State v. Altamirano (1990)

However, Altamirano did not hold that a defendant has an absolute and unlimited right to any dwelling he merely considers to be his legal residence, or his “own home.” See 166 Ariz. at 437 (distinguishing cases upholding “convictions for burglary where the defendant had some legal or possessory interest in the residence”).

See State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432 , 435, 803 P.2d 425 , 428 (App. 1990) (“When a person’s intent in remaining on premises is for the purpose of committing a theft or some felony therein, such individual is no more welcome than one who initially entered with such intent.”).

No evidence was provided to dispute that she did not have an “absolute and unconditional right to enter and remain.” Altamirano, 166 Ariz. at 437.

In other words, burglary “protects] the dweller or occupier from intruders,” State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432 , 803 P.2d 425, 428 (Ariz.Ct.App.1990), and helps “to secure the sanctity of one’s home, especially at nighttime when peace, solitude, and safety are most desired and expected,” State v. Singley, 383 S.C. 441 , 679 S.E.2d 538, 540 (S.C.Ct.App.2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]t the heart of burglary law is protection of the individual and f…

See, e.g., People v. Gauze, 15 Cal.3d 709 , 125 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 542 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1975) (ruling that roommate could not be convicted of burglarizing his own apartment); State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432 , 803 P.2d 425, 429-30 (1990) (ruling that person could not be convicted of burglarizing his own home).

State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 435 , 803 P.2d 425, 428 (App.1990).

See e.g., State v. Altamirano, 803 P.2d 425, 427-28 (Ariz.App.1990) (although person enters another's premises lawfully, presence can become unlawful if that person remains there with intent to commit felony); State v. Embree, 633 P.2d 1057, 1058-59 (Ariz.App.1981) (legislature intended to have burglary statute apply to those who enter premises even during normal business hours); State v. Van Dyke, 621 P.2d 22, 23-24 (Ariz.1980) (citing long line of Arizona cases showing tha…

See State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 435 , 803 P.2d 425, 428 (App.1990) (primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent behind the statute); State v. Berry, 101 Ariz. 310, 312 , 419 P.2d 337, 339 (1966) (statute to be construed according to evil it is designed to remedy).

See State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432 , 803 P.2d 425 (App.1990); State v. Embree, 130 Ariz. 64 , 633 P.2d 1057 (App.1981).

See State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432 , 435, 803 P.2d 425 , 428 (App. 1990).

Laws, ch. 38, § 1 (former A.R.S. § 13-302(A), the precursor statute to § 13-1501(4), specifically itemizing “construction materials” as commercial items); see also State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 434 , 803 P.2d 425, 427 (App.1990) (acknowledging former § 13-302(A) “conceptually similar” to current statute).

Laws, ch. 38, § 1 (former A.R.S. § 13-302(A), the precursor statute to § 13-1501(4), specifically itemizing “construction materials” as commercial items); see also State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432 , 434, 803 P.2d 425 , 427 (App. 1990) (acknowledging former § 13-302(A) “conceptually similar” to current statute).

See State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 437 , 803 P.2d 425, 430 (App.1990) (noting that courts avoid “statutory interpretation[s] that lead[] to absurd results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature”); State v. Arthur, 125 Ariz. 153, 155 , 608 P.2d 90, 92 (App.1980) (“[A] statute is to be given a sensible construction that will accomplish the legislative intent and at the same time avoid an absurd result.”).

See also State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432 , 803 P.2d 425 (App.1990). ¶ 11 Based on our construction of the disputed phrase in § 13-502(D) and our review of the record, we find that Flynt’s conduct involved a substantial threat of death or physical injury and therefore affirm his 10.5 year commitment to the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board.

See State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 435 , 803 P.2d 425, 428 (App.1990) ("It is clear that although a person enters another’s premises lawfully and with consent, his presence can become unauthorized, unlicensed, or unprivileged if he remains there with the intent to commit a felony.”); State v. Embree, 130 Ariz. 64 , 633 P.2d 1057 (App.1981).