United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States (1947)

See also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 572-573 (1977); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 410 (1947).

Cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 763 (1946); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 376, 384 (1986); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 408 (1947).

For example, a judge in a criminal trial "is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, see Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 105 (1895); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 408 (1947), regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction." United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 572-573 (1977).

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 320, n. 14 (1979); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 408-409 (1947); Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607, 615 (1946); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 196, n. 12 (1977).

The primary reason that this possibility has been thought one not tolerable in those other situations applies with equal or greater force to a constitutionally erroneous burden-shifting instruction: the right violated is one that exists apart from the right not to be convicted except upon a legally sufficient amount of evidence; it is therefore irremedially violated whatever the actual evidence of guilt in the particular case. 6 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 320 n. 14…

For this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing a jury to come forward with such a verdict, see Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 [ 15 S.Ct. 273 , 39 L.Ed. 343 ] (1895); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 [ 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973 ] (1947), regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.

Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states: No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.76 …

The Court in that case held that labor unions and their members could be held responsible for the illegal actions of individual officers or members committed during labor disputes only if they "actually participated, gave prior authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetration.” Id. at 403 , 67 S.Ct. at 779 (footnote omitted).

See also United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 410 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 783 , 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (“[Wjhere the evidence against an accused charged with a crime is well-nigh conclusive and the court fails to give the reasonable-doubt instruction ... [i]t could not be said that the failure was harmless error.”) In addition, the Court’s more general discussion about the kinds of errors that require automatic reversal suggests that a…

In doing so, we are fully aware that pronouncements, so we do not accept the conclusion that those processes were little more than a Potemkin Village intended only to provide cover so that the Unions could say whatever they thought would damage Care One. 68 Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003). 69 29 U.S.C. § 106 (emphasis added). 70 Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 409 . 71 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1). 72 See Appellant Br. at 12–14. 73 Id. at 18 . 16 any such in…

The construction the Supreme Court placed on this special exemption was so broad that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the dissenting minority, pointed out that all unions need do in the future to escape liability for the illegal actions of their officers is simply to pass a standing resolution declaiming such responsibility. [ 330 U.S. at 413, 421 , 67 S.Ct. at 785, 788 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ] The conferees agreed that the ordinary law of agency should apply to…

Cf. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 98 (2008) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, C.J., and Alito, J., dissenting) (“We owe far more to the lower courts, which depend on this Court’s guidance, and to litigants, who must conform their actions to the Court’s [holding].”); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 413 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, with Vinson, C.J., and Burton, J., concurring in result) (“The lower courts must apply th…

It is axiomatic that a judge “may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993); accord United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 , 572–73 (1977); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895).

And even if the issue were not raised at all, we have the “power to notice a ‘plain error’ though it is not assigned or specified.’” Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 , 82 S. Ct. 1287, 1288 (1962) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 412 , 67 S. Ct. 775, 784 (1947)). 16 Case: 11-14302 Date Filed: 08/16/2013 Page: 17 of 18 Third, the error affected Madden’s substantial rights.

It is clear that the issuance of a peremptory instruction in a criminal case is wrong, see United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947), but the language included on the Appellants’ verdict form was not a peremptory instruction.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that even overwhelming evidence cannot constitutionally substitute for an actual jury finding, whether formal or effective, on an essential element of a serious crime. -7- See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-80 ; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947); Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946); see also Cabana…

As the Bonanno court observed, "the Supreme Court has held that the union need do no more than authorize an agent's general activity." Id. at 12 (citing Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. at 410 , 67 S.Ct. at 783 ("The grant of authority to an officer of a union to negotiate agreements with employers * * * may well be sufficient to make the union liable.")). 15 As to the union's authorized representative, Woodward was empowered to conduct the union's busine…

As the Bonanno court observed, “the Supreme Court has held that the union need do no more than authorize an agent’s general activity.” Id. at 12 (citing Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. at 410 , 67 S.Ct. at 783 (“The grant of authority to an officer of a union to negotiate agreements with employers * * * may well be sufficient to make the union liable.”)).

