Joshua Stonecipher v. William E. Bray, 653 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1981). · Go Syfert
Joshua Stonecipher v. William E. Bray, 653 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“no cause of action against the irs under section 1983 because the irs is a federal agency and its agents performed no acts under color of state law”
141 citation events (25 in the last 25 years) across 37 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Fredyma v. IRS (nhd, 1998-01-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Fredyma v. IRS
D.N.H. · 1998 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
no cause of action against the irs under section 1983 because the irs is a federal agency and its agents performed no acts under color of state law
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. Unkown Trustee
D. Mont. · 2024 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas v. Spencer
S.D. Cal. · 2020 · confidence medium
See Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797 , 801 26 (9th Cir. 1995); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gray v. United States Department Of Justice
D. Nev. · 2020 · confidence medium
Teplitsky v. Dep’t of Justice, 127 F.3d 21 1106 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A Bivens action cannot be maintained against a federal agency.”). 22 2 See also Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding dismissal of a 23 § 1983 claim because “the IRS is a federal agency and its agents performed no acts under color of state law”). 1 Next, the United States is immune from lawsuits except as it has expressly waived its 2 sovereign immunity.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Emrit v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
D. Haw. · 2020 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017); Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1995); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cassandra Johnson v. United States
9th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Appellants failed to establish that their claims fall within the limited exception to the Anti-Injunction Act that we have recognized in Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), and subsequent cases.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Cleveland v. CIR
7th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Comm., 419 U.S. at 10 ; Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1986); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1981), and because the Tax Court does not have equitable jurisdiction to entertain Cleveland’s theory that withholding in his situation is unfair.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cleveland v. Commissioner
7th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Comm., 419 U.S. at 10 , 95 S.Ct. 13 ; Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir.1986); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 400-01 (9th Cir.1981), and because the Tax Court does not have equitable jurisdiction to entertain Cleveland’s theory that withholding in his situation is unfair.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tough v. Internal Revenue Service
6th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Robinson v. A & M Elec., Inc., 713 F.2d 608, 609 (10th Cir.1983); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beech v. Commissioner
D. Ariz. · 2001 · confidence medium
Similarly, in Wages , the Ninth Circuit said that “the remedies provided by Congress, particularly the right to sue the government for a refund of taxes improperly collected, foreclose a damage action under Bivens in this situation.” See also, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 , 108 S.Ct. 2460 , 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) (“When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”); and Sto…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pesci v. Internal Revenue Service (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Nev. · 1999 · confidence medium
Bright, 780 F.2d at 770 (citing Maxfield v. United States Postal Service, 752 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir.1984); Stonecipher, 653 F.2d at 403 (employer has not breached employment contract by withholding taxes from wages and paying employee the balance); Callow v. Amerace Corp., 681 F.2d 1242, 1243 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming dismissal of action against employer seeking to recover withheld federal and state income tax)); see Edgar v. Inland Steel Company, 744 F.2d 1276, 1278 (7th Cir.1984) (employees have no cause of action against employers to recover wages withheld and paid over to the government i…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Seber v. Unger (2×)
N.D. Ill. · 1995 · confidence medium
Id. at 424, 93 S.Ct. at 606 ; see also Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.1987); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Aubrey L. Teters Dolly G. Teters v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service
9th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982). 9 AFFIRMED. * The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tonn v. United States
D. Minnesota · 1993 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982); see Gonsalves v. IRS, 986 F.2d 1407 (table), text reported at 1993 WL 48808 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 151 , 126 L.Ed.2d 112 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gonsalves v. IRS
1st Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
But, because his "due process rights are adequately protected by the statutory scheme which allows him to contest his tax liability in the Tax Court prior to paying the disputed tax or to sue for a refund in federal district court . . . ," Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. at 595 ), these additional procedures are not constitutionally required.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gonsalves v. IRS
1st Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
But, because his "due process rights are adequately protected by the statutory scheme which allows him to contest his tax liability in the Tax Court prior to paying the disputed tax or to sue for a refund in federal district court . . . ," Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th ___________ ____ Cir. 1981) (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. at ________ ____________ 595), these additional procedures are not constitutionally ________________ required.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gilbert T. Gonsalves v. Internal Revenue Service
1st Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
But, because his "due process rights are adequately protected by the statutory scheme which allows him to contest his tax liability in the Tax Court prior to paying the disputed tax or to sue for a refund in federal district court ...," Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. at 595 ), these additional procedures are not constitutionally required.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jeff Slama v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John E. Judge v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See Wilcox, 848 F.2d at 1008 ; Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981) (due process rights are adequately protected by statutory scheme which allows taxpayer to contest liability in tax court or sue for refund in district court). 1 6 The tax court imposed $5,000 sanctions against Judge pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6673 for filing a frivolous petition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maisano v. Welcher
9th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Sec. 6502 (a); Todd v. United States, 849 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir.1988); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982)). 16 The Maisanos next assert that the tax lien must remain secret until reduced to judgment or until the conditions set forth in 31 U.S.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maisano v. Welcher
9th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Maisano, 908 F.2d at 409 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6502 (a); Todd v. United States, 849 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir.1988); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitcombe v. United States Department of Treasury
9th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir.1982); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982). 18 The seizure of the trucks certainly caused financial hardship.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ralph J. Maisano, III and Audrey D. Maisano v. United States
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Under section 6502 of the Code, the IRS is authorized to collect the assessed amount by either a “levy or by a proceeding in court.” 26 U.S.C. § 6502 (a) (emphasis added); see also Todd v. United States, 849 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir.1988) (“taxpayers do not have the right to a hearing prior to collection efforts by the IRS”); Stonecipher v. Brag, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981) (argument that due process requires the IRS to grant hearing *410 before determining the taxpayer’s liability for federal income tax is foreclosed by well-settled law; moreover, “due process rights are adequ…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hollett v. Browning
E.D. Cal. · 1988 · confidence medium
As explained in Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982): The prompt collection of taxes is necessary for the nation’s continued existence and is an important governmental interest that justifies postponing notice and an opportunity for a hearing ...
cited Cited as authority (rule) San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical Group, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, Board of Supervisors for San Bernardino, Francis L. Comunale
9th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gallman v. Pierce
N.D. Cal. · 1986 · confidence medium
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 , 95 S.Ct. 449, 452 , 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) King v. State Of California
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
For the elements of civil rights cases, see Central Building Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 388-91 , 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3148-50 , 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982) (Section 1981); Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646 , 649 (9th Cir.1984) (Section 1983); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982) (Section 1985); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 , 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2050-51 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) King v. California
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
For the elements of civil rights cases, see Central Building Contractors Ass’n. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 388-91 , 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3148-50 , 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982) (Section 1981); Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646 , 649 (9th Cir.1984) (Section 1983); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982) (Section 1985); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 , 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2050-51 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Church of Human Potential, Inc. v. Vorsky
D.N.J. · 1986 · confidence medium
Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir.1982); Zemial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir.1983); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Maxfield, 752 F.2d at 435 ; Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982). 40 An award of attorney's fees is particularly warranted in this case as Bechtel should not be forced to bear the expense of this action and appeal simply because it properly complied with federal and state law.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Maxfield, 752 F.2d at 435 ; Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wise v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service
D. Mont. · 1986 · confidence medium
Id., Stonecipher, supra, at 403.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John B. Cameron, Jr. v. Internal Revenue Service
7th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246 , 249 n. 1 (6th Cir.1983); Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 583-84 (5th Cir.1983); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401-03 (9th Cir.1981); but cf. Murray v. United States, 686 F.2d 1320 , 1325 n. 7 (8th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Richcreek v. Grecu
S.D. Ind. · 1985 · confidence medium
See Edgar v. Inland Steel Co., 744 F.2d 1276, 1278 (7th Cir.1984); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401, 403 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment v. Heckler
E.D. Cal. · 1985 · confidence medium
"The object of § 7421(a) is to withdraw jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collections of federal taxes.” Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 , 82 S.Ct. 1125, 1128 , 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962) ("Williams Packing”); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982). 29 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Charles E. Hawkins v. Bechtel Power Corporation, Michael E. Martello, and David E. Shanteau
6th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Judy Edgar v. Inland Steel Company, a Corporation
7th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), ce rt. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beerbower v. United States
E.D. Mich. · 1984 · confidence medium
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 , 93 S.Ct. 602, 606-607 , 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1972); Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Jenkins v. Rockwell International Corp. (3×) also: Cited "see"
D. Nev. · 1984 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, supra at 403; Campbell v. Amax Coal Co., supra at 702; see Stefanelli v. Silvestri, supra at 1320.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dan M. Zernial v. United States of America
5th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
See Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir.1982) (actions of federal officials taken under color of federal law cannot form basis of suit under section 1983); Stonecipher v. Bray, supra, 653 F.2d at 401, 403 (same where both federal and private defendants acting under color of federal law).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hauptmann v. Wilentz
D.N.J. · 1983 · confidence medium
Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1164 (3d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 , 92 S.Ct. 747 , 30 L.Ed.2d 749 (1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Schultz v. Stark
E.D. Wis. · 1983 · confidence medium
E.g., Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited "see" (PS) Haymore v. United States
E.D. Cal. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1981) 19 (federal agencies and employees cannot be sued under Section 1983 because they do not act 20 under state authority).
cited Cited "see" (PC) Saintillus v. U.S. Supreme Court
E.D. Cal. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1981) 3 (federal agency cannot be sued under § 1983 because its agents perform no acts under color of 4 state law).
discussed Cited "see" Govig & Associates Incorporated v. United States of America
D. Ariz. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
Under this narrow exception, the AIA does not bar a tax suit “if it is clear that 6 under no circumstances could the [g]overnment ultimately prevail . . . [and] if equity 7 jurisdiction otherwise exists.” Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7 ; see Stonecipher v. Bray, 8 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1981) (setting forth the exception’s two-part test). “‘Only if 9 it is . . . manifest, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, that the 10 government cannot [prevail]’ is the first part of the test satisfied.” Church of Scientology 11 of Cal. v. United States, 920 F.2d 1481, 14…
cited Cited "see" McCarty v. Roos
D. Nev. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited "see" Giles v. Volvo Trucks North America
M.D. Penn. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding district court's dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 action against the IRS because "its agents performed no acts under color of state law''); Wise v. Comm’r of the I.R.S., 624 F.Supp. 1124, 1129 (D.Mont.1986) (“Any actions taken by the [private employers] were taken in compliance with the instructions of the IRS were done under color of federal law, and are thus not actionable under Section 1983.”). 5 .
cited Cited "see" Martin v. Scott
9th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 401 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited "see" Raymond A. Moorefield v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
9th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1981) (stating that statutory scheme for contesting CIR's deficiency determinations comports with due process) 4 Moorefield's contention that he was improperly denied his right to a jury trial lacks merit.
cited Cited "see" Meyer v. Reno
D.D.C. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 , 102 S.Ct. 1006 , 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir.1980).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Joshua STONECIPHER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
William E. BRAY, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
80-5037.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 10, 1981.
653 F.2d 398
Donald W. MacPherson, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant., Philip R. Placier, Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, San Francisco, Cal., George L. Hastings, Washington, D.C., argued, for defendants-appellees; John J. Bouma, Phoenix, Ariz., Gilbert E. Andrews, Washington, D.C., on brief.
Tang, Poole, Lucas.
Cited by 96 opinions  |  Published
TANG, Circuit Judge:

Stonecipher filed an action against his employer, Bechtel Corporation, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), seeking: (1) an injunction prohibiting Bechtel from denying him exemption from federal income tax withholding; (2) a writ of mandamus directing the IRS to order payment of withheld taxes; (3) a writ of mandamus directing the IRS to hold a hearing before denying his claim for exempt status; and (4) punitive damages. The district court dismissed the action against both defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. We affirm.

In January 1979, Stonecipher submitted to Bechtel a Form W-4 withholding certificate claiming exemption from federal income tax. Bechtel, unable to verify the correctness of the certificate, forwarded it to the IRS pursuant to Treasury Regulation § 31.3402(n)-l (1979).

On February 27, 1979, the IRS requested Stonecipher to contact them so that they could determine whether he was entitled to claim exemption from withholding. Enclosed with the letter was a worksheet to enable Stonecipher to calculate his withholding allowances. The letter informed Stonecipher that if he did not respond within two weeks, the IRS would advise Bechtel to withhold from his wages as if he were a single person claiming no additional exemptions.

When Stonecipher failed to substantiate the information contained in his W-4, the IRS informed him that it had determined that his W-4 was incorrect; that he was not entitled to claim exemption from withholding; and that it had advised Bechtel to disregard his W-4 and to withhold as if he were a single person with no exemptions. Pursuant to the IRS’s instructions, Bechtel withheld taxes from Stonecipher’s wages.

In August 1979, Stonecipher filed his complaint against Bechtel, the IRS, and their respective agents. [1] The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Stonecipher appeals.

I

Dismissal Against IRS

A. Injunctive Relief

Stonecipher’s complaint sought to enjoin the IRS from denying him exempt status and to require the IRS to repay withheld taxes. Stonecipher alleged that the IRS had no authority to review his W-4 or to direct Bechtel to withhold taxes and that these actions violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1983,1985, and 1986. Stone-cipher further alleged that even if the IRS’s actions were authorized by law, due process required the IRS to hold a hearing to determine whether he qualified for exempt status before instructing Bechtel to withhold.

