Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education (1985)

But the Court previously has recognized that “[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 669 (1985).

But the Court previously has rec- ognized that “[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 669 (1985). 22 Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provided federal grants to finance supplemental educational programs in school districts with high concentrati…

See also ibid. (“[T]he [Pennhurst] notice problem does not arise in a case such as this, in which intentional discrimination is alleged”); Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 665-666 (1985) (holding that there was sufficient notice under Pennhurst where a statute made clear that some conditions were placed on the receipt of federal funds, and stating that Congress need not “specifically identify] and proscribe]” each condition in the legislation).

Although we have been careful not to imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation, see, e. g., Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 669 (1985) (Title I), we have regularly applied the contract-law analogy in cases defining the scope of conduct for which funding recipients may be held liable for money damages.

At most, the Court has accepted that Spending Clause legislation has “a contractual aspect” while steadfastly Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 23 JACKSON, J., dissenting insisting that such laws nonetheless “cannot be viewed in the same manner as a bilateral contract governing a con- crete transaction.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 669 (1985); accord, B.

At most, the Court has accepted that Spending Clause legislation has “a contractual aspect” while steadfastly Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 23 JACKSON, J., dissenting insisting that such laws nonetheless “cannot be viewed in the same manner as a bilateral contract governing a con- crete transaction.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U. S. 656, 669 (1985); accord, B.

Bennett v. Ky. Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666-67 , 105 S.Ct. 1544 , 84 L.Ed.2d 590 (1985) ("[T]he background of the actual operation of Title I" informs a proper understanding of "the fundamental nature of the obligations assumed under Title I.").

As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he State gave certain assurances as a condition for receiving the federal funds, and if those assurances are not complied with, the Federal Government is entitled to recover amounts spent contrary to the terms of the grant agreement.” Bennett v. Kentucky, 470 U.S. at 663, 105 S.Ct. at 1549 .

Id. at 1218 (citing Bennett, 470 U.S. at 670 (“We agree with the [agency] that the [state grantee] clearly violated existing statutory and regulatory provisions . . . .”) (emphasis added) (collecting cases)3).

Id. at 1218 (citing Bennett, 470 U.S. at 670 (“We agree with the [agency] that the [state grantee] clearly violated existing statutory and regulatory provisions . . . .”) (emphasis added) (collecting cases)3).

Cf. Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985) (noting that Congress need not “prospectively resolve every possible ambiguity” in Spending Clause legislation).

No. 89-97, sec. 121 (a), § 1902(c), 79 Stat. 286 , 348 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(c) (1969)) (MOE provision in the original Medicaid statute); Bennett, 470 U.S. at 671 (describing MOE provision in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965).

But the Supreme Court held that the funding conditions were unambiguous based on the combination of the statute and the agency’s authorized regulations: “We agree with the [agency] that the [state grantee] clearly violated existing statutory and regulatory provisions . . . .” Bennett, 470 U.S. at 670 (emphasis added); see id. (considering exercises of the spending power based on both the “the statutory provisions” and “the regulations . . . and other guidelines provided by t…

Cf. Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 , 105 S.Ct. 1544 , 84 L.Ed.2d 590 (1985) (“Unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy”).

See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 183 (2005) (States had sufficient notice of their responsibility under Title IX because the regulations had "been on the books" for some time); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999) (same); cf. Bennett, 470 U.S. at 669 ("the fact that Title I [of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965] was an ongoing, cooperative program meant that grant recipients had an opportunity to seek clar…

See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 183 (2005) (States had sufficient notice of their responsibility under Title IX because the regulations had “been on the books” for some time); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999) (same); cf. Bennett, 470 U.S. at 669 (“the fact that Title I [of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965] was an ongoing, cooperative program meant that grant recipients had an opportunity to seek clar…

See Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, 470 U.S. 656, 669 , 105 S.Ct. 1544, 1552 , 84 L.Ed.2d 590 (1985) (“Unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.”); Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441, 1449 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Claims that “arise under a federal grant program …

See Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, 470 U.S. 656, 669 , 105 S.Ct. 1544, 1552 , 84 L.Ed.2d 590 (1985) ("Unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy."); Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441, 1449 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Claims that "arise under a federal grant program …

An agency’s choice of legal instrument has important consequences across a variety of contexts, including the “general rules regarding drafting and ambiguities.” 12 Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985) (because “grant agreements . . . cannot be viewed in the same manner as a bilateral contract governing a discrete transaction,” 10 Congress has given agencies some further flexibility, permitting them in “specific instance[s],” to label an agreement a “procu…

Cf. Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666 (1985) (explaining that Pennhurst was no defense to liability because “[t]he requisite clarity in this case is provided by Title I; States that chose to participate in the program agreed to abide by the requirements of Title I as a condition for receiving funds”).

