Burlington Northern Railroad v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (1987)

But see Burlington Northern, 107 S.Ct. 1841 , 1854-55 & n. 15 (1987) (discussed infra).

Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U. S. 429, 444-446 (1987)).

Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U. S. 429, 444 (1987) (resolution procedures for major disputes “virtually endless”); Detroit & T.

Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U. S. 429, 436, n. 4 (1987) (injunction on secondary picketing in railroad labor dispute); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 , *482 546-547 (1976) (protective order on press coverage of criminal trial).

See Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 449 , 107 S.Ct. at 1853 (“[A] federal court may enjoin a strike ... if a union does not comply with its obligation under Section 2 First of the RLA ‘to exert every reasonable effort’ to resolve the dispute.”); see also Chicago & N.W.

Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 437 (1987).

The plain words of the statute — that a labor dispute does not depend on “whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee,” 29 U.S.C. § 113 (c) — “reflects Congress’ decision to abolish ... the distinction between primary activity between the immediate disputants and secondary activity.” Bhd. of Maintenance Way Employees, 481 U.S. at 439 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has consistently characterized Norris-LaGuardia's definition of "labor dispute" as "broad." See, e.g., Bhd. of Maintenance Way Employees, 481 U.S. at 441 ("Congress made the definition of `labor dispute' broad because it wanted it to be broad"); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at 712 ("Congress deliberately included a broad definition [of labor disputes] to overrule judicial decisions that had unduly restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from t…

Instead, "if Congress should now find that abuses in the nature of secondary activities have arisen in the railroad industry ... it is for Congress, and not the Courts, to strike the balance 'between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests.' " 107 Id. at 452-53 , 107 S.Ct. at 1855 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 445 (1987) (quotation marks omitted).

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 438 (1987).

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 432 , 107 S.Ct. 1841 , 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (“A dispute over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them is a ‘major dispute’ in the parlance of railway labor law and is governed by the Railway Labor Act.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R.

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987) (quoting Elgin, Joliet & E.

See Burlington N. R.R., 481 U.S. at 447 , 107 S.Ct. at 1858 (“Faced with a choice between the ambiguity in the RLA and the unambiguous mandate of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, we choose the latter.”).

See Burlington N. R.R., 481 U.S. at 447 , 107 S.Ct. at 1858 ("Faced with a choice between the ambiguity in the RLA and the unambiguous mandate of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, we choose the latter."). 13 Pan Am argues that intermittent work stoppages are illegal under the RLA because such stoppages are "unprotected" activity under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C.

See Burlington, 481 U.S. at 441 (“Congress made the definition of ‘labor dispute’ broad because it wanted it to be broad.”) (cleaned up).

Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 445 (1987); BNSF Ry.

To effectuate peaceful dispute resolution, the RLA sets out a mandatory and “virtually endless” process of “negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation.” Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987).

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 436 (1987).

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 432 (1987) (“A dispute over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them is a ‘major dispute’ in the parlance of railway labor law and is governed by the Railway Labor Act.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R.

As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he Railway Labor Act `cannot be appreciated apart from the environment out of which it came and the purposes which it was designed to serve.'" Burlington N. R.R., Co. v. Brotherhood of Main- 4 tenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987) (quoting Elgin, J. & E.

Co. v. 3 B.M.W.E., 481 U.S. ___ , 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1860 (1987), where "a literal reading of [the] statute[will] produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters," United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985), or "where acceptance of that meaning would lead to absurd results . . . or would thwart the purpose of the statute," Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) (cit- ing Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)), or where…

The Court began by observing that "the [Norris-LaGuardia Act] reflects Congress' decision to abolish, for purposes of labor immunity, the distinction between primary activity between the immediate disputants and secondary activity in which the employer and the members of the union do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Id. at 439 , 107 S.Ct. at 1848 (quotations and citations omitted).

The Court began by observing that “the [Norris-La-Guardia Act] reflects Congress’ decision to abolish, for purposes of labor immunity, the distinction between primary activity between the immediate disputants and secondary activity in which the employer and the members of the union do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.” Id. at 439 , 107 S.Ct. at 1848 (quotations and citations omitted).

