Pierce v. United States (1941)

See Pierce, 314 U.S. at 311 (“[J]udicial enlargement of a criminal act by 15 interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes 16 must be defined with appropriate definiteness.”); accord Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC- 17 029, ¶¶ 47-49 (“Without . . . legislative guidance, the courts should not be placed in 18 the position of inventing fictions to expand the definition of criminal activity. . . . 19 This is not the first time our courts have cautioned ag…

As the Court recognized in Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 , 62 S.Ct. 237, 239 [ 86 L.Ed. 226 ], ‘judicial enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness.’ ” * * * * * * “Indeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art.

As the Court recognized in Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 [ 62 S.Ct. 237, 239 , 86 L.Ed. 226 ], `judicial enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness.' Even where vague statutes are concerned, it has been pointed out that the vice in such an enactment cannot `be cured in a given case by a construction in that very case placing valid limits on the s…

The crime `must be defined with appropriate definiteness.' Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 [ 32 S.Ct. 237 , 239, 86 L.Ed. 226 ].

Thus, in a case where the evidence permitted, the jury might properly consider not only the actual distance the victim is moved, but also such factors as whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased both the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker’s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.” (Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at …

Plainly, our decision constitutes “judicial enlargement of a criminal Act” (Pierce v. United States (1941) 314 U.S. 306, 311 [ 62 S.Ct. 237, 239-240 , 86 L.Ed. 226 ]) for which defendant must have had fair warning to be held accountable.

As the Court recognized in Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 [ 62 S.Ct. 237, 240 , 86 L.Ed. 226 ], “judicial enlargement of a criminal Act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness.” Even where vague statutes are concerned, it has been pointed out that the vice in such an enactment cannot “be cured in a given case by a construction in that very case placing valid limits on the s…

I, § 9.) An ex post facto law is “any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed . . . .” (Beazell v. Ohio (1925) 269 U.S. 167, 169-170 [ 70 L.Ed. 216, 217 , 46 S.Ct. 68 ]; Bouie v. *518 Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 353 [ 12 L.E…

Pueblo v. Mantilla, 71 D.P.R. 36, 40 (1950); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941).

As the Court recognized in Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 [ 62 S.Ct. 237, 239 , 86 L.Ed. 226 ], “judicial enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war with fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness.” ...

See, e. g., Pierce v. United States, 314 U. S. 306 (1941) (holding that an officer or employee of the Tennessee Valley Authority was not “‘an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States, or any Department, or any officer of the Government thereof’” within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884); see also Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 591 (1958) (resolving a conflict among the courts of appeals and finding that a claim aga…

See also Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311-312 , 62 S.Ct. 237 , 86 L.Ed. 226 (1941). .

See Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 , 62 S.Ct. 237 , 86 L.Ed. 226 (1941); Aiglar, Legislation In Vague Or General Terms, 21 Mich.L.Rev. 831, 836 (1923). 19 .

See also Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 , 62 S.Ct. 237 , 86 L.Ed. 226 and Lindgren v. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation, 4 Cir., 55 F.2d 117, 120 , certiorari denied 286 U.S. 542 , 52 S.Ct. 499 , 76 L.Ed. 1280 .

See also Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 , 62 S.Ct. 237 , 86 L.Ed. 226 and Lindgren v. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation, 4 Cir., 55 F.2d 117, 120 , certiorari denied 286 U.S. 542 , 52 S.Ct. 499 , 76 L.Ed. 1280 .

See Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 310-12 (1941) (holding that neither the predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 912 nor subsequent legislation brought employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority within the scope of the statute and holding that the absence of specific inclusion by Congress indicates an intention to exclude).

See id. (quoting extensively from Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311-12 , 62 S.Ct. 237 , 86 L.Ed. 226 (1941), and Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). 3 .

See Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 , 62 S.Ct. 237 , 86 L.Ed. 226 (1941).