). 4 Gonzalez does n…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) T.E.B., A CHILD v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Fundamental error is error that “reach[es] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.” Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960). “[F]or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.” State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993). 5 Battery is a first-degree misdemeanor. § 784.03(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2020).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) I.T., THE MOTHER v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
MCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 988 So. 2d 1148, 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Sparks v. State, 740 So. 2d 33, 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993); Alamo Rent–A–Car v. Phillips, 613 So. 2d 56 , 58 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla. 1981). 2 trial, the operative administrative order provided, in relevant part: “Termination of parental rights and juvenile delinquency cases shall be conducted remotely if ordered by the chief judge or the presiding judge or, if not, shall be conducted in person.” In re: Comprehensive COV…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Giardina v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2019 · confidence medium
Giardina has not shown that the state appellate court’s rejection of his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, 10 See State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1993) (explaining that a facial challenge to a statute’s validity may be raised for the first time on appeal only if the error is fundamental and finding that the validity of a statute allowing enhanced sentences for habitual violent felony offenders could be raised for the first time on appeal because it was basic to the judicial decision under review and involved funda…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donald Otis Williams v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
Mordenti v. State, 630 So. 2d 1080, 1084 (Fla. 1994). “[F]or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due - 33 - process.” State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (citing D’Oleo-Valdez v. State, 531 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1988); Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1981)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark James Asay v. State of Florida, SC16-102 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc. & SC16-628 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc. (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth Isaac Parkerson v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
However, “[a] facial challenge to a statute’s constitutional validity may be raised for the first time on appeal ... if the error is fundamental.” State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Currilly
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
We reject the State’s argument that the legal basis for the prosecutor’s objection is apparent from the argument presented below; at no point during the sentencing hearing did the prosecutor argue that it is improper to withhold adjudication of guilt after a revocation of probation, nor did the State ever mention section 948.06(2)(b). 3 Likewise, we reject the State’s argument that the error in this case is fundamental error that can be raised on appeal despite the lack of preservation below because the error is not “basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denia…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Middleton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
In State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1993), the Florida Supreme Court stated: “[W]e conclude that chapter 91-44’s biennial reenactment of chapter 89-280, effective May 2,1991, cured the single subject violation as it applied to all defendants sentenced under section 775.084 whose offenses were committed after that date.” Middleton was sentenced in 1994, well after any violation in the statute had been cured.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roberts v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
In his pro se motion, Roberts also acknowledged that the Johnson court had further ruled “that chapter 91-44⅛ biennial reenactment of chapter 89-280, effective May 2, 1991, cured the single subject violation as it applied to all defendants sentenced under section 775.084 whose offenses were committed after that date.” Johnson, 616 So.2d at 4 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nawaz v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Fundamental error “must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.” Hopkins v. State, 632 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Fla.1994) (quoting State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Quinnell v. Platt
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Because the alleged error was not preserved and it does not constitute fundamental error, see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993) (“for an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process”), appellant has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that harmful error occurred in ease number 1D08-4888.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shootes v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
It is well settled that “for an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.” State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hannum v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Jackson, 983 So.2d at 574 ). “ ‘[F]or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.’ ” Hopkins v. State, 632 So.2d 1372, 1374 (Fla.1994) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
An error is “fundamental” only when it is one that “goes to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause of action and is equivalent to a denial of due process.” J.B. v. State, 705 So.2d 1376 , 1378 (Fla.1998) (citing State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993)) (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fleitas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See also F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla.2003); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
However, this Court has cautioned that the fundamental error doctrine should be used "very guardedly." "[F]or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process." 632 So.2d at 1374 (citations omitted) (quoting Sanford, 237 So.2d at 137 , and State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leveritt v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
To constitute fundamental error, the asserted error must be “equivalent to a denial of due process.” Mordenti v. State, 630 So.2d 1080, 1084 (Fla.1994)(quoting State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993)), or “error that ‘reach[es] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error,’ ” Barnes v. State, 743 So.2d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla.1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jones
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Goodyear did not, however, challenge the facial constitutionality of the Act below, and "[a] facial challenge to a statute's constitutional validity may be raised for the first time on appeal only if the error is fundamental." State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Further: “[a]n error is fundamental when it goes to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause of action and is equivalent to a denial of due process.” J.B., 705 So.2d at 1378 (citing State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993)); see also Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186 , 191 n. 5 (Fla.1997) (holding that for an error to be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bush v. Holmes
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Fla.1982); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993); Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93, 105 (Fla.2002).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Franklin v. State (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
Grant, 770 So.2d at 657 (citing State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harvey v. State
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
For example, in State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993), we held that an unconstitutional amendment to the habitual offender statute could be attacked for the first time on appeal because it concerned a "facial challenge to a statute's constitutional validity" that did not involve any factual application, and because the unconstitutional statute affected Johnson's due process liberty interest, making its application fundamental error.
examined Cited as authority (rule) FLA. DHSMV v. Critchfield (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
This Court's decision in State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1993), also supports our conclusion that chapter 98-223 violates the single subject rule.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leveritt v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
To constitute fundamental error, the asserted error must be "equivalent to a denial of due process." Mordenti v. State, 630 So.2d 1080, 1084 (Fla.1994)(quoting State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993)), or "error that `reach[es] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error,'" Barnes v. State, 743 So.2d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla.1996)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
See Thompson, 750 So.2d at 647-48 ; State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1993); Bunnell, 453 So.2d at 809 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reed v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Fundamental error has been defined as "error which goes to the foundation of the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action," Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970); and as error which is "basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process." State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grant v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1993); accord Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167, 1172 (Fla.1991) ("The act may be as broad as the legislature chooses provided the matters included in the act have a natural or logical connection").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dixon v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n.4 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Watson v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trapp v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Salters v. State, 758 So.2d 667 , 669 n. 4 (Fla.2000); Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); cf. Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89, 98 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993). [5] Trapp requests that we also address whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to utilize a diagram to facilitate witness testimony.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valentine v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); cf. Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), ce rt. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carson v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See also Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 , 623 n. 4 (Fla.2000); cf. Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Medina v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); cf. Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garcia v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See also Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); cf. Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Levan v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993). [2] Through the passage of chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, the Legislature created the possession of a firearm offense for which Levan was convicted.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hunt v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 -623, 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999) cert. denied, -U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valdes v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 -623, 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); cf. Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crawford v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); cf. Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cyrus v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Waldo v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n.4 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Williams
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Cf. Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620, 623 , 624 n. 4 (Fla.2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 950 , 145 L.Ed.2d 825 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1993).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Cecil B. JOHNSON, Respondent. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Cecil B. JOHNSON, Appellee.
79150, 79204.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan 14, 1993.
616 So. 2d 1
Overton.
Cited by 239 opinions  |  Published