Thereafter, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the Court took the even more extreme step of approving a federal court injunction to enjoin a strike that the union was conducting despite a contract promising to arbitrate and to refrain from strikes. 6Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1987); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, 826 F.2d 1141, 1145 (1st Cir. 1987). -1…

Id. at 458-59 (footnote omitted). ___ Thereafter, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks ___________________ ______________ Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the Court took the even more _____ extreme step of approving a federal court injunction to enjoin a strike that the union was conducting despite a contract promising to arbitrate and to refrain from strikes. ____________________ 6Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance _________________________ ________________…

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 448 , 107 S.Ct. 1841 , 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987)(“The NLRA does not contain a ‘sweeping prohibition’ of secondary activity; instead it ‘describes and condemns specific union conduct directed to specific objectives.’ ”)(quoting Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 , 78 S.Ct. 1011 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1186 (1958)); The Developing Labor Law § 3.II.C, at 43 (explaining that Congress enacted 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4) to “outlaw various seconda…

Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employ[e]es, 481 U.S. 429, 436, n. 4 , 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1846, n. 4 , 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (parties "reasonably likely" to find themselves in future disputes over collectivebargaining agreement); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 578 , 107 S.Ct. 1419, 1424 , 94 L.Ed.2d 577 (1987) (O'CONNOR, J.) ("likely" that respondent would again submit mining plans that would trigger contested state permit requirement); Press-Enterprise …

See Burlington N. R.R., Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 444 , 107 S.Ct. 1841 , 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (“The Railway Labor Act ‘cannot be appreciated apart from the environment out of which it came and the purposes which it was designed to serve’ ”), quoting Elgin, J. & E.

Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 779 , 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a “limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes”); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434 , 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845 , 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (“In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to en…

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 441 (1987) (“Congress made the definition of ‘labor dispute’ broad because it wanted it to be broad”) (internal brackets and quotation marks removed).

To that end, the RLA sets out a mandatory and “virtually endless” process of “negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation.” Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987).

Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd.of Maintenance of Way Emp., 481 U.S. 429, 448 (1987)); Cal. Ass’n of Emp. v. Building & Constr.

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429 , 436 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. 1841 , 1846 n. 4, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) ("Because these same parties are reasonably likely to find themselves again in dispute over the issues raised in this petition, and because such disputes typically are resolved quickly by. . . legislative action, this controversy is one that is capable of repetition yet evading review.").

Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 445 , 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1851 , 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (“[I]f the parties exhaust these [RLA] procedures and remain at loggerheads, they may resort to self-help in attempting to resolve their dispute, subject only to such restrictions as may follow from the invocation of an Emergency Board under § 10 of the RLA.”); Brotherhood of R.R.

See Burlington Northern, 107 S.Ct. at 1854 (“the primary goal of the RLA is to settle strikes and avoid interruptions to commerce.”).

Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 302 ). 16 See also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bd. of Maint. of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429, 451 (1987) (“[T]he primary goal of the [Railway Labor Act] is to settle strikes and avoid interruptions to commerce.”).

Workers, 973 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987)).

Workers, 973 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987)).

Co. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 444-446 (1987).

Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 449 (1987).

To that end, the RLA sets out a mandatory and “virtually endless” process of “negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation.” Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987).

Workers, 973 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987)).

Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Emp., 481 U.S. 429, 448 (1987)); Cal. Ass’n of Emp. v. Building & Constr.

Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 436, n.4 (1987).

Co. v Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 US 429, 442-443 [1987]; Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry.

The requirements of the RLA have been held to impose “virtually endless ‘negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation.’ ” Burlington, 481 U.S. at 454 , 107 S.Ct. 1841 , quoting Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.

Ct. 1841, 1854-55, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987)). 6 This Court can add little to the Marquar court’s analysis and is persuaded by both its reasoning and result.

In this instance, however, the Court concluded that injunctive relief was unnecessary in the face of labor plaintiffs’ assurances that no self-help would be undertaken. 29 This result is in accord with the Supreme Court’s instruction that the “judiciary should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy ... unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff’s right.” Burlington Northern R.R., 481 U.S. at 446 , 107 S.Ct. at 1851, quoting International Ass’n of Machin…

The Supreme Court has held that, despite the broad reach of this language, the Norris-LaGuardia Act “does not deprive the federal court[s] of jurisdic­ tion to enjoin compliance with various mandates of the Railway Labor Act.” Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood o f Maintenance o f Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 445 (1987) (quoting International A ss’n o f Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 772-73 (1961)).