As the Bonanno court observed, "the Supreme Court has held that the union need do no more than authorize an agent's general activity." Id. at 12 (citing Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. at 410 , 67 S.Ct. at 783 ("The grant of authority to an officer of a union to negotiate agreements with employers * * * may well be sufficient to make the union liable.")) 15 As the union's authorized representative, Woodward was empowered to conduct the union's business a…

As the Bonanno court observed, “the Supreme Court has held that the union need do no more than authorize an agent’s general activity.” Id. at 12 (citing Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. at 410 , 67 S.Ct. at 783 (“The grant of authority to an officer of a union to negotiate agreements with employers * * * may well be sufficient to make the union liable.”)) As the union’s authorized representative, Woodward was empowered to conduct the union’s business at Y…

“This means that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s guilt of ‘every element of the charged offense.’ ” Id. at 1320-21 (quoting Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22 , 97 S.Ct. 29, 30 , 50 L.Ed.2d 25, 28 (1976) (per curiam)). “ ‘[A] judge may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence.’ ” Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 83 , 103 S.Ct. 969, 975 , 74 L.Ed.2d 823, 832 (1983) (plurality opinion) (quoting United Br…

We noted that in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, supra, the United States Supreme Court addressed Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act stating, ... its [Section 6’s] purpose and effect was to relieve organizations ... and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officer or member of the organization, without clear proof that the organization or member charged with responsibi…

As was stated by the United States Supreme Court in United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 , 67 S.Ct. 775 , 91 L.E. 973 (1947), decided before the Taft-Hartley Act entered the picture (see n. 2, supra): ... its [Section 6’s] purpose and effect was to relieve organizations ... and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officer or member of the organiza…

As was stated by the United States Supreme Court in United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 , 67 S.Ct. 775 , 91 L.E. 973 (1947), decided before the Taft-Hartley Act entered the picture (see n. 2, supra ): ... its [Section 6's] purpose and effect was to relieve organizations ... and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officer or member of the organiz…

See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947) ("[A] judge may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence.").

Cf. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 410 (1947) (“No matter how clear the evidence, [defendants] are entitled to have the jury instructed in accordance with the standards which Congress has prescribed.

See also United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 410 (1947) (“No matter how clear the evidence, [defendants] are entitled to have the jury instructed in accordance with the standards 31 which Congress has prescribed.

Id. at 406-407, 67 S.Ct. at 781 (footnote omitted).

See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1355 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) (“[A] trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict ... regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.”); United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (“[A] judge may not d…

Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.1983) (“knowing tolerance” of illegal activity sufficient to uphold monetary award against local union for its representative’s failure to control violence); United Bhd. of Carpenters, v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 410 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 783 , 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (“knowing participation by the union in the operation of the illegal agreement after its execution”).

Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 (5th Cir.1967) (footnote omitted), citing United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973, 985 (1946) ("For a judge may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence.").

To the contrary, rather than referencing obscure legal concepts, they have neither technical nor specialized meanings, are used in everyday parlance, and there is no reason to conclude that the grand jurors in any manner were inadequately instructed in this regard (see, Browne v International Bhd. of Teamsters, 203 AD2d 13,15 [“actual authorization”]; Brotherhood of Carpenters v United States, 330 US 395, 406 [“knowing participation”; “actual authorization”]; accord, Nathan’…

United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-573 [ 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1355-56 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 ] (1977); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 [ 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973 ] (1947)...." Sandstrom v. Montana, supra 442 U.S. at 516 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. at 2455 n. 5.

Crisantos, supra, 102 N.J. at 272 (citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973, 985 (1947)).

