Roe v. Com. (2006)

Further, courts “have the authority to interpret their own orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

See Hodgins v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 102, 108 (2012); Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 (2006).

See Hodgins v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 102, 108 (2012); Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 (2006).

See Hodgins v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 102, 108 (2012); Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 (2006).

“That interpretation, however, must be reasonable, and we will ‘apply an abuse of discretion standard.’” Bajgain v. Bajgain, 64 Va. App. 439, 453 (2015) (quoting Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006)).

Deference is required, however, only if the trial court’s interpretation of its own order is “reasonable.” See, e.g., Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006); Davis v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 722 , 732 (2019). - 11 - But as the parties acknowledged at oral argument, no published decision by our appellate courts addresses whether that interpretive rule applies when interpreting provisions of the uniform pretrial scheduling order prescribed by Rule 1:18.

“We apply an abuse of discretion standard in determining whether the circuit court’s interpretation of its order is reasonable.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006).

Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

“It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders,” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006), and by granting the Association’s motion without further comment, the circuit court effectively adopted the procedure the Association requested.

Moreover, circuit courts have the authority to interpret their own orders on which a contempt finding is based, although that interpretation “must be reasonable.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 (2006).

Moreover, circuit courts have the authority to interpret their own orders on which a contempt finding is based, although that interpretation “must be reasonable.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 (2006).

“That interpretation, however, must be reasonable, and [this Court] will ‘apply an abuse of discretion standard.’” Bajgain v. Bajgain, 64 Va. App. 439, 453 (2015) (quoting Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006)).

Husband claims that the circuit court intended for wife to refinance the mortgage and remove his name from the loan. “[C]ircuit courts have the authority to interpret their own orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

See Hodgins v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 102, 108 (2012); Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 (2006). -6- On appellate review, “[t]he evidence is considered in the light most favorable to . . . the prevailing party below.” Jacobs, 61 Va. App. at 535 . “[T]he trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)).

Whereupon the Court heard the evidence presented on behalf of both parties and the argument of counsel . . . and . . . finds and determines that [Green]’s counterclaim fails and she is not entitled to judgment on same.” It is well-established that a “circuit court speaks through its orders,” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006), and that “such orders are presumed to reflect accurately what transpired,” Temple v. Mary Wash. Hosp., Inc., 288 Va. 134 , 141 (2014).

“We apply an abuse of discretion standard in determining whether the circuit court’s interpretation of its order is reasonable.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006).

Whereupon the Court heard the evidence presented on behalf of both parties and the argument of counsel . . . and . . . finds and determines that [Green]’s counterclaim fails and she is not entitled to judgment on same.” It is well-established that a “circuit court speaks through its orders,” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006), and that “such orders are presumed to reflect accurately what transpired,” Temple v. Mary Wash. Hosp., Inc., 288 Va. 134 , 141 (2014).

Whereupon the Court heard the evidence presented on behalf of both parties and the argument of counsel . . . and . . . finds and determines that [Green]’s counterclaim fails and she is not entitled to judgment on same.” It is well-established that a “circuit court speaks through its orders,” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006), and that “such orders are presumed to reflect accurately what transpired,” Temple v. Mary Wash. Hosp., Inc., 288 Va. 134 , 141 (2014).

This Court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo, id., but we give deference to the circuit court’s interpretation of its own orders, if reasonable, see Hodgins v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 102, 108 (2012); Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 (2006).

Bicycling A “well-established principle in our jurisprudence is that circuit courts have the authority to interpret their own orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

Related to her first argument, appellant also asserts that the trial court erred “by failing to use the plain meaning of words in its interpretation of court orders.” “It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006).

Co., 865 F.2d 807, 810-11 (7th Cir. 1988); Roe v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E. 2d 526, 528 (Va. 2006). 4 We also note that courts have differed on whether any deference should be given when a lower court interprets language agreed to by the parties and which is merely incorporated in the court’s order, rather than language drafted by the court itself.

Although a court speaks through its written orders, Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006), a reviewing court should read those orders in context, Coward, 295 Va. at 363 n.11.

Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

The trial court’s written order explicitly states that the dismissal of the original indictment was “without prejudice.” “It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

Although a court speaks through its written orders, Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006), a reviewing court should read those orders in context, Coward, 295 Va. at 363 n.11.

Although a court speaks through its written orders, Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006), a reviewing court should read those orders in context, Coward, 295 Va. at 363 n.11.

“It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

“It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

However much the judge intended to suspend operation of his August 12 order, and even though he essentially said so verbally, Virginia law holds that a court “speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Va. 2006).

Roe v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Va. 2006).

“That interpretation, however, must be reasonable, and [this Court] will ‘apply an abuse of discretion standard.’” Bajgain v. Bajgain, 64 Va. App. 439, 453 (2015) (quoting Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006)).

Rather it interpreted its May 22, 2014 order, and it is a “well-established principle in our jurisprudence . . . that circuit courts have the authority to interpret their own orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006).

“It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders,” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006), and that “those orders are presumed to accurately reflect what transpired” at trial, Rubino v. Rubino, 64 Va. App. 256, 265 (2002) (quoting McBride v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 30, 35 (1997)).

Consequently, because a “‘court speaks only through its orders,’ we look to the . . . order-not the court’s remark[s] from the bench-to discern its holding.” Pilson v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 442, 444 (2008) (quoting Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006)).

Rather it interpreted its May 22, 2014 order, and it is a “well-established principle in our jurisprudence . . . that circuit courts have the authority to interpret their own orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 (2006). 12 We also note that the September 29, 2016 order, which dealt with the issues from the August 11, 2015 hearing, lists a motion “requesting the [trial c]ourt issue a Rule to Show Cause and hold [wife] in contempt of court for claiming certain federa…

He reasons that the “grand jury order clearly discharged the grand jury” and that “[o]nce discharge took place, it was wholly improper to use the same panel of grand jurors to indict other persons including [appellant] on March 14, 2017.” However, “[a]nother well-established principle in our jurisprudence is that circuit courts have the authority to interpret their own orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006).

Such deference, however, is not unlimited, and a “circuit court’s authority to interpret its order is subject to judicial review and . . . [, to be upheld, its] interpretation must be reasonable.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006).

The Commission’s “interpretation, however, must be reasonable, and we will ‘apply an abuse of discretion standard.’” Id. (quoting Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006)). 3 Grizzard argues that, because of its allegedly erroneous ruling, the Commission erred in finding that employer’s defense was reasonable, and thus erred in denying Grizzard’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Code § 65.2-713(A).

In reviewing a record, this Court follows the rule “well-established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006).

“It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006).

That interpretation, however, must be reasonable, and we will “apply an abuse of discretion standard.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006).

“It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006) (citations omitted).

Because a trial court speaks through its orders, see, e.g., Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2006), it was necessary for the JDR court to enter an order communicating to appellant and his wife and family members that the order was extended, the hearing was continued to allow the appellant to obtain counsel, and appellant was still to have no contact with his family members.

Accordingly, husband’s argument here fails.7 specific case, the record simply does not support husband’s allegation that the circuit court actually “relied solely” on the “Fairfax guidelines” when determining the amount of pendente lite spousal support. 7 Furthermore, husband’s argument here overlooks the basic principle “in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders.” Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006).

Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006) (citing Smoot v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 495, 500 , 559 S.E.2d 409, 412 (2002)). 15 Six months after the court entered its final order, counsel for appellants notified counsel for appellees and the court that it allegedly never received a copy of the underlying order despite its purported persistent monitoring of the circuit court’s electronic case information system.

“Because a ‘circuit court speaks only through its orders,’ we look to the sentencing order . . . to discern its holding.” Pilson v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 442, 444 , -4- 663 S.E.2d 562, 563 (2008) (quoting Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2006)).

“Because a ‘circuit court speaks only through its orders,’ we look to the sentencing order ... to discern its holding.” Pilson v. Commonwealth, 52 Va.App. 442, 444 , 663 S.E.2d 562, 563 (2008) (quoting Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2006)).

Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 , 628 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2006) (citations omitted).