Dow Chemical Co. v. United States Ex Rel. Administrator (1986)

See id., at 586-587 . 2 Whether that property is residential or commercial, the basic principle is the same: ‘“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.’ ” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967)); see Florida v. Riley, 488 U. S. 445, 449-450 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35, 40-41 (1988); Dow Chemical Co. v. Un…

See Florida v. Riley, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 693, 696 , 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (police may make warrantless aerial observations from helicopter of activities within a greenhouse which was exposed to public view because it had a partially opened roof); see also Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 , 106 S.Ct. 1819, 1827 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (“[T]he taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the…

Co. -7- v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (“Plainly a business establishment or an industrial or commercial facility enjoys certain protections under the Fourth Amendment.”).5 Even so, “[a]n expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home,” Burger, 482 U.S. at 700 , and a business owner or operator does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the portions of a business…

See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237 , 106 S.Ct. at 1826 (“[a]ny actual physical entry by EPA into any enclosed area would raise significantly different questions”).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 , 106 S.Ct. 1819 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (“[Sjurveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 232 , 106 S.Ct. 1819 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) ("State tort law does not define the limits of the Fourth Amendment.").

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (taking aerial photos of an industrial plant was not a search); Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 600 (2018) (affirming the “ability to observe inside curtilage from a lawful vantage point”).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235, 239 (1986); or for a property visible over a fence to individuals perched atop “a [hypothetical] truck or a two-level bus,” see Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 .

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229, 238 (1986).

In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court held that taking aerial photo- graphs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amend- ment. 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).

In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court held that taking aerial photo- graphs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amend- ment. 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).

If planes can photograph individual objects on a property as small as one half inch in diameter, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986), I cannot grasp how AIR photos representing individuals on public streets as mere pixelated dots with no distinguishing features flunks the Fourth Amendment test.

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229, 238 (1986) (approving of “commercial aerial photographer” flying over a suspected industrial building without using “highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public”); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (finding no violation where officer “circled twice over respondent’s property in a helicopter” at 400 feet to observe greenhouse “[w]ith his naked eye”); United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430 , …

These areas, known as the “curtilage,” are treated as “part of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984), and receive the same property- based protections as “the interior of a structure,” Dow Chem. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986); erects a ten-foot fence to conceal his yard from street-level views, California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); closes himself in a phone booth to place a call, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); stows a zipped luggage bag in the bedroom closet of an apartment at which he was temporarily staying, United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2005); or hides cocaine in a shoe box in the basement rafter…

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986) (changes in technology not only ―enhance[] industrial process, and indeed all areas of life,‖ but ―they have also enhanced law enforcement techniques‖).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (permitting aerial observation with enhancing camera technology of an industrial complex without a warrant, even though the government used a camera that provided “more detailed information than naked-eye views”).

III Ryan further contends that the district court failed to give him enough time to develop his case through discovery. “[C]ontrol of discovery is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its discovery rulings will be reversed only where they are arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.”4 Though generally “a ruling that denies a party an adequate opportunity to discover facts to oppose a motion for summary judgment is unreasonable if summary judgment is subsequentl…

See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (entering private property with “No Trespassing” signs to observe marijuana plants in an “open field” not visible from outside the property); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (photographing an industrial complex with a precision aerial mapping camera); California v. Ciaolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (using aerial surveillance in public airspace to observe the curtilage of a private resi…

Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978).

Co. v. United States , 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986)).

See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 , 239 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1819 , 1827 n. 5, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) ("Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations."). 1.

Co. v. United States , 476 U.S. 227 , 233, 106 S.Ct. 1819 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) ("When Congress invests an agency with enforcement and investigatory authority, it is not necessary to identify explicitly each and every technique that may be used in the course of executing the statutory mission."); In re Nowell , 293 N.C. 235 , 237 S.E.2d 246 , 252 (1977) ( "Any administrative agency empowered to investigate complaints and allegations of wrongdoing must have a broad discreti…

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding government’s use of sophisticated cameras and zoom lenses to photograph industrial site was not a search); id. at 237 n.4 (noting, for purposes of its analysis, that “it [is] important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened” (emphasis in original)). 54 Cowles v. State, 23 P.3d 1168, 1170-71 (Alaska 2001). 55 Id. at 1171 . 56 Id. at 1172 . 57 Id. at…

Co. v. United States , 749 F.2d 307 , 314 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd , 476 U.S. 227 , 106 S.Ct. 1819 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) ("The backyard and area immediately surrounding the home are really extensions of the dwelling itself."); State v. Walker , 154 Wis.2d 158 , 453 N.W.2d 127 , 138 (1990) (holding that a backyard was within the curtilage of the home), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Felix , 339 Wis.2d 670 , 811 N.W.2d 775 , 790 (2012).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 , 106 S.Ct. 1819 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (“Dow plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is prepared to observe.”).

See Minn.Stat. §§ 144A.10 and 144A.53 (granting the Department and its director broad discretion to determine the manner in which evidence is gathered and the manner in which violations are determined); see also Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 , 106 S.Ct. 1819, 1824 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (“When Congress invests an agency with enforcement and investigatory authority, it is not necessary to identify explicitly each and every technique that may be used in…

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).

See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989) (plurality op.) (reversing the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress contesting the search of a greenhouse in a residential backyard conducted pursuant to a warrant, which was obtained based upon observations gained 3 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989) (plurality op.); Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v. Ciraola, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Katz v. United Sta…

See , e.g. , Florida v. Riley , 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989) (plurality op.) (reversing the trial court's grant of a motion to suppress contesting the search of a greenhouse in a residential backyard conducted pursuant to a warrant, which was obtained based upon observations gained from helicopter surveillance, because the helicopter surveillance did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding only that…

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-238 (1986) ("the government `has "greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property" because "the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home"'"). [11] Even if a coinhabitant of the home had actual authority to consent to a search of the home, the consent would not extend to a closed suitcase, overnigh…

See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237 ("[a]ny actual physical entry by EPA into any enclosed area would raise significantly different questions").

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235, 239 , 106 S. Ct. 1819 , 90 L.

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).

Setting aside the particular characteristics of the Thomases’ property and the particular circumstances of the two incidents in which WCO Moon entered onto and searched their property, the challenged statute clearly could be applied to authorize a waterways conservation officer to enter onto private property that does not constitute curtilage— for example, entry onto commercial or industrial property, , , 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (finding that open areas of large industrial …

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1986) (“Dow’s inner manufacturing areas are elaborately secured to ensure they are not open or exposed to the public from the ground.

But as Dow Chemical 10 Co. v. United States (the second case) illustrates, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the government’s use of certain minimally-intrusive, sense-enhancing techniques does not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment. ¶100 In Dow Chemical, the Court held that the use of a sophisticated precision mapping camera to obtain enhanced aerial photographs of an industrial complex from lawfully navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth…

App. 479, 483 , 518 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1999) (quoting Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226, 235 (1986)).

Ed. 2d 226, 235 , 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (1986)).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986). -5- “‘The curtilage of a dwelling house is a space necessary and convenient, habitually used for family purposes and the carrying on of domestic employment; the yard, garden or field which is near to and used in connection with the dwelling.’” Patler v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 448, 451 , 177 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1970) (quoting Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 795 , 94 S.E. 168, 172 (1917)).

The “route which any visitor to a residence would use,” such as driveways, walkways or similar passageways, “is not private in the Fourth Amendment sense,” United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 465 (2d Cir.2002), and a “visual observation is no ‘search’ at all.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-235, 239 , 106 S.Ct. 1819 , 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986)). *288 Although there is a issue of material fact as to whether th…

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-239 (1986).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986).

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 , 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 , 90 L.

Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986) (“When Congress invests an agency with enforcement and investigatory authority, it is not necessary to identify explicitly each and every technique that may be used in the course of executing the statutory mission.”).

See Holden, 964 P2d at 321-22 ; cf. Dow Chemical Company v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236-40 (1986) (because Dow had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the outdoor areas of its manufacturing plant, aerial photography with a mapping camera did not violate the Fourth Amendment).

The United States Supreme Court has further defined the curtilage of a private house as “a place where the occupants have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept.” Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 , 90 L.