Other courts have so held: United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v United States, 330 US 395, 412, n 26 ; 67 S Ct 775 ; 91 L Ed 973 (1947); United States v Freed, 688 F2d 24, 25 (CA 6, 1982); State v Tripp, 236 NC 320, 321; 72 SE2d 660 (1952); Ellsworth v State, 258 Wis 636, 639-640; 46 NW2d 746 (1951); Hoover v State, 568 P2d 404, 405 (Alas, 1977); State v Canaday, 116 Ariz 296; 569 P2d 238 (1977).

See United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416-18 (3d Cir.1982); State v. Ingenito, supra, 87 N.J. at 212 ; State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 207-08 (1979); cf. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973, 985 (1947) (a judge may never direct a verdict of guilty); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-83 (1st Cir.1969) (submitting special jury findings in criminal case is prejudicial error when …

It has long been recognized that a trial judge “may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence.” (Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 395, 408 [ 91 L.Ed. 973, 985 , 67 S.Ct. 775 ]; accord United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 564, 572-573 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 651-652 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 ]; Sparf and Hansen v. United States (1895) 156 U.S. 51, 105 [ 39 L.Ed. 343, 362 , 15 S.Ct. 273 ]; cf. Sandstrom v. Montana (1979)…

Ass’n., 453 Pa. 43, 52 , 308 A.2d 98, 103 (1973), quoting from Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 403 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 780 , 91 L.Ed. 973, 982-83 (1947).

Brotherhood of Carpenters v. U. S., 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947).

See MCLA § 767.27b, and People v. Dubina (1943), 304 Mich 363 . 3 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure, §§'1638, 1639 and 1658. ’ . " DeCecco v. United States (CA 1, 1964), 338 F2d 797; Gollin v. Richman (CA 3, 1948), 166 F2d 123, certiorari denied 333 US 875 ( 68 S Ct 905 , 92 L Ed 1151 ); United States v. Manuszak (CA 3, 1956), 234 F2d 421; United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States (1947), 330 US 395, 408 ( 67 S Ct 775 , 91 L Ed 973 )…

Appellant argues that the court of criminal appeals wrongly decided Martin, that the Waco court in Brown improperly relied on Martin in a case with similar facts, 3 and that we should ignore both cases and instead follow the United States Supreme Court’s holding in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 398 (1947).

See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 412 (1947) (“We have the power to notice a ‘plain error’ though it is not assigned or specified.”); accord, Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 (1962).

Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 735-36 ; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 403 ( 1947).

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 509-510 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 320 n.14, (1979); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joinders of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408-409 (1947); Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 615 (1946)).

(Dunn v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 390, 393-394 [ 52 S.Ct. 189, 190-191 , 76 L.Ed. 356 , 80 A.L.R. 161 ] [the acquittal may have been the jurors’ “ ‘assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity’ ”]; United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 63 [ 105 S.Ct. 471, 475 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 ] [recognizing “ ‘the unreviewable power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons’ ”]; People v. Palm…

It has long been recognized that a trial judge “may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence.” United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947); see also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84 (1983); Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895).

See Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 , 82 S.Ct. 1287, 1288 , 8 L.Ed.2d 798, 799 (1962); United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 411-12 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 784 , 91 L.Ed. 973, 987 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 , 30 S.Ct. 544, 547 , 54 L.Ed. 793, 796 (1910); Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 , 16 S.Ct. 1127, 1137 , 41 L.Ed. 289, 298 (1896); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1977); Manning v. State, 500 S.W.2…

There is no way of knowing here whether the jury's verdict was based on facts within the condemned instructions ... or on actual authorization or ratification of such acts...." Id, at 408-409, 91 LEd 973 , 67 SCt 775 [782-83] (footnotes omitted).

For this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, see Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 [ 15 S.Ct. 273, 294 , 39 L.Ed. 343 ] (1895); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 [ 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973 ] (1947), regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.

For this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, see Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 [ 15 S.Ct. 273, 294 , 39 L.Ed. 343 ] (1895); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 [ 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973 ] (1947), regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction.