Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ (1995)
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· 77 citation events
across 8 courts.
Showing the 25 strongest citers on record
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City of Winter Springs v. State (2001)
See Lake County v. Water Oak Management Corp., 695 So.2d 667, 668 (Fla.1997) (citing City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 30 (Fla. 1992)). [2] "[T]he standard [of review] is the same for both prongs; that is, the legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apportionment of the costs of those benefits should be upheld unless the determination is arbitrary." Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, 667 So.2d 180, 184 (Fla. 1995). …
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& SC14-1618 Florida Bankers Association v. Florida Development Finance Corporation, etc. & Robert Reynolds v.… (2015)
Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
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Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
citation omitted
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Scott Morris v. City of Cape Coral, etc. (2015)
See Sarasota Church of Christ, 667 So.2d at 184 (“[Legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apportionment of the costs of those benefits should be upheld unless the determination is arbitrary.”).
“[Legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apportionment of the costs of those benefits should be upheld unless the determination is arbitrary.”
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Donnelly v. Marion County (2003)
In Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 182-83 (Fla.1995), the supreme court distinguished a special assessment from a tax: Taxes are levied throughout a particular taxing unit for the general benefit of residents and property and are imposed under the theory that contributions must be made by the community at large to support the various functions of the government.
Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d at 184 (“[T]he standard is the same for both prongs; that is, the legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apportionment of the costs of those benefits should be upheld unless the determination is arbitrary.”). .
“[T]he standard is the same for both prongs; that is, the legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apportionment of the costs of those benefits should be upheld unless the determination is arbitrary.”
Sarasota Cty. v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1995) (“To require that the stormwater utility services be funded through a general ad valorem tax, as requested by the religious organizations who filed this action, would shift part of the cost of managing the stormwater drainage problems, which are created by developed real property, to undeveloped property owners who neither significantly contributed to nor caused the stormwater drainage problems.…
Sarasota Cty. v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1995) (“To require that the stormwater utility services be funded through a general ad valorem tax, as requested by the religious organizations who filed this action, would shift part of the cost of managing the stormwater drainage problems, which are created by developed real property, to undeveloped property owners who neither significantly contributed to nor caused the stormwater drainage problems…
THE 2010-2011 SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS “[A] valid special assessment must meet two requirements: (1) the property assessed must derive a special benefit from the service provided; and (2) the assessment must be fairly and reasonably apportioned according to the benefits received.” Sarasota Cty. v. Sarasota Church of Christ, 667 So.2d 180, 183 (Fla. 1995) (citing City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 30 (Fla. 1992)).
citing City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 30 (Fla. 1992)
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City of Lewiston v. GLADU (2012)
Id. (citing Sarasota Cnty. v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 184-87 (Fla.1995) (upholding a fee utilizing factors nearly identical to those in McLeod )). 4 *970 [¶ 20] The City’s Ordinance passes this test.
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Donovan v. Okaloosa County (2012)
City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 30 (Fla.1992) (“The apportionment of benefits is a legislative function, and if reasonable persons may differ as to whether the land assessed was benefitted by the local improvement, the findings of the city officials must be sustained.”). “[T]he standard [for determin ing whether to sustain the findings] is the same for both prongs; that is, the legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apporti…
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City of Lewiston v. Gladu (2011)
App. 3d 2005); McLeod v. Columbia County, 599 S.E.2d 152, 155 (Ga. 2004); Ed. Of Education of Jordan School Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 94 P.3d 234, 242 (Utah 2004); City of Gainesville v. State of Florida, 863 So. 2d 138, 143-48 (Fla. 2003); Densmore v. Jefferson County, 813 So.2d 844, 854-55 (Ala. 2001); Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton, 497 S.E.2d 858, 861 (Va. 1998); Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d 180, 186 (Fla. 1996); Roseburg School Dist. v.…
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Desiderio Corp. v. City of Boynton Beach (2010)
During judicial review, “the standard is the same for both prongs [of the special benefits test]; that is, the legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apportionment of the costs of those benefits should be upheld unless the determination is arbitrary.” Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 184 (Fla.1995).
See City of Winter Springs, 776 So.2d at 258 ; Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 184 (Fla.1995).
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City of North Lauderdale v. SMM Properties, Inc. (2002)
See City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 30 (Fla.1992); South Trail Fire Control Dist. v. State, 273 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla.1973) (determination of special benefits is one of fact for legislative body and apportionment of the assessments is a legislative function). "[T]he standard is the same for both prongs; that is, the legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apportionment of costs of those benefits should be upheld unless the det…
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City of Gainesville v. STATE, DOT (2001)
Special assessments are, to be sure, one statutorily authorized means for financing construction of municipal stormwater management systems. [1] See Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 186-87 (Fla.1995).
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Pinellas County v. State (2001)
Cf. Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla.1995) (observingin the context of a similar challenge levied against certain stormwater management special assessments (rather than user fees)that, where the County's assessments against certain properties were reasonably related to the treatment of polluted stormwater contributed by those properties, "[t]o require that the stormwater utility services be funded through a general ad valorem tax,…
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City of Pembroke Pines v. McConaghey (1999)
On the other hand, "special assessments must confer a special benefit on the land burdened by the *350 assessment and are imposed under the theory that the portion of the community that bears the cost of the assessment will receive a special benefit from the improvement or service for which the assessment is levied." Sarasota County, 667 So.2d at 183 (citations omitted).
citations omitted
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Bolt v. City of Lansing (1998)
Any effort somehow to rely upon a different definition of "user" is essentially a matter of semantics more than of substance, given the state statutory scheme. [ Id. at 1421.] [12] See Sarasota Co. v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 186 (Fla., 1995) ("Although we do not find that the previous funding of stormwater services through taxation was inappropriate, we do find that the stormwater funding through the special assessment at issue complies with the dicta…
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Maryland Attorney General Opinion 96 OAG 061 (2011)
Leonardo v. Board of County Commissioners, 214 Md. 287, 306-9 , 134 A.2d 284 (1957) (upholding erosion control charge based on waterfront footage); see also Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 185 (Fla. 1995) (upholding special assessment for stormwater facilities against developed properties that generate polluted runoff and therefore benefit from such facilities). 9 In this regard, it is notable that the General Assembly has referred to “drai…
upholding special assessment for stormwater facilities against developed properties that generate polluted runoff and therefore benefit from such facilities
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(2011) (2011)
Leonardo v. Board of County Commissioners , 214 Md. 287 , 306-9 , 134 A.2d 284 (1957) (upholding erosion control charge based on waterfront footage); see also Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc. , 667 So.2d 180 , 185 (Fla. 1995) (upholding special assessment for stormwater facilities against developed properties that generate polluted runoff and therefore benefit from such facilities). *Page 69 MDE has developed a model ordinance that includes a stormwater uti…
upholding special assessment for stormwater facilities against developed properties that generate polluted runoff and therefore benefit from such facilities
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City of Clearwater v. SCH. BD. OF PINELLAS (2005)
Compare Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180 (Fla.1995) (special assessments), with City of Cocoa v. Sch.
user fees
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QUIETWATER ENTERTAINMENT v. Escambia County (2005)
The legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits must be upheld unless the determination is "palpably arbitrary." City of Pembroke Pines v. McConaghey, 728 So.2d 347, 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); see also Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, 667 So.2d 180, 184 (Fla.1995); compare City of North Lauderdale, 825 So.2d at 348 (holding that the City's findings of special benefit were not supported by the record).
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SMM Properties, Inc. v. City of North Lauderdale (2000)
See Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 183 (Fla.1995).
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Bolt v. City of Lansing (2000)
See Sarasota Co. v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So.2d 180, 185-186 (Fla., 1995); Long Run Baptist Ass'n, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Co. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 775 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Ky.App., 1989); Teter v. Clark Co., 104 Wash.2d 227, 232-233 , 704 P.2d 1171 (1985); Zelinger v. Denver, 724 P.2d 1356 (Colo., 1986).