Neuberger v. Commissioner (1940)

Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U. S. 83, 88 (1940).

Since "there is no presumption that the agent is clothed with sovereign immunity," 312 U. S., at 85 , the Court examined the statute establishing the RFC and concluded that there was no affirmative indication by Congress that it had meant to exempt the RFC from paying costs after it had lost a lawsuit. [4] This rule has been frequently recognized by the Court, United States v. De la Maza Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 724 (1832); Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123, 125 (1883); …

Rev. 360; Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.), §2555 (d), p. 522; Borden’s Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 209 ; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 . 14 West India Oil Co. v. Domenech, 311 U. S. 20, 28 ; United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 64 ; Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U. S. 83, 85, n. 1 ; Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U. S. 91, 101-103 ; Federal Communications Comm’n v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 311 U. S. 132, 137 ; Taft v. …

Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1184 (6th Cir. 1982) (“conference report” can rebut “presumption” that “a difference in language reflects a difference in meaning” (citing Moore v. Harris, 623 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980)); see also Neuberger v. CIR, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (“The maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ . . . can never override clear and contrary evidences of Congressional intent.”).

It can never override clear and contrary evidences of [legislative] intent.” Neuberger v. Comm’r, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); see also Wash. State Labor Council v. Reed, 65 P.3d 1203 , 1209 (Wash. 2003) (“[T]he rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius d[oes] not necessarily apply without considering other factors which may persuade the court that legislative intent was the opposite of what the stat- utory construction rule would require.”).

It can never override clear and contrary evidences of [legislative] intent.” Neuberger v. Comm’r, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); see also Wash. State Labor Council v. Reed, 65 P.3d 1203 , 1209 (Wash. 2003) (“[T]he rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius d[oes] not necessarily apply without considering other factors which may persuade the court that legislative intent was the opposite of what the stat- utory construction rule would require.”).

It can never override clear and contrary evidences of [legisla- tive] intent.” Neuberger v. Comm’r, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); see also Wash. State Labor Council v. Reed, 65 P.3d 1203 , 1209 (Wash. 2003) (“[T]he rule of expressio unius est exclu- sio alterius d[oes] not necessarily apply without considering 1 It is true that there are no magic words necessary for the legislature to create a liberty interest.

For that reason, it "can never override clear and contrary evidences of Congressional intent." Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); United States v. Castro, 837 F.2d 441, 443 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding legislative history and context indicate maxim cannot apply); National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624 , 648 n.33 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that evidence of legislative intent renders the maxim inapplicable). 54 As the District Court recognized in its …

That the amendment of 1933 changed and the Revenue Act of 1938 restored the law of 1932 as we have explained it is plain from the legislative history of the two Acts and of § 23(r) (1).” Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, 311 U.S. 83, 89, 90 , 61 S.Ct. 97, 102 , 85 L.Ed. 58 .

Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 US 83, 88 , 61 S Ct 97 , 85 L Ed 58 (1940) (“The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is an aid to construction, not a rule of law.

Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).

Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).

Again and again, the Court has cautioned that the maxim “ is an aid to construction, not a rule of law,” Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940), and that “ [hjowever well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose [and] will read text in the light of context,” SEC v. C.M.

Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).

Although in the federal jurisdiction an income tax is not imposed on the partnership as such as in our Act, 13 L.P.R.A. § 3013 et seq., 1962 ed., the partnership receives a particular treatment, see Newberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Rabkin and Johnson, Federal Taxation of Partnerships, 55 Harv.

Si bien en la jurisdicción federal a la sociedad {partnership) como tal no se le impone una contribución sobre in-gresos como lo hace nuestra ley, 13 L.P.R.A. sees. 3013 et seq., ed. 1962, recibe un tratamiento particular, ver Newberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Rabkin and Johnson, Federal Taxation of Partnerships, 55 Harv.

(See American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 316 [ 73 S.Ct. 307 , 97 L.Ed. 337 ] ; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 222-223 [ 63 S.Ct. 997 , 87 L.Ed. 1344 ] ; Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 206-207 [ 48 S.Ct. 480 , 72 L.Ed. 845 ] ; Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 [ 61 S.Ct. 97 , 85 L.Ed. 58 ].) The Secretary and his predecessors have consistently interpreted the act as authorizing regulations with respect to…

But the logical inference from section 183 5 is that his share of the partnership’s gross, e. g., Harry Landau, supra; Neuberger v. Commissioner, supra at p. 89, less his share of the partnership’s deductions, e. g., United States v. Coulby, supra; Lord Forres, 25 B.

But the logical inference from section 183 5 is that his share of the partnership’s gross, e. g., Harry Landau, supra; Neuberger v. Commissioner, supra at p. 89, less his share of the partnership’s deductions, e. g., United States v. Coulby, supra; Lord Forres, 25 B.

See Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 , 61 S.Ct. 97 , 85 L.Ed. 58 (1940).

See Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 , 61 S.Ct. 97 , 85 L.Ed. 58 (1940).

See Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 , 61 S.Ct. 97 , 85 L.Ed. 58 .

See, also, Neuberger v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 104 F.2d 649 , reversed on other grounds, 311 U.S. 83 , 61 S.Ct. 97 , 85 L.Ed. 58 .

This is not a rigid rule and will not apply if the result “is contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.” Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991); see also Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).

See Council of District of Columbia v. Clay, 683 A.2d 1385, 1390 (D.C.1996) (citing Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 83, 88 , 61 S.Ct. 97 , 85 L.Ed. 58 (1940)).

See Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 , 61 S.Ct. 97 [101], 85 L.Ed. 58 (1940).”); In re Arnett, 731 F.2d 358, 360-361 (6th Cir.1984) ("Our review is guided by principles of statutory construction.

See, e. g., Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 83, 89 , 61 S.Ct. 97 , 85 L.Ed. 58 ; Koshland v. Hel-vering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 , 56 S.Ct. 767 , 80 L.Ed. 1268 ; Alaska Steamship Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 256, 264 , 54 S.Ct. 159 , 78 L.Ed. 302 ; United States v. Missouri Pac.

This is not a rigid rule and will not apply if the result “is contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.” Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991); see also Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).

This is not a rigid rule and will not apply if the result “is contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.” Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991); see also Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).

See also Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 US 428 , 61 S Ct 97 , 85 L Ed 1438 (1941), where the Supreme Court stated, at 432: “* * * While it is useful at times in resolving statutory ambiguities, it does not mean that the prior construction has become so embedded in the law that only Congress can effect a change. * * * It gives way before changes in the prior rule or practice through exercise by the administrative agency of its continuing rule-making power. * * *” (Emphasis suppli…