United States v. Pewee Coal Co. (1951)

When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 115 (1951), regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.

And “[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 322 (2002) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 115 (1951)).

“When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 115 (1951), regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.

Id., at 116 (plurality opinion of Black, J., with whom Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson, JJ., joined; no other Justice challenged this portion of the opinion).

See also United States v. Lynah, supra, at 465; United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 117 (1951).

Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (quoting United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)).

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951) (government’s wartime seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national coal miners’ strike constituted a compensable taking).

See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“capable of earning a reasonable return”); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 117-18, 119 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (Black, J., plurality) (Reed, J., concurring in the judgment) (upholding award of just compensation to owner of a coal mine the government had occupied and operated for over five months); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7, 16 , 69 S.Ct. 1434 , 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949) (…

United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951) (plurality opinion cited as example in Cedar Point). 17 The second category of a physical “per se” taking occurs when there is a “government-authorized physical invasion[]” or a physical occupation of private property.

“When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner (United States v. Pewee Coal Co (1951) 341 U.S. 114, 115 [ 95 L.Ed. 809 ]), regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.

Physical appropriations of private property 15 | constitute “the clearest sort of taking.” Id. at 148 (citations omitted).

Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)).

Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)).

Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)).

United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951).

See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341–42 (acknowledging that development moratoria of longer than one year could impose taking); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951) (taking where government possessed and operated coal mine for approximately five months); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 , 3–4 (1949) (condemnation of almost three and one-half years); Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed.

In sum, “[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the . . . owner.” Id. at 322–23 (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537–40 (“The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.”).

Examples include the installation of physical items on buildings, Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 , and the seizure of control over private property, Horne, 576 U.S. at 361-62 (crops); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951) (mines).

Examples include the installation of physical items on buildings, Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 , and the seizure of control over private property, Horne, 576 U.S. at 361-62 (crops); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951) (mines).

Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)).

As the Supreme Court has stated, the government has a “‘categorical duty’” under the Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation when it “‘physically takes possession of an interest in property.’” Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. at 31 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002), and citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)).

In Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court made clear that “[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.” Id. at 322 (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)).

The Supreme Court has held that “fair compensation for a temporary possession of a business enterprise is the reasonable value of the property’s use.” United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 117 , 71 S.Ct. 670, 672 , 95 L.Ed. 809, 813 (1951) (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 , 69 S.Ct. 1434 , 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949)) (emphasis added).

United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 117 (1951); Eyherabide v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 598, 607 , 345 F.2d 565 (1965).

See United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114 , 115–117 (1951) (plurality opinion).

See United States v. Pewee Coal Co., supra. As the Court recognizes, governmental action in the form of regulation which severely diminishes the value of property may constitute a “taking.” See United States v. Kansas City Life Ins.

See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-16 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (finding a physical taking without the government offering to acquire rights by purchase beforehand); United States v. Gen.

See also id. at 324 n. 18, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing "`actual taking of possession and control' of a coal mine" analyzed as a physical taking, United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 116 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951), from issuance of "a wartime order requiring nonessential gold mines to cease operations" analyzed as a regulatory taking, United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 , 78 S.Ct. 1097 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1228 (1958)).

Inc. , 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005) ; see United States v. Pewee Coal Co. , 341 U.S. 114 , 115-17, 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (concluding that a taking occurred when the government seized and operated a private party's coal mines).

Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005); see also, e.g., United States v. Pew *1307 ee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (government seizure and operation of private coal mine); United, States v. Gen.

Id.; see United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-16 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951).

Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005); see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (seizure and operation of private coal mine); United States v. Gen.

Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 , 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (finding a permanent physical invasion where state required owners to allow cable lines to be placed on their buildings), and United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (finding a physical taking where government took control of mine by requiring officials to “conduct operations as agents for the Government”), with Penn Cent.

See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-16 (1951) (finding a physical taking without the government offering to acquire rights by purchase beforehand); United States v. Gen.

Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005); see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (seizure and operation of private coal mine); United States v. Gen.

See United States v. M.C.C. of Fla., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501 , 1505-06 (11th Cir.1985), vacated on other grounds by 481 U.S. 1034 , 107 S.Ct. 1968 , 95 L.Ed.2d 809 (1987), reinstated in relevant part on remand, 848 F.2d 1133 (11th Cir.1988). 6 .

Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005); see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 118-19 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (holding that the government effected a taking by “taking possession and operating control” of the plaintiffs mines to avert a strike). “[E]ven if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 ,…

See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 , 69 S.Ct. 1434 , 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949) (finding compensable taking where military temporarily commandeered laundry plant for use during World War II); see also United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 , 71 S.Ct. 670, 671 , 95 L.Ed. 809, 813 (1950).

Id. at 1580-81 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Pewee Coal Co., Inc., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 118-19 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (affirming a judgment by the Court of Claims ordering the Government to pay certain operating losses mainly attributable to increased wage payments incurred when it temporarily seized and operated a coal mine to avert a strike); W.H.

Physical takings are characterized by “direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 ; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (seizure of coal mine); United States v. Gen.

Physical takings are characterized by "direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 ; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (seizure of coal mine); United States v. Gen.

See United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115, 117-18, 119 , 71 S.Ct. 670 , 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951) (Black, J., writing for the plurality) (Reed, J., concurring in the judgment) (upholding award of just compensation to owner of a coal mine that the government had occupied and operated for over five months); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7, 16 , 69 S.Ct. 1434 , 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949) (referring to “the record of its past earnings” and holding that the “…

See United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 119-20 , 71 S. Ct. 670, 673 (1951) (Reed, J., concurring) (temporary Fifth Amendment taking – right to compensation for temporary government occupancy and use of a private coal mine to avert nationwide coal miners strike – internal citations omitted); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 3 , 69 S. Ct. 1434, 1436-37 (1949) (private owner right to just compensation for temporary government occupancy and use of a p…

See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 , 115–16 (1951) (explaining that the government’s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike was a takings requiring just compensation).

Most intuitively, this category applies when the government uses 26 its powers of eminent domain to condemn property formally, or when the government “physically 27 takes possession of property without acquiring title to it.” Id. at 2071; see, e.g., United States v. 1 Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (plurality opinion) (physical taking occurred where federal 2 government took possession of coal mine via presidential executive order); United States v. 3 General Motors Cor…

See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 , 115–16 (1951) (holding that an Executive Order “directing the Secretary of Interior to take immediate possession, so far as may be necessary or desirable, of any and all mines producing coal in which a strike or other stoppage has occurred or is threatened” constitutes a taking).

See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 , 115–17 (1951); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 3, 14 (1949); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 , 261–67 (1946); United States v. Gen.

Physical takings are characterized by “direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 ; see, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (seizure of coal mine); United States v. Gen.

See M.C.C. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 481 U.S. 1034 , 107 S.Ct. 1968 , 95 L.Ed.2d 809 (1987), vacating and remanding 772 F.2d 1501 , 1506-07 (11th Cir.1985) (in light of Tull)-, Granfinanciera, supra, rev’g sub nom.

See United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 119-20 (1951) (Reed, J., concurring); see also Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring).