State v. Tarango (1996)

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 212 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1996) (emphasis added). ¶ 4 In August 1996, four months after Tarango was filed, Defendant filed the petition for post-conviction relief at issue here, contending his sentence should be vacated because his flat-time sentence was illegal under Tarango 's interpretation of the statute.

Ed. 2d 205, 209 , 100 S. Ct. 2247, 2259 (1980) (to the extent questions existed regarding the availability of special parole terms as punishment for drug conspiracies, “they must be resolved in accord with the rule of lenity”); State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Ariz. 1996) (“The rule of lenity suggests an interpretation that permits parole eligibility.”); Fields v. Suthers, 984 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Colo. 1999) (holding that rule of lenity applies in con…

If that endeavor nevertheless leaves a statute “‘susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996), quoting State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 549-50 , 683 P.2d 744, 748-49 (App. 1983), aff’d, 140 Ariz. 544 , 683 P.2d 743 (1984).

If that endeavor nevertheless leaves a statute “ ‘susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996), quoting State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 549-50 , 683 P.2d 744, 748-49 (App.1983), affd, 140 Ariz. 544 , 683 P.2d 743 (1984).

See id. at 240 , 669 P.2d at 1017 ; State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210, 211 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302, 1303 (1996) (courts must follow text of plain, unambiguous statute as written and “are not permitted to rewrite statutes”); see also State v. Patchin, 125 Ariz. 501, 502 , 610 P.2d 1062, 1063 (App. 1980) (“[T]his court is not at liberty to rewrite the statute under the guise of judicial interpretation.”).

See id. at 240 , 669 P.2d at 1017 ; State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210, 211 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302, 1303 (1996) (courts must follow text of plain, unambiguous statute as written and “are not permitted to rewrite statutes”); see also State v. Patchin, 125 Ariz. 501, 502 , 610 P.2d 1062, 1063 (App. 1980) (“[T]his court is not at liberty to rewrite the statute under the guise of judicial interpretation.”).

See State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996) (“[f]or first-time offenders, former §§ 13-701 and 13-702 provide the range of sentences”); State v. Martinez, 127 Ariz. 444, 449 , 622 P.2d 3, 8 (1980) (“[t]he presumptive sentence, the range of punishment, and the other circumstances of punishment for non-dangerous offenders are determined in accordance with A.R.S. §§ 13-701 and 13-702(A) and (B)”); State v. Wagner, 194 Ariz. 1, ¶ 9 , 976 P.2d 250, ¶ 9 (…

As our supreme court has recently reaffirmed, ‘When a statute is ‘susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996) (quoting State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 549-50 , 683 P.2d 744, 748-49 (App.1983)). ¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 13-901.01, but respectfully dissent from i…

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 (1996) (rule of lenity applicable when criminal sentencing statute susceptible to more than one interpretation); Serrato, 259 Ariz. 493 , ¶ 33 (rule of lenity pertinent if ambiguity persists after all interpretative tools applied); see also State v. Sanchez, 209 Ariz. 66, ¶ 6 (App. 2004); Reinesto v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 190, 192 (App. 1995). ¶35 In my view, the rationale energizing the rule of lenity provides an additional compellin…

Id. at 209, 212 . 3 STATE v. SCALPH Opinion of the Court The following year, the legislature amended what is currently A.R.S. § 13-703(N) by inserting immediately after the language cited in Tarango, the following: The release provisions prescribed by this section shall not be substituted for any penalties required by the substantive offense or a provision of law that specifies a later release or completion of the sentence imposed before release. 1997 Ariz. Sess.

In that case, the Legislature had enacted a measure retroactively requiring flat-time sentences, responding to our holding in State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 212 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1996), that certain prisoners could not be given such sentences.

As explained in Montes, Murray dealt with a retroactive amendment to sentencing statutes to allow a court to apply flat time sentences in a pending case when the supreme court had already held in State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 212 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1996), that such flat time sentences could not be applied.

As explained in Montes, Murray dealt with a retroactive amendment to sentencing statutes to allow a court to apply flat time sentences in a pending case when the supreme court had already held in State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 212 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1996), that such flat time sentences could not be applied.

When a statute is “susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996) (citation omitted).

After we issued our decision, however, our supreme court decided State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 212 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1996), which affirmed the appellate court’s decision that similarly situated “prisoners ... could not be given flat-time sentences and are thus parole eligible.” Murray, 194 Ariz. 373, ¶ 3 , 982 P.2d at 1288 .

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996).

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996).

Consequently, if a “statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, ... doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Id. (quoting State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996)). ¶ 24 Hughes also shows that a criminal conflict of interest does not exist merely because a public officer acts in a way that appears to be a conflict in the eyes of the public or prosecutors.

