National Ass'n of Clean Water Agencies v. Environmental Protection Agency (2013)

We believe that the EPA has carried its burden of demonstrating that the UPL “reflect[s] a reasonable estimate of the emissions achieved in practice by the best performing sources.” Cement Kiln, 255 F.3d at 871-72 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also NACWA, 734 F.3d at 1148 (“[H]aving decided to account for variability, and having decided to estimate that variability, EPA bears the burden of demonstrating with substantial evidence that its estimate is reasonable.”).

Cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies, 734 F.3d at 1128 (“Congress’s use of the word ‘any’ in the definitional phrase ‘any facility which combusts any solid waste from commercial or industrial establishments’ rendered the phrase clear and unambiguous, and EPA had no authority to create exceptions not explicitly listed in the statute through its definition of ‘commercial or industrial waste.’” (citing Natural Res.

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002); Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1125 (D.C.

See CAA § 112(d)(1), 45 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (d)(1) (EPA “may distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources”) (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1159 (D.C.

Calculating emission standards that satisfy the Section 112(d) statutory criteria is a complicated process: EPA must gather and analyze data for boilers in each given category and then arrive at an emissions floor for each category that has “maximum stringency” but is also “continuously achievable.” U.S. Sugar Corp. I, 830 F.3d at 632 ; see also, e.g., id. (promulgating emission standards that satisfy “the statutory criteria is no easy task”); Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agen…

But EPA made neither of these arguments in the rulemaking, and as indicated above, “we cannot accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.” National Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1138 (D.C.

The agency, however, nowhere specified these distances in the final TSD, and “we cannot accept . . . counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1138 (D.C.

Nonetheless, we “have leeway ‘to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits' because ‘jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.’ ” Nat'l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1161 (D.C.Cir.2013) (quoting Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 , 127 S.Ct. 1184 , 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007)).

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (4)(a)-(e),' with Title III, § 802, 82 Stat. at 219 (adding section 2518(4)(a)-(e) to Title 18). ’ To the extent Title Ill’s two identification requirements are functionally redundant, it is clear that “Congress could sensi-r bly have seen some practical value in the redundancy,” Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 445 , 115 S.Ct. 2227 , 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F…

Whether a secondary material is solid waste determines whether EPA regulates a facility burning the material under 42 U.S.C. § 7429 or § 7412, and “EPA’s decision to regulate a source under one section rather than the other has practical consequences.” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (D.C.Cir.2013).

See, e.g., Husqvarna AB v. EPA 254 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C.Cir.2001) (“Because section 213 does not mandate a specific method of cost analysis, we find reasonable the EPA’s choice to consider costs on the per ton of emissions removed basis.”); National Association of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA 734 F.3d 1115, 1156-57 (D.C.Cir.2013) (citing Husqvarna; EPA could consider cost-effectiveness in setting a beyond-the-floor standard under Section 129(a)(2) of the Act).

Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1119 (D.C.

Sector Colls. & Univs., 681 F.3d at 449 (citation omitted), as the agency’s robust participation in the 48 notice-and-comment process is crucial to fulfilling the APA’s goals of “ensur[ing] that affected parties have an opportunity to participate in and influence agency decision making at an early stage,” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1148 (D.C.

The State argues that “people make mistakes all the time” but “[t]hat does not make them incompetent under any meaningful understanding of the word.” The State proposes that for recall purposes incompetence must be alleged in one of two ways: 128 AS 01.10.040. 129 See Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1126 (D.C.

Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1148 (D.C.

“In some cases, redundancy may reflect the broad purpose of a congressional statute.” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1126 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “[i]n some cases, redundancy may reflect the broad purpose of a congressional statute,” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1126 (D.C.

The Court begins with Article III standing, “a prerequisite to a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction.” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1160 (D.C.

The Court begins with Article III standing, “a prerequisite to a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction.” Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1160 (D.C.Cir.2013) (quotation marks omitted).

See generally National Ass'n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA (" NACWA "), 734 F.3d 1115 , 1122, 1144-45 (D.C.

See National Association of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1158 (D.C.

See also National Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1128 (D.C.

A party wishing to raise a new objection after the comment period ends may ask the EPA to reconsider its implementation plan, but the EPA may refuse unless the “objection is of central relevance to the outcome of the rule” and either the objection was “impracticable to raise” within the comment period or the “grounds for ... objection arose after the period for public comment.” Id.; see Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. *287 EPA 734 F.3d 1115, 1158 (D.C.Cir.2013).

See National Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA 734 F.3d 1115, 1128 (D.C.Cir.2013) (“The word ‘any’ is usually understood to be all inclusive, and EPA presented no compelling reason why ‘any’ should not mean ‘any.’ ”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA No. 98-1379, 755 F.3d at 1019 , 2014 WL 2895943, at *6 (“From the statute’s mandatory and inclusive language we can only conclude the Congress intended to require that E…

Cir. 2020); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1148 (D.C.

See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1136-38 (D.C.

See Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1136-38 (D.C.Cir.2013) (rejecting agency rule under APA substantial evidence standard where group challenging rule presented credible evidence contrary to agency findings and agency offered only “mere assertion” that rule accounted for contrary evidence in reply); Butte Cnty., 613 F.3d at 194 (rejecting agency finding under APA substantial evidence standard where agency failed to “articulate a satisfactory explan…

See Nat'l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1160 (D.C.Cir.2013) ("[b]ecause Article III standing is a prerequisite to a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction, [the court] cqnnot proceed at all in any cause unless [it] first determine^] that a party seeking to be heard" has standing) (quotation marks omitted). 3 .