[*401] Under I.R.C. § 7421(a), the district court properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction Stonecipher’s prayer for injunctive relief. Section 7421(a) provides in pertinent part:

[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person. . . .

Section 7421(a), also known as the “Anti-Injunction Act,” has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court and is strictly enforced. See, e. g., Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974); Alexander v. Americans United, Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 94 S.Ct. 2053, 40 L.Ed.2d 518 (1974). The only exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is where the taxpayer demonstrates that: (1) under no circumstance can the governmental defendant ultimately prevail; and (2) the taxpayer will be irreparably harmed if the injunction is not granted. Enochs v. William Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7, 82 S.Ct. 1125, 1129, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962).

With respect to the first prong of the Anti-Injunction Act exception, Stonecipher argues that the IRS could not have ultimately prevailed on his civil rights claims or his due process claim. As discussed below, see sections I.B.-I.C., infra, we disagree. Moreover, because Stonecipher can sue for a tax refund under I.R.C. § 7422, he has failed to satisfy the exception’s second prong, requiring a showing of irreparable harm if injunctive relief is denied.

B. Damage Relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986

The district court properly dismissed Stonecipher’s complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986 for failure to state a claim. Sections 1981, 1985, and 1986 address equal rights under the law and are intended to protect citizens against racial discrimination. Nowhere in his complaint did Stonecipher allege that he was the victim of racial or other class-based invidiously discriminatory action. The district court also properly dismissed Stonecipher’s section 1983 action. Section 1983 allows a party to bring a civil action for constitutional deprivations against persons acting under color of state law. Stonecipher has no cause of action against the IRS under section 1983 because the IRS is a federal agency and its agents performed no acts under color of state law.

C. Damage Relief under Bivens

Stonecipher also argues that the IRS and its agents, acting under color of federal law, denied him due process by not holding a hearing prior to ordering Bechtel to withhold taxes. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Stonecipher’s Bivens-styled claim encompasses two separate arguments. First, he contends that prior to April 1, 1980, the IRS did not have the statutory authority to review a W-4 that had been referred to it by an employer and to direct the employer to withhold, taxes from the employee’s wages in accordance with its review determination. . Second, he argues that even if the IRS was empowered with such authority, due process required it to hold a hearing prior to the collection of the taxes so that he could challenge the propriety of the IRS’s decision.

Treasury Regulation § 31.3402(f)(2)-l (1979) requires an employee to file a W-4 with the employer upon commencement of employment. Stonecipher filed a W-4 under Treasury Regulation § 31.3402(n) (1979) which allows an employee to claim exemption from withholding if: (1) the employee incurred no income tax liability in the preceding year; and (2) the employee anticipates no income tax liability for the current year. Bechtel was hot required, however, to ascertain whether Stonecipher was entitled to claim exemption from withholding but rather was obligated under Treasury Regulation § 31.3402(n)-l (1979) to contact the District Director of the IRS if it be[*402] lieved that the W-4 contained an incorrect statement. [2]

Prior to April 1, 1980, Treasury Regulation § 31.3402(f)(2) — 1 (1979) authorized an employer who had received an invalid certificate to withhold from an employee’s wages as if the employee were a single individual claiming no exemptions. The regulation was silent, however, as to what procedures the District Directors were to follow upon being notified that a particular W — 4 was believed to be inaccurate. The procedures established by the IRS and followed here consisted of notifying the employee that the W-4 in question contained an incorrect statement; requesting the employee to verify the statement; and instructing the employer to regard the W-4 as an invalid certificate if the employee failed to submit sufficient information to determine the certificate’s correctness. On April 1, 1980, these procedures were codified by amending Treasury Regulation § 31.3402(f)(2)-l, T.D. 7682, to include paragraph (g). [3]

In determining whether the IRS was authorized before the amendment to review Stonecipher’s W-4, we must construe the regulatory scheme in light of its purpose and interpret its particular parts so as not to render other parts meaningless. See United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974). With this principle of statutory construction in mind, we interpret the language of Treasury Regulation § 31.-3402(n)-l (1979), which relieves the employer of the burden of determining the correctness ofaW^ and requires the employer to refer a questionable W-4 to the District Director, as an implicit grant of authority to the IRS to review withholding certificates for compliance with the internal revenue laws and to declare invalid those certif[*403] icates found not to be in compliance. To hold that the IRS did not have such a power of review would render Treasury Regulation § 31.3402(n)-l (1979) meaningless. [4]

Stonecipher’s argument that due process required the IRS to grant him a hearing before determining that he was not entitled to claim exemption from federal income tax is foreclosed by well-settled law. The prompt collection of taxes is necessary for the nation’s continued existence and is an important governmental interest that justifies postponing notice and an opportunity for a hearing. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-97, 51 S.Ct. 608, 610-12, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931). Stonecipher’s due process rights are adequately protected by the statutory scheme which allows him to contest his tax liability in the Tax Court prior to paying the disputed tax or to sue for a refund in federal district court or in the Court of Claims. See id.