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., James W. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bureau Chief, and Charlie McCoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, for petitioner/appellant.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven A. Rothenburg and Jamie Spivey, Asst. Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for respondent/appellee.

[*2] OVERTON, Justice.

We have for review Johnson v. State, 589 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in which the district court held that the amendments to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989) (the habitual violent felony offender statute), contained in chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida, violated the single subject rule of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution.[1] The district court acknowledged conflict with Jamison v. State, 583 So.2d 413 (4th DCA), rev. denied, 591 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1991), and McCall v. State, 583 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991),[2] and certified the following to be a question of great public importance:

WHETHER THE CHAPTER 89-280 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 775.084(1)([b])(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR TO THEIR REENACTMENT AS PART OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES, BECAUSE IN VIOLATION OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION.

Johnson, 589 So.2d at 1372. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (3)-(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the affirmative and, for the reasons expressed, approve the decision of the district court in this case.

Through an information filed on July 23, 1990, Johnson was charged with the sale or delivery of cocaine. The offense occurred on July 5, 1990. Subsequently, the prosecution filed a notice of intent to classify Johnson as a habitual violent felony offender pursuant to section 775.084. The notice was filed on February 1, 1991, and sought to have Johnson's sentence enhanced on the basis of a prior violent felony conviction on July 16, 1987, for "aggravated battery." On February 21, 1991, Johnson was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years as a habitual violent felony offender, with a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence.

On appeal, Johnson contested his sentence on the grounds that the amendments to the habitual offender statute contained in chapter 89-280 violated the single subject rule of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. Chapter 89-280 contained amendments to sections 775.084, 775.0842, and 775.0843, Florida Statutes (1989), governing sentences for habitual felony offenders, and amendments to chapter 493, Florida Statutes (1989), relating to the repossession of personal property and the licensing requirements of persons authorized to repossess such property. Critical to Johnson's sentencing was the amendment to section 775.084(1)(b)(1)k, which added to the habitual violent felony offender category, a defendant who was previously convicted of an "aggravated battery."

