Smith v. United States (1954)

But see Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 150 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192, 197 (1954); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 , 45 S.Ct. 1 , 69 L.Ed. 131, 148 (1924); Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224, 229 , 22 S.Ct. 889 , 46 L.Ed. 1137, 1140 (1907); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 , 18 S.Ct. 183 , 42 L.Ed. 568, 573 (1897).

See id. at 93-94, 75 S.Ct. 158 ; see also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the statements of the accused.”).

See Smith, 348 U.S. at 156 , 75 S. Ct. at 199 ("All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense 'through' the statements of the accused."); Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 , 75 S. Ct. at 164 (prosecution required to present "substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworth…

See Smith, 348 U.S. at 156 (“All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the statements of the accused.”); Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d at 979 (“Although it is true that the sum total of this evidence might well be insufficient, standing alone, to prove entry, we do not read Opper o…

See Smith, 348 U.S. at 156 (“All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the statements of the accused.”); Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d at 979 (“Although it is true that the sum total of this evidence might well be insufficient, standing alone, to prove entry, we do not read Opper o…

Id.; see also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“One available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense through the statements of the accused.”).

Id.; see also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“One available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense through the statements of the accused.”).

Id. at 98 , 75 S.Ct. 158 (citation omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 155 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“An admission which assumes this importance in the presentation of the prosecution’s case should not go uncorroborated, and this is true whether we consider the statement an admission of one of the formal ‘elements’ of the crime or of a fact subsidiary to the proof of these ‘elements.’ ”).

See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“[A]n accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession.”).

Id.; see Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“[Ojne available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the statements of the accused.”).

See id. at 93-94, 75 S.Ct. 158 ; see also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the statements of the accused.”).

The requirement for corroboration “is rooted in ‘a long history of judicial experience with confessions and in the realization that sound law enforcement requires police investigations which extend 9 beyond the words of the accused.’” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 489 (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954)).

See Smith, 348 U.S. at 156 (“All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the statements of the accused.”); Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d at 979 (“Although it is true that the sum total of this evidence might well be insufficient, standing alone, to prove entry, we do not read 32 UNIT…

See Crane, 476 U.S. at 691 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 (“evidence about the manner in which a confession was obtained is often highly relevant to its reliability and credibility”); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“[TJhough a statement may not be ‘involuntary’ ..., still its reliability may be suspect if it is extracted from one who is under the pressure of a police investigation — whose words may reflect the strain and confusion attending…

See Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 (“[The independent evidence] tends to make the admission reliable, thus corroborating it while also establishing independently [any] other necessary elements of the offense.”); Smith, 348 U.S. at 156 (“[O]ne available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense ‘through’ the statements of the accused.”); see also United States v. Trombley, 733 F.2d 35, 37-38 (6th Cir. 1984) (ho…

Even if he had, Nicholson fails to show how an incriminating statement over the phone to a private individual is sufficiently analogous to a post-arrest admission “to an official charged with investigating the possibility of wrongdoing.” United States v. Reynolds, 367 F.3d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 155 (1954)). 4 Case: 23-11198 Document: 94-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/28/2025 No. 23-11198 B.

Instead, because corpus delicti simply protects against convictions based on false confessions, the government need only offer evidence that “bolster[s] the confession itself.” Id. at 924 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954)).

Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954).

Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954).

Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954).

To be sure, “an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession.” United States v. Deville, 278 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954)).

Still, false confessions occur. 148 And there is an argument 143 Rock, 483 U.S. at 61 . 144 Boyer has not directed this Court to any other cases that illustrate the alleged per se ban on confessions experts across the state of Louisiana. 145 Rock, 483 U.S. at 62 . 146 Id. at 57 . 147 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (States have “broad latitude” to exclude evidence, and “[s]uch rules do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disp…

Under the corroboration rule, the government must provide “substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement.” Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 488–89 (1963); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954); Dalhouse, 534 F.3d at 806 .

See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1954) ("Although ... it is clear that the [defendant's] statement is not a confession admitting to all the elements of the offense ... [w]e hold the rule [against convictions based on uncorroborated, extrajudicial confessions] applicable....").

