Landry v. State (1995)

See Landry, 666 So. 2d at 125 (“A sua sponte denial of a demand for speedy trial does not somehow stop the time periods set forth in subdivision (b) from running, as the trial judge in this case obviously believed.”).

Cf. Landry, 666 So.2d at 128 (“The determination of whether a speedy trial demand is valid should not involve a subjective evaluation of trial strategy or mere second guessing by the trial court.”).

We have held that the purpose of the speedy trial rule is to "give the court control of its docket so that guilt or innocence may be determined in a manner consistent with the proper investigation and preparation of the case by the prosecution and, at the same time, guaranteeing to the defendant his constitutional right to a speedy trial." Landry v. State, 666 So.2d 121, 125 (Fla.1995) (quoting State ex rel.

In Landry v. State, 666 So.2d 121, 127 (Fla.1995), the supreme court explained the trial court’s obligation once a speedy trial is demanded: [I]n determining whether a demand is valid-under subdivisions (g) and (j) of rule 3.191, the court must consider whether the accused has a “bona fide desire” to obtain a speedy trial and whether the accused “has diligently investigated the case” and “is timely prepared for trial.” (citation omitted.) This determination is primarily an o…

Landry v. State, 666 So.2d 121, 127 (Fla.1995).

See Landry v. State, 666 So. 2d 121 , 125–26 (Fla. 1995) (discussing a trial court’s duty to determine whether a speedy trial violation has occurred).

See Landry v. State, 666 So.2d 121 (Fla.1995).

See Landry v. State, 666 So.2d 121, 125 (Fla.1995) (holding that the rules of criminal procedure do not authorize the sua sponte denial of a demand for speedy trial; motion by prosecuting attorney is required). ■ Reversed with directions to discharge McNeal in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p)(3).