Monroe v. Pape (1961)

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled by Monell, 436 U.S. at 663 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , the Supreme Court held that municipalities were not "persons" under § 1983.

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (municipalities not "persons” within the meaning of § 1983), overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

As Justice Frankfurter wrote, these rights create "a realm of sanctuary surrounding every individual and infrangible, save in a very limited class of circumstances, by the agents of government." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 208-09 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), maj. op. overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc.

As Justice Frankfurter wrote, these rights create “a realm of sanctuary surrounding every individual and infrangible, save in a very limited class of circumstances, by the agents of government.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 208-09 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), maj. op. overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Section 1983 was originally enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871, entitled “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 , 81 S.Ct. 473, 475 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (quoting 17 Stat 13); overruled by Monell, 436 U.S. at 663 , 98 S.Ct. at 2022 (local governments not wholly immune from suit under Section 1983).

The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was to address the lawlessness in the southern states after the Civil War (see Cong Globe, 42nd Cong, 1st Sess, at 236 [1871]) and to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 171 [1961], overruled by Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658 [1978] [Monroe was overruled insofar as it held that local governments are wholly immune from suit under section 1983]).

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled by Monell v. New York, New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

The statute was enacted, according to *479 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), because of the lack of enforcement by states of Fourteenth Amendment rights because of prejudice, intolerance, neglect or otherwise.

Although the court dismissed plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the city on the authority of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled by Monel1 v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, it upheld plaintiff’s right to sue the city under § 1981, stating: In other than section 1983 actions [an] employer would ordinarily ... be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for [the] misconduct [of its employees] if it occurred during the per…

Relying on a 1961 Supreme Court case, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (categorizing these actions as akin to a traditional tort), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

DISCUSSION Plaintiff filed the standard form entitled “Complaint for a Civil Case” as his complaint (Doc. 1), asserting the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (categorizing these actions as akin to a traditional tort), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Id. at 299 (relying on Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978)).

But see Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1089 , 97 S.Ct. 1097 , 51 L.Ed.2d 534 (1977) 16 As indicated by such cases as Monroe v. Pape, supra note 6 , 365 U.S. at 169 , 81 S.Ct. at 474, 5 L.Ed.2d at 495 , and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 679 , 66 S.Ct. 773, 774 , 90 L.Ed. 939, 940 (1946), an action grounded in the Constitution's protections against unlawful searches and seizures may also contain allegations su…

But see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 224-25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

But see Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 873 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 ; Toa Baja Development v. Garcia Santiago et al., D.C., 312 F.Supp. 899 .

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the *315 state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked") (overruled in part not relevant here, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 664-689 (1978)).

Merrill, Property: Takings 262 (2002); see McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Com- munity Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U. S. 668, 672 (1963) (observing that it would defeat the purpose of §1983 “if we held that assertion of a federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court”); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state rem- edy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused befo…

Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 184 (1961) ("`Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of' state law' ") (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 326 (1941)).

Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked”).

See Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 183 ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy . . ."). [14] The debates contain several references to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts over federal questions, [15] and numerous suggestions *100 that the state courts would retain their established jurisdiction so that they could, when the then current political passions abated, demonstrate a new sensitivity to federal rights. [16] To the extent that it did intend to…

Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) (“It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief”). *80 * * * Discover and Vaden have agreed to arbitrate any dispute arising out of Vaden’s account with Discover, Vaden’s allegations against Discover have given rise to such a dispute.

But even though the majority accurately identifies the substantive constitutional right violated, the majority concludes that a substantive due process violation of the kind found in Rochin and Johnson v. Glick "require[s] an intentional act." I cannot agree. 98 In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S,Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court held that a Section 1983 claim contained no state of mind requirement. 365 U.S. at 187 , 81 S.Ct. at 484 ("We do not th…

However, the Court apparently considered this phrasing of the issue merely to be a restatement of Classic's holding that "action taken under color of law" includes " '[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' " Id. 365 U.S. at 184 , 81 S.Ct. at 482 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326 , 61 S.Ct. at 1043 ); see id. 365 U.S. at 186 , 81 S.Ct. at 484 ("conclud[ing] that the meaning …

See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 338 , 103 S.Ct. 1108 , 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) ("It is clear from the legislative debates that, in the view of the Act's sponsors, the victims of Klan outrages were deprived of `equal protection of the laws' if the perpetrators systematically went unpunished."); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-180 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) ("It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federa…

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 , 102 S.Ct. 2557 , 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."). *218 We conclude that this precept also holds true in a request for injunctive relief in a § 1983 action.

See Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 484 ("We conclude that the meaning given 'color of' law in the Classic case and in the Screws and Williams case was the correct one; and we adhere to it."); see also Williams v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 576, 577 (1951) ("The question in this case is whether a special police officer who in his official capacity subjects a person suspected of crime to force and violence in order to obtain a confession may be prosecuted" for conduct under color of law.)…

See Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S., at 183 , 81 S.Ct. at 482 ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy ").

See Monroe v. Pape , 365 U.S. 167 , 183, 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) ("The federal remedy [under § 1983 ] is supplementary to [any] state remed[ies], and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.").

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (“Section 1983 should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions”), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc.

Lee, 363 F.3d at 935 n. 3; see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 , 345 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (rejecting an argument that “the judge’s decision to issue the warrant breaks the causal chain between the application for the warrant and the improvident arrest” because “the common law recognized the causal link between the submission of a complaint and an ensuing arrest”); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (“Section [1983] …

See Raymond, 207 U.S. at 37 , 28 S.Ct. at 13 ("the board was making an assessment which it had jurisdiction to make under the laws of the state"); Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 294 , 33 S.Ct. at 317 (the challenged "acts [were] done under the authority of a municipal ordinance passed in virtue of power conferred by a state"); Classic, 313 U.S. at 325-26 , 61 S.Ct. at 1042-43 (challenged acts "were committed in the course of [the officials'] performance of duties under the Loui…

In 43 Case: 24-60370 Document: 127-1 Page: 44 Date Filed: 11/17/2025 No. 24-60370 Zinermon v. Burch, the Court reaffirmed Monroe v. Pape’s holding that “[a] plaintiff . . . may invoke § 1983 regardless of any state-tort remedy that might be available to compensate him for the deprivation of these rights.” 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.

See Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 484 (“We conclude that the meaning given ‘color of’ law in the Classic case and in the Screws and Williams case was the correct one; and we adhere to it.”); see also Williams v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 576, 577 (1951) (“The question in this case is whether a special police officer who in his official capacity subjects a person suspected of crime to force and violence in order to obtain a confession may be prosecuted” for conduct under color of law.)…

They rely on language from Monroe v. Pape, where the Supreme Court rejected the idea that litigants must exhaust state remedies before suing under section 1983. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.

They rely on language from Monroe v. Pape, where the Supreme Court rejected the idea that litigants must exhaust state remedies before suing under section 1983. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.

They rely on language from Monroe v. Pape, where the Supreme Court rejected the idea that litigants must exhaust state remedies before suing under section 1983. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.

They rely on language from Monroe v. Pape, where the Supreme Court rejected the idea that litigants must exhaust state remedies before suing under section 1983. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.

See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 338 (1983) (“It is clear from the legislative debates that, in the view of the Act’s sponsors, the victims of Klan outrages were deprived of ‘equal protection of the laws’ if the perpetrators systematically went unpunished.”); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-180 (1961) (“It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in fed- eral courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, in…

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”).

Id. at 138, 153, 108 S.Ct. at 2306-07, 2314 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 137-38, 147 ; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 , 81 S.Ct. 473, 482 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 503 (1961) ("[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked"), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Willbourn v. City of Tulsa, 721 P.2d 8…

Perhaps this is because many were drafted before 3 the emergence of § 1983 civil rights litigation, which despite being passed in 1871, "languished in relative obscurity until 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape [, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) ]." Kaminski v. Coulter , 865 F.3d 339 , 345-46 (6th Cir. 2017) (" Monroe opened the gates for § 1983 litigants, transforming the little-used statute into a powerful tool for checking abuses by sta…

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”).

Jones v. Bock, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 910, 919 , 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007); Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500 , 102 S.Ct. 2557 , 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 , 93 S.Ct. 1689 , 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973); McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 , 83 S.Ct. 1433 , 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Borges Colon v. Roman-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir.2006); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (“The feder…

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (“The federal remedy of § 1983 is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”).

Ed. 2d 100 (1990) (“[T]he constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is complete when the wrongful action is taken.”); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 , 81 S. Ct. 473 , 5 L.

See Monroe, 81 S. Ct. at 484 (“We conclude that the meaning given ‘color of’ law in the Classic case and in the Screws and Williams case was the correct one; and we adhere to it.”); see also Williams v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 576, 577 (1951) (“The question in this case is whether a special police officer who in his official capacity subjects a person suspected of crime to force and violence in order to obtain a confession may be prosecuted” for conduct under color of law.)…

Paul, 823 F.3d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 2016) (“§ 1983 imposes liability on an official who oversteps [his] authority and misuses power”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (“Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”).

The Supreme Court has “on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a [Section] 1983 action should be dismissed where the plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies.” Patsy v. Bd. Of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”).