II

Dismissal Against Bechtel

Stoneeipher’s complaint against Bechtel alleged the same constitutional and statutory violations as it did against the IRS. With respect to the actions arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1985, and 1986, the district court properly dismissed the complaint for the same reasons we held that Stonecipher’s complaint failed to state a claim against the IRS. Even assuming that Bechtel acted under color of state law in withholding state taxes from Stonecipher’s wages, his complaint failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because Bechtel’s actions in withholding taxes prior to a hearing did not deprive him of any constitutional right.

Stonecipher’s complaint further alleged that Bechtel breached his employment contract by withholding taxes from his wages. This argument is without merit. Stonecipher has not alleged that his employment contract contained a provision requiring Bechtel to refrain from withholding taxes from his paycheck. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, we conclude that when an employer withholds taxes from an employee’s wages and pays the employee the balance, the employer has discharged his contractual obligations. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118, 120 (10th Cir. 1952). Indeed, a contractual clause providing otherwise might very well be invalid as contrary to public policy.

Ill

Costs

Based upon the record in this case and the arguments presented, we are convinced that this appeal is frivolous. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1912 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, we award costs to Bechtel and the IRS.

AFFIRMED.

1

. The complaint also joined the defendants’ spouses. No allegations, however, were made against the spouses in the complaint and there was no reference to them in Stonecipher’s brief on appeal.

2

. As of April 1, 1979, Stonecipher and approximately 1,000 tax-protestor/employees had filed W — 4 forms claiming exemption from withholding. This barrage of unusual filings justified Bechtel in questioning the veracity of Stonecipher’s W — 4.

3

. The new paragraph provides in pertinent part:

(g) Submission of certain withholding certificates — (1) General rule. An employer shall submit, in accordance with paragraph (g)(3) of this section, a copy of any withholding exemption certificate which is received from the employee during the reporting period (without regard to the date it is effective) if the employee is employed by that employer on the last day of the reporting period and if—
(ii) The certificate indicates that the employee claims a status exempting the employee from withholding, and the exception provided by paragraph (g)(2) of this section does not apply.
(2) Exception. A copy of the certificate shall not be submitted under paragraph (g)(l)(ii) of this section if the employer reasonably expects at the time the certificate is received that the employee’s wages (under chapter 24 of the Code) from that employer shall not then usually exceed $200 per week. (5) Computation of withholding. Until receipt of written notice from the Internal Revenue Service that a certificate, a copy of which was submitted under this section, is defective, that certificate is effective and the employer shall withhold on the basis of the statements made in that certificate. If the Internal Revenue Service finds that a copy of a withholding exemption certificate submitted contains any materially incorrect statement or if, after written request to the employee for verification of the statements on the certificate, the Internal Revenue Service finds that a copy of a withholding exemption certificate submitted contains any materially incorrect statement or if, after written requests to the employee for verification of the statements on the certificate, the Internal Revenue Service determines that it lacks sufficient information to determine if the certificate is correct, and in either event so notifies the employer in writing, the employer shall then consider the certificate to be defective for purposes of computing amounts of withholding. The employer shall promptly furnish the employee who filed the defective certificate, if still in his employ, with a copy of the written notice of the Internal Revenue Service with respect to the certificate and may request another withholding exemption certificate from the employee. The employer shall withhold amounts from the employee as if the employee were a single person claiming no exemptions (see § 31.3402(f)(2)-! (a)) until a new certificate is filed. If and when the employee does file a new certificate the employer shall withhold on the basis of that new certificate as currently effective, but must submit a copy of that new certificate if required by, and in accordance with, this paragraph (g).
4

. In Campbell v. Amax Coal Co., 610 F.2d 701 (10th Cir. 1979), a case almost identical to the present one, it was also held that prior to the April 1, 1980 amendment, the District Director had the authority to declare withholding certificates invalid and to instruct employers to withhold accordingly. See also Rapp v. Peper, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 91, 80-374 (D. Alaska 1979).