Smith v. Commonwealth (1998)

Parson v. Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 565 , 686 S.E.2d 452, 455 (2006) (citing cases); Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 357, 363 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998).

Moreover, remorse includes “sympathy” or “concern for the victims of the crimes for which he was convicted.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 364-65 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998).

Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 360-63 (1998) (holding that “a trial court may consider a defendant’s lack of remorse at sentencing, even when the defendant has chosen to enter an Alford plea”).

See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998) (“[A] trial court may consider a defendant’s lack of remorse at sentencing, even when the defendant has chosen to enter an Alford plea.”).

A sentencing court “must take into account a wide range of information, including the defendant’s remorse or lack thereof, in determining ‘a sentence that best effectuates the criminal justice system’s goals of deterrence (general and specific), incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998) (quoting Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 524 , 465 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1996)).

Id. (“An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”).

In exercising its discretion, the trial court “must take into account a wide range of information, including the defendant’s remorse or lack thereof, in determining ‘a sentence that best effectuates the criminal justice system’s goals of deterrence (general and specific), incapacitation, retribution and rehabilitation.’” Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 75, 87 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 (1998)).

Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 364 (1998); see also Thomason, 69 Va. App. at 99 (“Appellant’s sentence was within the statutory range, and our task is complete.”). - 14 - CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 88 (lowa 2005); Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 357, 363 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998); State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 96 , 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Jarvis, 214 N.C.App. 84, 97 , 715 S.E.2d 252 , 261 2011).

Such evidence that is explicitly linked to the defendant’s constitutional right to contest the proceedings in general is not allowed, as to penalize a defendant for pleading not guilty would be a blatant violation of due process and his constitutional rights.3 Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 362 (1998); see Lawlor, 285 Va. at 266.

Rodas’s entire argument erroneously conflates showing remorse with accepting responsibility, but “an expression of remorse does not presuppose acceptance of criminal responsibility.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 364 (1998).

In exercising its discretion, the trial court “must take into account a wide range of information, including the defendant’s remorse or lack thereof, in determining ‘a sentence that best effectuates the criminal justice system’s goals of deterrence (general and specific), incapacitation, retribution and rehabilitation.’” Baldwin v. -6- Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 75, 87-88 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 (1998)).

Moreover, “[t]he court must take into account a wide range of information, including the defendant’s remorse or lack thereof, in determining ‘a sentence that best effectuates the criminal justice system’s goals of deterrence (general and specific), incapacitation, retribution and rehabilitation.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998) (citation omitted).

Ed. 2d 162 (1970)." Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 361 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1998).

See Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 357, 359 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 12 (1998).

Id. at 707 (citations omitted) . . . ; see generally Smith v. Com., 27 Va.App. 357 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1998) (quoting State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94 , 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct.App.1995)) (“’[A]lthough an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions . . . [but the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime, including [the] defendant’s lack of remorse.’”).

See Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 357, 363 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998).

See Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 357 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 13-14 (1998) (allowing consideration of lack of remorse by defendant entering Alford plea, notwithstanding defendant’s argument that doing so “may chill the use of the Alford plea and may increase the burden on the courts”). ' IV.

See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 357, 363 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1998) (holding that “a trial court may consider a defendant’s lack of remorse at sentencing, even when the defendant has chosen to enter an Alford [or nolo contendere ] plea”).

We need not decide whether Rigdon meets the statutory definition of victim because the record demonstrates that her testimony and written statement were admissible under Rock v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 254 (2005).3 In Rock, we held that nothing in the Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act prohibits a court from admitting relevant evidence or testimony from other witnesses who do not meet the statutory definition of “victim.” Id. at 261-63 ; see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 27…

Id. at 707 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see generally Smith v. Com., 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Howry, 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)) (“ ‘[Although an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions . . . [but the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime, including [the] defendant’s lack of remorse.’ ”).