The Supreme Court has explained that, when a state accepts federal funds, the state nec- essarily agrees “to comply with, and its liability is determined by, the legal requirements in place when the grants were made.” USCA11 Case: 22-10168 Document: 102-1 Date Filed: 01/20/2023 Page: 40 of 42 40 Opinion of the Court 22-10168 Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985).

Id. (“[W]e ... disagree with the suggestion ... that substantial compliance with applicable legal requirements affects liability.”).

Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (alterations accepted) (quoting Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666 (1985)).

Id. (quoting Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)).

Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (alterations accepted) (quoting Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666 (1985)).

See, e.g., Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 659 (1985) (“In order to assure that federal funds would be used to support additional services that would not otherwise be available, the Title I program . . . prohibited the use of federal grants merely to replace state and local expenditures.”). 13 Case: 22-10560 Document: 119-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/25/2024 No. 22-10560 On the other hand, if Section 802(c)(2)(A) is so expansive as to require the States to accept p…

And “liability is determined by[] the legal requirements in place when the grants were made” and “should be informed by the statutory provisions, regulations, and other guidelines provided by the [agency] at that time.” Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985).

And “liability is determined by[] the legal requirements in place when the grants were made” and “should be informed by the statutory provisions, regulations, and other guidelines provided by the [agency] at that time.” Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985).

See Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656 , 662–63 (1985) (“Although recovery of misused . . . funds clearly is intended to promote compliance with the requirements of the grant program, a demand for repayment is more in the nature of an effort to collect upon a debt than a penal sanction.”).

It is true, as the panel points out, that the Supreme Court has recognized that in establishing federal grant programs, Congress cannot always “prospectively resolve every possible ambiguity concerning particular applications of [a program’s] requirements.” Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985).

But the Supreme Court has recognized that, in establishing federal grant programs, Congress cannot always “prospectively resolve every possible ambiguity concerning particular applications of the [program’s statutory] requirements.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666, 669 (1985) (making point in context of federal education grant program).

The Supreme Court, it added, had already explicitly rejected a Medicaid-as-contract theory, holding that “‘unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.’” Id. (quoting Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)).

Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1985) (“[T]he background of the actual operation of Title I” informs a proper understanding of “the fundamental nature of the obligations assumed under Title I.”).

Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666-69 (1985) (noting that federal grant programs cannot prospectively resolve every possible “ambiguity” concerning particular applications of their statutory requirements). 21 In this case, Alabama received ample notice of its nondiscrimination obligations under Title VI.

See Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 , 105 S.Ct. 1544, 1552 , 84 L.Ed.2d 590 (1985) (“Unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy”). “[T]he contract we are interpreting is one in which the United States is a party, and one which is entered into pursuant to authority conferred by federal statute.

“Unlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.” Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985).

Finally, where there was no ambiguity with respect to limitations on use of the grant monies, the government is not limited to recovering “misused federal funds only if every improper expenditure has been specifically identified and proscribed in advance.” Id. at 666 (emphasis omitted).

And second, it held that the suit was not barred by the “expressly or impliedly forbids” limitation because the grant disallowance did not arise from an “‘express or implied contract’ as that phrase is used in the Tucker Act”; “‘[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.’” Id. 22 at 1449 (alteration in original) (quoting Benne…

While reliance interests may be relevant “in evaluating past expenditures” and may preclude attempts to divest aliens of benefits received under our prior interpretation, see Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985), there can be no prospective reliance on a con- tinued misinterpretation of federal law.

As the Supreme Court has noted, “[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985).

As the Supreme Court has noted, “[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.” Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985).

Ct. 366, 370 (1991) (citing Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)) (“Where rights and obligations are prescribed by statute and regulation rather than determined through the mechanics of a bilateral exchange, there is no contract . . . .”); see also Nalette v. United States, 72 Fed.

Ct. 366, 370 (1991) (citing Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)) (“Where rights and obligations are prescribed by statute and regulation rather than determined through the mechanics of a bilateral exchange, there is no contract . . . .”); Taylor v. United States, 113 Fed.

Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Ed., 470 U.S. 656, 666 (1985).

Agency v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 992 F.3d 350, 361 (5th Cir. 2021) (state waivers of sovereign immunity); Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666 (1985) (limits on state uses of federal funding). 11 one.

In Morrisey, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly acknowledged that Congress may require grantees to abide by “‘the legal requirements in place when the grants were made’ [and] [t]hese ‘legal requirements’ include existing regulations.” 59 F.4th at 1148 (quoting Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985)).

For example, Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education involved Title I funds made available to States “to support compensatory education programs for disadvantaged children.” 470 U.S. 656, 659 (1985).

In many instances, however, the analogy will not work because “[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress[.]” Id. (quoting Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)).

Ct. 366, 370 (1991) (citing Bennett v. Kentucky Dep't of Editc., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)) ("Where rights and obligations are prescribed by statute and regulation rather than determined through the mechanics of bilateral exchange, there is no contract in the usual sense of that word.").

There the Court taught that, “[ujnlike normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.” Id at 670, 105 S.Ct. 1544 .