Goldman v. Landsidle (2001)

The Principles from Goldman v. Landsidle Control This Court has been rigorous in requiring parties to establish standing "to make certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case." Goldman , 262 Va. at 371 , 552 S.E.2d at 71 (collecting cases).

As a general rule, without “a statutory right, a citizen or taxpayer does not have standing to seek mandamus relief . . . unless he [or she] can demonstrate a direct interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the outcome of the controversy that is separate and distinct from the interest of the public at large.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 373 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 72 (2001).

First, standing ordinarily requires “a direct interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the outcome of the controversy that is separate and distinct from the interest of the public at large.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371-73 (2001); McClary v. Jenkins, 299 Va. 216 , 222 (2020); see Westlake, 273 Va. at 120 ; Platt, 299 Va. at 692.

Id. at 372 , 552 S.E.2d at 71 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Further, “a party claiming standing must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371, 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001).

Dep’t of the Env’t, 29 A.3d 584, 586 (Md. 2011); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795 , 797–98 (Minn. 1992) (maintaining an “injury in fact” requirement); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 , 280–81 (Tenn. 2001) (expressly refusing to adopt “public rights” standing); Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001) (refusing to recognize general, state taxpayer standing). 59

It further asserts that this court has departed from the mainstream by emphasizing personal pecuniary harm to the party asserting the claim apart from this more fundamental injury to all taxpayers. 11 We recognize that an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions confer standing on taxpayers to challenge the misappropriation of municipal funds. 12 See Goldman v. *20 Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 372 , 552 S.E.2d 67 (2001) (“[t]he *21 right of taxpayers to challenge the legality of ex…

“The purpose of requiring standing is to make certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.” Kelley v. Stamos, 285 Va. 68 , 73 (2013) (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001)).

This requires “a direct interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the outcome of the controversy that is separate and distinct from the public at large.” Layla H. v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. App. 116 , 134 (2024) (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 373 (2001)).

He contends that since “he has a direct personal stake in preventing [the] demolition” of the building on the property and that “no public hearing was held concerning the disposal of the property,” the circuit court’s finding was erroneous because his pleadings “demonstrate [that he has] a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001).

“The purpose of requiring standing is to make certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.” Id. at 125-26 (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001)).

Turning to Primis’s argument, “[t]he purpose of requiring standing is to make certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.” Small v. Fannie Mae, 286 Va. 119 , 125-26 (2013) (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001)).

It is well established, however, that “local taxpayers possess the common law right ‘to challenge the legality of expenditures by local governments.’” Id. at 363 (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 372 (2001)).

“The purpose of requiring standing is to make certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001).

Standing requires that a party must show “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 (2001); Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 589 (1984) (citation omitted) (“The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . .’”).

“The purpose of requiring standing is to make certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.” Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001).

"The purpose of requiring standing is to make certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case." Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001); see also Livingston v. Virginia Dep't of Trans., 284 Va. 140, 154 , 726 S.E.2d 264, 272 (2012) (same).

“The general requirements of standing have often been stated: ‘The purpose of requiring standing is to make - 23 - certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.’” Id. (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001)).

“The general requirements of standing have often been stated: ‘The purpose of requiring standing is to make - 23 - certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.’” Id. (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001)).

“The general requirements of standing have often been stated: ‘The purpose of requiring standing is to make certain that a party who asserts a particular position has the legal right to do so and that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the case.’ ” Id. (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001)).

Dep’t of the Env’t, 29 A.3d 584, 586 (Md. 2011); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795 , 797–98 (Minn. 1992) (maintaining an “injury in fact” requirement); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 , 280–81 (Tenn. 2001) (expressly refusing to adopt “public rights” standing); Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001) (refusing to recognize general, state taxpayer standing). 59

Dep’t of the Env’t, 29 A.3d 584, 586 (Md. 2011); In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795 , 797–98 (Minn. 1992) (maintaining an “injury in fact” requirement); City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 , 280–81 (Tenn. 2001) (expressly refusing to adopt “public rights” standing); Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001) (refusing to recognize general, state taxpayer standing). 59

Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001) (citations omitted).

Thus, a party claiming standing must demonstrate-a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001) (citations omitted)).

Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001) (internal citations omitted).

Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371, 552 S.E.2d 67 (2001).

Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 372-74 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 72 (2001).

It is “a duty which ought to be and can be performed.” While the majority does not address the issue of adequate remedy at law (See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001)), it must be recognized that defendants may proceed to trial and then avail themselves of the right to appeal an adverse judgment at the conclusion of the consolidated and bifurcated cases.

See Goldman v. Landsidle, Comptroller, 262 Va. 364, 372 , 552 S.E.2d 67 (2001).

In asking whether a person has standing, we ask, in essence, whether he has a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the case so that the parties will be actual adversaries and the issues will be fully and faithfully developed.” Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 589 , 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1984) (internal citation omitted); see also Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 371 , 552 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2001).

See Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364 (2001).