Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hospital (2009)

See also Moore, 560 F.3d at 175 (“[T]he entire purpose of an immunity provision is to afford some discretionary latitude to decisionmakers to make close calls unhaunted by the specter of civil liability.”).

See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 , 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (stating “[I]t is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action ‘under color of state law’ and the ‘state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical.”); United States v. Price, 383 *181 U.S. 787, 794, n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152 , 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966); Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653,…

Inst. of Minn. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Trade & Technical Schs., 817 F.2d 1310, 1314 (8th Cir.1987) (finding that accreditation agency was “not governed by constitutional guidelines”); cf. Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 179 (4th Cir.2009) (setting framework for private entity’s actions to be considered state action).

E.g., Moore v. Williams-burg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir.2009).

In Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hospital, the plaintiff-doctor’s medical privileges were immediately suspended based on allegations of sexual abuse of a minor child. 560 F.3d 166, 169 (4th Cir. 2009).

See, e.g., Tshibaka v. Sernulka, 673 F. App’x 272, 275 (4th Cir. 2016); Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2009). 15 consent may jeopardize medical care to patients in the Hospital.

The state is deemed responsible for the private entity’s action “if the private party acts (1) in an exclusively state capacity, (2) for the state’s direct benefit, or (3) at the state’s specific behest.” 560 F.3d at 179 (citations omitted).

The statutory color-of-law prerequisite is synonymous with the more familiar state-action requirement—and the analysis for each is identical. , 572 F.3d 176 , 180–81 (4th Cir. 2009); , 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982) (stating “it is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action ‘under color of state law’ and the ‘state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical.”); 560 F.3d 166, 178 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The same …

Conn. Jan. 12, 2009) (same); see also Moore v. Williamsburg Reg'l Hosp. , 560 F.3d 166 , 177 (4th Cir. 2009) ("When read in full, the report accurately states what happened"); Brown , 101 F.3d at 1334 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding report potentially "false" where report listed incorrect reason for disciplinary action taken against plaintiff).

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Moore v. Williamsburg Reg'l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining the Act "provides immunity from damages to participants in a 'professional review action' if the action meets certain standards and follows certain procedures" and creates "a statutory presumption that a professional review action meets the requirements for immunity unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance…

“The same analysis applies to whether an action was taken 'under color of state law’ as required by § 1983 and whether the action was state action.” Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 178 (4th Cir.2009). .

The facts in this case do not fit a “deliberate indifference” scenario, and the alleged discrimination is not “so arbitrary and egregious that it shocks the conscience and is unjustifiable by any government interest.” Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 180 (4th Cir.2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 175 (4th Cir.2009). 1.

While there is *569 authority for the proposition that a private actor who acts pursuant to an order of a state actor does so under color of law, see, e.g., Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 179 (4th Cir.2009) ("The state is deemed responsible for the private entity’s action if the private party acts [inter alia ] at the state’s specific behest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tewksbury v. Dowling, 169 F.Supp.2d 103, 110 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (private physician…

See Moore v. Williamsburg Reg'l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir.2009) ("Th[e] parenthetical clearly implies that the term `professional conduct' is not limited to past medical conduct that has already affected patient welfare.... [N]othing in the statute requires peer review committees to wait until medical disaster *1286 strikes."); Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 203 (3d Cir.2005) ("The plain language of the statute indicates the breadth of `conduct' encompassed…

See Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir.2009) (“Th[e] parenthetical clearly implies that the term ‘professional conduct’ is not limited to past medical conduct that has already affected patient welfare.... [Njothing in the statute requires peer review committees to wait until medical di saster strikes.”); Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 203 (3d Cir.2005) (“The plain language of the statute indicates the breadth of ‘conduct’ encompassed with…

See generally Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hospital, 560 F.3d 166, 180 , 2009 WL 621619, * 12 (4th Cir.2009) ("Plaintiff also alleges that WRH did not provide him adequate procedures when it deprived him of his property right in his medical practice.

See Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 169-70, 176 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding immunity where doctor had: (1) opportunity to present his case at executive meeting the same night he was summarily suspended in "the best interest of patient care and welfare”; (2) participated with counsel in a review hearing two months later where he presented argument, called witnesses, and presented evidence; and (3) a "full-blown” hearing on his appeal to the board five months lat…

Moreover, by failing to object at the outset of or during his peer review hearing, appellant waived all adequate notice and hearing challenges. 4 See 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (b); see, e.g., Moore v. Williamsburg Reg'l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 176 (4th Cir. 2009).

See generally Moore v. Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 180 (4th Cir.2009) (“Plaintiff was notified of the allegations against him, given ample opportunity to present evidence, allowed to call and cross-examine witnesses, and was represented by counsel throughout.

See also Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hospital, 560 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 875 , 130 S.Ct. 201 , 175 L.Ed.2d 127 (2009); Poliner v. Texas Health Systems, 537 F.3d at 376 .