See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954) ("[O]ne available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense 'through' the statements of the accused.").

See Smith, 348 U.S. at *913 156, 75 S.Ct. at 199 ("All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offenses `through' the statements of the accused.").

Id.; see also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 , -17- State v. Cardenas-Flores (Zaida Yesenia), 93385-5 75 S. Ct. 194 , 99 L.

The Court cited “[t]he general rule that an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession” and stated that the purpose of this rule was to prevent “errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. at 152-53, 75 S.Ct. 194 *52 (citation omitted).

See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 155 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) (“An admission which assumes this importance in the presentation of the prosecution’s case should not go uncorroborated. ...”); In re Welfare of M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 735-36 (Minn.1984) (requiring corroboration of statements which were incriminating but did not establish all elements of the crime).

In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1954), the United States Supreme Court recognized that, at times, a person may confess to a criminal act yet not actually be guilty of such wrongdoing.

Williams provided information to law enforcement on other inmates in the same pod, which law enforcement knew to be accurate and provided confidence in Williams’s information. [¶29] The State acknowledges the general rule is “an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession,” see Kukert, 2021 ND 192, ¶ 20 (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954)); but that, “[t]he evidence establishing the corpus delicti—independent of the accused’s extra…

Id. (citing Bishop, 431 S.W.3d at 59 n.33 (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954))).

Id. (citing Bishop, 431 S.W.3d at 60 n.33 (quoting Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954))).

Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954).

As noted in Defendants’ motion, “even if a confession is false, it does not necessarily follow that it was coerced.” ECF No. 292, Defs.’ Mem. at 9 (citing Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) (“[T]he experience of the courts, the police and the medical profession recounts a number of false confessions voluntarily made.”)).

Id. at 59 n.33 (citing Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954)).

In the fed- eral civilian courts, corroboration has consistently been an easy bar for the government to clear. “[C]orroborative evi- dence does not have to prove the offense beyond a reasona- ble doubt, or even by a preponderance . . . .” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954).

“All elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions[.]” Smith v. U.S., 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954).

Pueblo v. Campos Suárez, 86 DPR 310, 313-315 (1962); Opper v. United States, 348 US 84, 89-93 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 US 147, 201 (1954).

In fact, the corroboration need not “prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance.” Id. (citing Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954).

This principle is, in turn, based on the imperative “to prevent errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions alone,” and on the knowledge arising from “judicial experience” that “[c]onfessions may be unreliable be- cause they are coerced or induced.” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); see also Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 , 89–90 (1954).

Plaintiff also cites Smith v. U.S., 348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954), to argue that a “criminal conviction” cannot be sustained by an uncorroborated “extra-judicial confession.” But again, plaintiff does not face a criminal conviction; he faces a military personnel decision for which he is not entitled to the many protections of criminal procedure regarding confessions.

The general rule is “that an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession.” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954).

Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954) (stating that independent evidence used to corroborate a confession “does not have to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance”); United States v. Jones, 78 M.J. 37 , 42 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (finding that the quantum of evidence needed for corroboration is small and traditionally described as slight).

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal courts do not follow the traditional corpus delicti rule but instead examine whether there is sufficient evidence that an accused's confessions or other inculpatory statements are "trustworthy." United States v. Smith, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954). 2 It appears that more than 15 states have abandoned the traditional corpus delicti rule and have adopted the federal trustworthiness rul…

Although Woods is correct that the “corpus delicti doctrine incorporates the rule that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime based solely upon an uncorroborated confession or admission,” id. (citing Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954), and State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 506 (1983)), “[o]nly a reasonable inference of the corpus delicti need exist before a confession may be considered,” Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 (citing State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164 , 5 …

The purpose of the law as stated in Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) (citing Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 345 (1941)), is to protect against false confessions.

The purpose of the law as stated in Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) (citing Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 345 (1941)), is to protect against false confessions.

“The general rule that an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession” serves the purpose of 5 SEMENIUK-HAUSER — ARMY 20110976 preventing “convictions based upon untrue confessions alone.” Smith v. United States, 348 US 147, 152-53 (1954) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) .

Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1954).