Cherry v. State (2007)

See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 , 712–14 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated by Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 , 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).

STAT.§ 921.137); 3 Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 711-14 (Fla. 2007), abrogated by I-fall, 134 S. Ct. 1986 .

STAT.§ 921.137); 3 Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 711-14 (Fla. 2007), abrogated by I-fall, 134 S. Ct. 1986 .

Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007) (holding that SEM need not be taken into account), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 993 (2007), abrogated by Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). - 24 - Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016).

Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007), abrogated by Hall, 572 U.S. 701 .

Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-713 (Fla. 2007), abrogated by Hall v. Florida., 572 U.S. 701 , 134 S. Ct. 1986 , 188 L.

Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007) (holding that SEM need not be taken into account), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 993 (2007), abrogated by Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). - 24 - Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016).

Fla. Stat. § 922.07 . 5 Case: 14-12623 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 6 of 46 show an IQ test score of 70 or below before presenting any additional evidence of his intellectual disability. 4 See Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 707 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).

See Hall v. State, 109 So.3d 704, 707-08 (Fla.2012); Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla.2007).

See Hall v. State, 109 So.3d 704, 707 (Fla.2012); Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla.2007).

See, e.g., Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137, 142 (Fla.2009); Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 711-14 (Fla.2007) (per curiam).

See, e.g., Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009); Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 711-14 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).

Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007).

In our previous decision in Hall v. State (Hall IX), 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012), we affirmed the Fifth Circuit court’s denial of Hall’s postconviction motion, holding that our interpretation of section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes, in Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007), was proper.

See, e.g., Cherry, 959 So.2d at 714 (“Because we find that [the defendant] does not meet this first prong of the section 921.137(1) criteria, we do not consider the other two prongs of the mental retardation determination.”).

See Phillips, 984 So.2d at 512 (“As the trial court found, ‘there was no evidence [t]o support the Defendant’s contention that his poor grades were a result of mental retardation.’ ”); Cherry [v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 711 (Fla. 2007) ] (clarifying the statutory requirement by explaining that the defendant must establish that both “subaverage general intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior manifested before the age of eighteen”). [FN8] In its order rejectin…

As we have explained, this Court is highly deferential to the postconviction court and “will not substitute its judgment for that of the tidal court on ... the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence.” Wyatt v. State, 71 So.3d 86, 105 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 709 (Fla. 2007)).

In denying Thompson relief, as more fully explained, the trial court and this Court relied on Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-14 (Fla. 2007), which held that if a defendant could not establish an IQ score of 70 or below, then his intellectual disability claim should be denied without consideration of the other prongs of the intellectual disability test.

Interpreting this statute in a case that preceded Hall, the Florida Supreme Court “held that a person whose test score is above 70, including a score within thé margin for measurement error, does not have an intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show his faculties are limited.” Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1994 (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007)).

Under section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2009), to prevail on this claim Diaz was required to establish: “(1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the condition before age eighteen.” Franqui v. State, 59 So.3d 82, 91 (Fla.2011); Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 711 (Fla.2007).

P. 3.203; Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137, 141 (Fla.2009); Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 711 (Fla.2007).

P. 3.203; Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137, 141 (Fla.2009); Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 711 (Fla.2007).

Weekly S178 (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007)).

Pursuant to Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007), in determining significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, this Court previously applied a bright-line IQ score cutoff of 70, which is two standard deviations below the mean IQ score of 100.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 503 (2012). 4 Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 3 134 S.Ct. at 2001 . 6 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007); Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1994 . 7 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1994. 8 Id. at 1996. 9 Id. 10 KRS 532.140(1) states in relevant part, “[N]o offender who has been determined to be an offender with a serious intellectual disability...shall be subject to execution.” functioning” is defined as an inte…

“When a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain such intent.” Brook v. State, 999 So.2d 1093, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla. 2007)).

Id. at 1994 (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam)).

Interpreting this statute in a case that preceded Hall, the Florida Supreme Court “held that a person whose test score is above 70, including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not have an intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show his faculties are limited.” Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1994 (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla.2007)).

However, this Court is “highly deferential to the trial court’s judgment on the issue of credibility,” Archer v. State, 934 So.2d 1187, 1196 (Fla.2006), and in “evaluating a trial court’s order, 'this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on ... the credibility of the witnesses ... ’ provided its order is supported by competent, substantial evidence,” Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 709 (Fla.2007) (quoting Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla…

When “evaluating a trial court’s order, ‘this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on ... the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence,’ provided its order is supported by competent, substantial evidence.” Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 709 (Fla.2007) (quoting Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla.2001)).

While some courts have reviewed such decisions for an abuse of discretion, see Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999); State v. White, 885 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio 2008), or clear error, see Com. v. Crawley, 924 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. 2007) (“[0]ur standard of review [for mental retardation determinations] is whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the legal conclusion drawn therefrom is clearly erroneous.”), others have treated it as a mixed …

Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712 (Fla.2007). 1.

In Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla.2007), this Court held that the statutes and rule had a strict cut-off at an IQ of 70 in order to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.

Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007).

Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007).

Cf. Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007) ("[C]ourts have no occasion to resort to rules of construction — they must read the statute as written, for to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power") (quoting Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So.2d 989, 990-91 (Fla.1996)).

Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007).

Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007).

Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007); Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005).

Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So.2d 318, 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713 (Fla.2007).

See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 , 712–714 (Fla. 2007).

See id. at 714 .

See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 711 (interpreting section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2002), as requiring a defendant seeking to establish an intellectual disability claim to prove that (1) “he has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,” an IQ of 70 or less, (2) “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning . . . with deficits in adaptive behavior,” and (3) manifestation of subaverage intellectual functioning and deficits prior to age eighteen). …

See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007) (“One standard deviation on the WAIS-III, the IQ test administered in the instant case, is fifteen points, so two standard deviations away from the mean of 100 is an IQ score of 70.

See Brook v. State, 999 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 713 (Fla. 2007)).

See Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-14 (Fla. 2007).

See Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712 (Fla. 2007); Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007) (“This Court does not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the circuit court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses.”).

See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712 (Fla. 2007); Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007) (“This Court does not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the circuit court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses.”).

See Hall v. State, 109 So.3d 704 (Fla.2012), citing Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712-13 (Fla.2007).

See Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 712 (Fla.2007); Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 146, 149 (Fla.2007) (“This Court does not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the circuit court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses.”).