Stanley v. Georgia (1969)

But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969).

But cf. Stanley v. Georgia (1969) 394 U.S. 557, 567 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 542, 550-551 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 ].) There is ample evidence of pandering in the instant case, e.g., the “adult” bookstore and the advertising blurbs on the covers of “Love Together”: “Not one word cut from this fiery tale of sexual excess in which perversion was the order of the day and normal sexuality something weird, square and almost unknown!” “Artists and models writhe together in frantic abandon in a world w…

But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 , 89 S.Ct 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (First Amendment protects viewing obscenity in the privacy of the home). .

But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed. 2 d 542 (1969).

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969) (“[T]he Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas”); Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 874 (1997).

Harper was not adjudged insane or incompetent. 110 Wash. 2d 873, 882 , 759 P. 2d 358, 364 (1988). [3] See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds").

Cf., e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.... [I]t cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”); McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir.1987) (“Given the strength of First Amendment protection for freedom of belief, prison authorities have no legi…

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1249 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) ("We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime.").

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”); cf. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002).

An injunction against speech harms not just the speakers but also the listeners (in this case the viewers and readers). “[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from lim- iting the stock of information from which members of the pub- lic may draw.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Stanley v. Ge…

See United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 956 , 959–60 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”).

Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1248 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) ("Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating (, inter alia, the sale and purchase of) obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home."); id. at 571-72 , 89 S.Ct. at 1251 (Stewart, J., concurring) (reaching same conclusion on Fourth Amendment grounds). 33 However, we do not agree with Beale that the use of drug-detecting canines is identical …

Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1248 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating [, inter alia, the sale and purchase of] obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home.”); id. at 571-72 , 89 S.Ct. at 1251 (Stewart, J., concurring) (reaching same conclusion on Fourth Amendment grounds).

As the Supreme Court has observed, “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 , 98 S.Ct. 1407 , 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“It is ... well established that the Constitution protects the ri…

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”).

See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1248 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“The line between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all.”) We cannot agree, however, that speech must be distilled from conduct, or vice versa, before O’Brien can be applied.

See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 820-21 , 120 S.Ct. 1878 , 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) (requiring more than "anecdotal evidence" of "signal bleed" problem in support of a regulation requiring broadcasters to fully scramble sexually-oriented programming); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) ("Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the gr…

See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 820-21 , 120 S.Ct. 1878 , 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) (requiring more than “anecdotal evidence” of “signal bleed” problem in support of a regulation requiring broadcasters to fully scramble sexually-oriented programming); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the gr…

According to Doe, by contrast, “the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.” Doe’s Br. 36 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).

Again, the First Amendment “protects the right to receive information and ideas,” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), and this right extends to prisoners “unless it is ‘inconsistent with a person’s status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.’” Clement v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 364 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. N.C.

This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.” Thunder Studios, Inc. v. Kazal, 13 F.4th 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).

Cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (recognizing an individual’s “right to read or observe what he pleases—the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home”; “He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his library.”); see Judiciary Hearing at 2820-2821 (statement of Sen.

See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the pri- vacy of one’s own home.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598 (1980) (rely- ing on the common law’s “unequivocal endorsement of the tenet that ‘a man’s house is his castle’” to conclude the Fourth Amendment prevents warrantless home arrests); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 , 634–35 (200…

Cf., e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving govern- ment the power to control men's minds.... [I]t cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of con- trolling a person's private thoughts."); McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Given the strength of First Amendment protection for freedom of belief, prison authori- ties have no legitimate penological interes…

See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”).

Id. at 565 , 89 S.Ct. at 1248 (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in the privacy of his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”).

See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”).

See TSEU, 746 S.W.2d at 206 ; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247-48 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”).

Speech that is obscene, under the legal definition of obscenity set forth in the margin, is unprotected under the First Amendment, and accordingly the state has a compelling interest in preventing its distribution. 29 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973) (“This Court has recognized that the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563 , 8…

See, eg., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) ("It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (''The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read ... and freedom of inquiry. ..."); Ban…

Justice Brennan reasoned that the right to receive information is inherent in the right to speak and that “the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.” Id. at 866 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965)); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“the Constitution protects the right to receive information …

As the Supreme Court has observed, “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 , 98 S.Ct. 1407 [1419], 55 L.Ed.2d 707 [722] (1978); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 [1247], 22 L.Ed.2d 542 [549] (1969) (“It is ... well established that the Cons…

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“It is now well-established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”) The Plaintiffs have a right to receive information that is independent of the judicial candidate’s right to speak and express their opinions.

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); accord Neinast v. Bd of Trustees of the Columbus Metro.

J. at p. 9.] Plaintiffs respond that privacy rights are not limited to those described by defendants, and rely on the right to privacy articulated in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man sitting alone in his own house what books he may read ... ”). [Plaintiffs’ Opp. to Def.’s Mot.

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 , 117 S.Ct. 2329 , 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (invalidating a statute because it “effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“[T]he right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth ... is fundamental to our free society.”); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, …

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1248 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds”).

This right was extended to certain kinds of private and constitutionally significant conduct occurring in one’s own home, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1248 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”).

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 , 48 S.Ct. 564, 572 , 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Bradeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he right to be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 , 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) ("[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247 , 22 …

C., 395 U.S. 367, 396 , 89 S.Ct. 1794 , 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 , 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 , 85 S.Ct. 1493 , 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 , 63 S.Ct. 862 , 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); see also, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 , …

See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 ("It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 482–483, (1965); Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1256.

“This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citation omitted).

Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2005); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); see also Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that “[a] prison’s refusal to allow an inmate access to a book presents a substantial First Amendment issue”).

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).

It is “well established that the” First Amendment “protects the right to receive information and ideas.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).

Nonetheless, it is “well established that the [federal] Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas,” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), and in that general sense, there can be no law or holding that would deprive Ohioans of this right, and thus, it is safe to conclude that the Ohio Constitution—like the United States Constitution—similarly protects the right to receive information and ideas. 53 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 140} The Ohio Constitut…

He then cites a United States Supreme Court case for the proposition that “a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.” Id.5 Appellant does not assert that he was punished for exercising that ____________________________________________ 5 Appellant cites Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).

See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”) (collecting cases); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read . . . .”).

But this argument is also unavailing as PETA has alleged that its “supporters[] wish[] to continue posting comments about TAMU laboratories.” Dkt. 39 at 20. 6 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”). 16 Perhaps in recognition of this fact, President Banks argues further that PETA “did not plausibly explain: (1) who would post the comments; (2) where the c…

See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas”).