Chapter 89-280 was enacted effective October 1, 1989. Chapter 91-44, Laws of Florida, reenacted the 1989 amendments contained in chapter 89-280, effective May 2, 1991, as part of the biennial adoption of the Florida Statutes. The reenactment has the effect of adopting as the official statutory law of the state those portions of statutes that are carried forward from the preceding adopted statutes. Once reenacted as a portion of the Florida Statutes, a chapter law is no longer subject to challenge on the grounds that it violates the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. See Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist. v. School Bd., 515 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1987); State v. Combs, 388 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 1980) (the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, only applies to "chapter laws," and sections of the Florida Statutes need not conform to the requirement); see also[*3] Linda S. Jessen, Preface to Florida Statutes at vi (1991).

Johnson's offense was committed before the reenactment of chapter 89-280 and during the window period in which that chapter was subject to attack as being violative of the constitution's single subject requirement. The window period in this instance ran from October 1, 1989, the effective date of chapter 89-280, to May 2, 1991, the date on which chapter 89-280 was reenacted. Consequently, Johnson had standing to raise the single subject violation. This single subject challenge was not raised before the trial court. Nevertheless, the district court addressed the issue and agreed that the constitutional single subject requirement had been violated, certifying the aforementioned question to this Court.

The State now challenges the district court's decision on two grounds. The State first asserts that Johnson is prohibited from challenging the constitutionality of chapter 89-280's amendments for the first time on appeal because the issue does not constitute fundamental error. Alternatively, the State contends that the amendments contained in chapter 89-280 do not violate article III, section 6, because the amendments all relate to the single subject of controlling crime and, consequently, are properly connected as required by the Florida Constitution.

The Fundamental Error Question

A facial challenge to a statute's constitutional validity may be raised for the first time on appeal only if the error is fundamental. Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1982); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1982); Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1970). In Sanford, we reviewed an article III, section 6, constitutional attack on the validity of a chapter law similar to the issue before us here. In that case, we evaluated the question of whether the arguments raised regarding an award of attorney's fees constituted fundamental error so as to allow us to consider a constitutional challenge to the chapter law's title, a challenge that had been raised for the first time on appeal. Because the merits of the case involved an employment retention and compensation question, we determined that the issue of attorney's fees did not go to the merits or the foundation of the case. Consequently, we refused to consider the constitutionality of the chapter law because no fundamental error question was raised. Sanford, 237 So.2d at 138. Subsequently, in reviewing other cases where issues were first being raised on appeal, we concluded that, for an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process. D'Oleo-Valdez v. State, 531 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1988); Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1981).

A review of the chapter law at issue reflects that it affects a quantifiable determinant of the length of sentence that may be imposed on a defendant. Section 775.084 allows a court to impose a substantially extended term of imprisonment on those defendants who qualify under the statute. Under the amendments to section 775.084 contained in chapter 89-280, Johnson was sentenced to a maximum sentence of twenty-five years, with a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years. Had he not qualified as a habitual offender under the new amendments, his maximum sentence under the guidelines would have been three and one-half years. Clearly, the habitual felony offender amendments contained in chapter 89-280 involve fundamental "liberty" due process interests. Contrary to the question raised in Sanford, we find the issue in this case to be a question of fundamental error.

We reached a similar conclusion in Trushin by finding that the arguments concerning the constitutional facial validity of the statute under which Trushin was convicted raised a fundamental error. 425 So.2d at 1130. However, we specifically noted in Trushin that "[t]he constitutional application of a statute to a particular set of facts is another matter and must be raised at the trial level." Id. at 1129-30. We conclude that the validity of chapter[*4] 89-280 falls within the definition of fundamental error as a matter of law and does not involve any factual application. Consequently, we hold that the challenge may be raised on appeal even though the claim was not raised before the trial court.

The Single Subject Requirement

Having found that the constitutional challenge is properly before this Court, we now address Johnson's contention that the amendments to the habitual felony offender statute contained in chapter 89-280 violate the single subject requirement of article III, section 6. We recently addressed the purpose of this single subject requirement in Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. 1991):

The purpose of this constitutional prohibition against a plurality of subjects in a single legislative act is to prevent "logrolling" where a single enactment becomes a cloak for dissimilar legislation having no necessary or appropriate connection with the subject matter. State v. Lee, 356 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1978). The act may be as broad as the legislature chooses provided the matters included in the act have a natural or logical connection. Chenoweth v. Kemp, 396 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1981).

In applying that purpose to chapter 89-280, we note the district court's description of that law:

The title of the act at issue designates it an act relating to criminal law and procedure. The first three sections of the act amend section 775.084, Florida Statutes, pertaining to habitual felony offenders; section 775.0842, Florida Statutes, pertaining to career criminal prosecutions; and section 775.0843, Florida Statutes, pertaining to policies for career criminal cases. Sections four through eleven of the act pertain to the Chapter 493 provisions governing private investigation and patrol services, specifically, repossession of motor vehicles and motorboats.

Johnson, 589 So.2d at 1371. As the district court noted, it is "difficult to discern a logical or natural connection between career criminal sentencing and repossession of motor vehicles by private investigators." Id. We agree. Chapter 89-280 addresses two very separate and distinct subjects, the first being the habitual offender statute, and the second being the licensing of private investigators and their authority to repossess personal property. These two concerns have absolutely no cogent connection; nor are they reasonably related to any crisis the legislature intended to address. See Scanlan; Burch v. State, 558 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1990); Bunnell v. State, 453 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1984). No reasonable explanation exists as to why the legislature chose to join these two subjects within the same legislative act, and we find that we must reject the State's contention that these two subjects relate to the single subject of controlling crime.

We hold that chapter 89-280 violates article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. However, we conclude that chapter 91-44's biennial reenactment of chapter 89-280, effective May 2, 1991, cured the single subject violation as it applied to all defendants sentenced under section 775.084 whose offenses were committed after that date. Consequently, the amendments contained within chapter 89-280 became effective on May 2, 1991, rather than October 1, 1989. See Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist. v. School Bd., 515 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1987); State v. Combs, 388 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 1980).

We realize that this decision will require the resentencing of a number of individuals who were sentenced as habitual felony offenders under section 775.084 as amended by chapter 89-280 and whose offenses were committed before May 2, 1991. However, the resentencing requirement will apply only to those defendants affected by the amendments to section 775.084 contained in chapter 89-280, such as the addition of the aggravated battery conviction category at issue here. This result is mandated by the legislature's failure to follow the single subject requirement of the constitution. Had the legislature passed the habitual offender amendments in a single act, this case would not be before us today.

[*5] Accordingly, for the reasons expressed, we approve the decision of the district court in the instant case and disapprove the decisions of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Jamison v. State, 583 So.2d 413 (4th DCA), rev. denied, 591 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1991), and McCall v. State, 583 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). This cause is remanded for resentencing in accordance with the valid laws in effect at the time of Johnson's sentencing on February 21, 1991.

It is so ordered.

BARKETT, C.J., and McDONALD, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.

GRIMES, J., concurs with an opinion.

GRIMES, Justice, concurring.

In Jamison v. State, 583 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 591 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1991), and McCall v. State, 583 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), the court relied upon this Court's decision in Burch v. State, 558 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1990), in concluding that chapter 89-280 did not violate the single subject rule. As the author of the Burch opinion, I find that case to be substantially different. The Burch legislation was upheld because it was a comprehensive law in which all of the parts were at least arguably related to its overall objective of crime control. Here, however, chapter 89-280 is directed only to two subjects — habitual offenders and repossession of motor vehicles and motor boats — which have no relationship to each other whatsoever. Thus, I conclude that this case is controlled by the principle of Bunnell v. State, 453 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1984), rather than Burch.

1 Article III, section 6, provides: "Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith... ."
2 McCall is a one paragraph opinion in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that chapter 89-280 did not violate the constitutional single subject requirement. As such, in Johnson the First District acknowledged conflict with McCall. However, the record in McCall reflects that McCall's sentence is actually outside the scope of this review. McCall was sentenced under section 775.084 because of several prior felony convictions, including delivery of cocaine and grand theft. None of the prior conviction categories under which McCall was habitualized were altered by the amendments to the statute contained in chapter 89-280. Consequently, McCall's sentence is unaffected by this opinion.