And, if a statute remains unclear after considering those factors, “ ‘the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996), quoting State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 549-50 , 683 P.2d 744, 748-49 (App.1983), aff'd, 140 Ariz. 544 , 683 P.2d 743 (1984).

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996); State v. Garcia, 189 Ariz. 510, 513 , 943 P.2d 870, 873 (App. 1997). ¶ 6 We appreciate the tidal court’s concern that by ordering probation it might impose an illegally lenient sentence.

See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-49 , 92 S.Ct. 515 , 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) (due process requires that ambiguities in criminal statutes be construed in favor of the defendant); State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996) (if “statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, ... doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant”), opinion adhered to on rehearing, State v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, 187 Ariz. 211 , 928 P.2d 635 (1996).

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996); *232 State v. Nihiser, 191 Ariz. 199, 201 , 953 P.2d 1252, 1254 (App.1997).

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996) (applying this doctrine to harmonize two apparently conflicting sentencing enhancement provisions of Title 13) (citations omitted).

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996).

Furthermore, because ¶ 13-901.01(G) is ambiguous as to whether preparatory offenses are included in its purview, we apply the rule of lenity, which “ ‘dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996), quoting State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 549-50 , 683 P.2d 744, 748-49 (App.1983) (decision approved and adopted in State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 544 , 683 P.2d 743 (1984)).

In so doing, we undertake to “avoid rendering statutory language superfluous, void, contradictory, or insignificant.” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 212 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1996). ¶ 7 One must possess a driver’s license while operating a motor vehicle in Arizona and must display it upon a police officer’s request.

If a criminal statute is “susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996) (quoting State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 549-50 , 683 P.2d 744, 748-9 (App. 1983)). ¶ 12 Because the value of the property stolen determines the felony classification assigned to a particular theft, see A.R.S. § 13-1802(D), the trier of fact in a theft c…

State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 212 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1996).

Defendant argues that section 13-901.01(F) is “susceptible to more than one interpretation, [and] the rule of lenity dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996).

This rule dictates that if a criminal statute is “ ‘susceptible to more than one interpretation ... any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (quoting State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 545, 549-50 , 683 P.2d 744, 748-49 (App.1983), decision approved and adopted, 140 Ariz. 544 , 683 P.2d 743 (1984)), affd on reh’g, State v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 187 Ariz. 211 , 928 P.2d 635 (1996). 2 Following the rule…

Tarango, 185 Ariz. at 212 , 914 P.2d at 1304 (emphasis added).

See State v. Laughter, 128 Ariz. 264, 269 , 625 P.2d 327, 332 (App.1980) (finding that because Arizona’s dangerous offenses penalty statute was silent on whether its provisions superseded those in the repetitive offender sentencing statute, the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a repetitive offender). ¶ 14 We find instructive the analysis in Tarango, 185 Ariz. at 210-11 , 914 P.2d at 1302-03 .

See State v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, ¶ 10 , 162 P.3d 650, 653 (App.2007); see also State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210-11 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302-03 (1996) (courts must follow plain, unambiguous text and may not “rewrite statutes”); State v. Patchin, 125 Ariz. 501, 502 , 610 P.2d 1062, 1063 (App.1980) (“[T]his court is not at liberty to rewrite the statute under the guise of judicial interpretation.”).

See, e. g., State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996). ¶ 13 There are, nevertheless, two recognized bases upon which a statute may be deemed implicitly repealed.

See State v. Tarango, 182 Ariz. 246, 250 , 895 P.2d 1009, 1013 (App.1994) (objection to evidence on one ground not sufficient to preserve objection to evidence on another ground), aff’d, 185 Ariz. 208 , 914 P.2d 1300 (1996).

See State v. Tarango, 182 Ariz. 246, 250 , 895 P.2d 1009, 1113 (App. 1994) (objection to evidence on one ground not sufficient to preserve objection to evidence on another ground), aff’d, 185 Ariz. 208 , 914 P.2d 1300 (1996).

See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 , 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2586-87 , 73 L.Ed.2d 202, 213 (1982). ¶22 We find this situation analogous to that faced by the court in State v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 187 Ariz. 211 , 928 P.2d 635 (1996), in which our supreme court clarified the applicability of its decision in State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208 , 914 P.2d 1300 (1996).

See State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 210 , 914 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1996).

See, e.g., State v. Tarango, 182 Ariz. 246, 249 , 895 P.2d 1009, 1012 (App.1994), approved, 185 Ariz. 208 , 914 P.2d 1300 (1996); State v. Harrison, 111 Ariz. 508, 510 , 533 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1975); State v. Olson, 134 Ariz. 114, 118-19 , 654 P.2d 48, 52-53 (App.1982); United States v. Innie, 7 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.1993).

See State v. Tarango, 185 Ariz. 208, 212 , 914 P.2d 1300,1304 (1996); State v. Johnson, 171 Ariz. 39, 42 , 827 P.2d 1134,1137 (App.1992).