People v. Babylon (1985)

Code, § 190.2, subds. (a)(ll), (a)(12), & (c), changing elements of certain special circumstances]; People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 727-728 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ] [Pen.

(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [“absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of his appeal”].) III At issue in this case is what constitutes finality for purposes of a juvenile delinquency case.

(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 882 ; Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 743-744; Hajek, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1196 ; see also People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81 , 95–96 [Estrada applied to statute creating a new affirmative defense]; People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 721-722, 728 [Estrada applied to statute narrowing class of prohibited acts]; People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 631 [Estrada applied to statute that offered “a potentially ameliorative bene…

(Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, pp. 141-142.) 29 Other than Estrada and Brown , Ramirez cites: People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 75-78 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 450 P.2d 591 ] (defendant entitled to resentencing on controlled substances conviction where amendment made offense a wobbler instead of a straight felony); People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 298 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ] (reversing oral copulation conviction after legislative amendment rendered the de…

(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ]; In re N.D. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 885, 891 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 ].) Defendant is before this court on direct appeal.

It is well established that “absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of his appeal.” (People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722, 725 (Babylon) [reversing conviction for violation of statute amended during pendency of appeal because a defendant is entitled to the benefit of an amended statute that “mitigates the punishment” or “decriminalizes the conduct altogether”]; accord, People v. Rossi (1976) 1…

(See § 3 ["No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."].) Under section 3, "`[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise. [Citation.].' [Citation.]") ( People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 , 171 P.3d 32 ].) Appellant maintains, however, relying on Estrada and its progeny, tha…

(See, e.g., People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 75-76 ; [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 450 P.2d 591 ]; People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 298-300 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ]; People v. Chapman (1978) 21 Cal.3d 124, 126-127 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 672 , 577 P.2d 1012 ]; People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 721-722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 300-301 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ].) [6] "The credits authorized in su…

The Attorney General relies on section 3 in contending we must presume the amendments to section 4019 were intended to apply prospectively only, absent express legislative intent or a "clear and unavoidable implication" to the contrary. (§ 3 ["No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."].) Under section 3, "`[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling im…

This bill, among other things, amended section 4019, effective January 25, 2010, to provide that any person who is not required to register as a sex offender and is not being committed to prison for, or has not suffered a prior conviction of, a serious felony as defined in section 1192.7 or a violent felony as defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c), to accrue conduct credit at the rate of four days for every four days of presentence custody. (3) Defendant contends that th…

It is to be applied only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753-754 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 , 171 P.3d 32 ], quoting In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ] ( Estrada ).) Notwithstanding Penal Code section 3, it is a "well-established principle that, absent a saving clause, a defendant is entitled to the b…

(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ]; People v. Figueroa (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 65, 70 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 368 ].) The Estrada rule has been applied to juvenile delinquency judgments.

The rule, therefore, is this: "[W]here the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, ... the amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed" in all cases in which judgment was not yet final when the amendment took effect. ( In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 748 .) Cases in which judgment is not yet final include those in which a conviction has been entered and sentence imposed but an appeal is pending when the …

(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ]; People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-304 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) The analysis by the Legislative Analyst in the Proposition 184 voter pamphlet indicated that when a defendant has two prior serious or violent convictions the sentence to be imposed was as follows, “Life sentence of at least 25 years.” (See Ballot Pamp., analysis of Prop. 184 by Legis.

(See People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ]; People v. Vasquez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 763 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 255 ] [absent savings clause, defendant entitled to such benefit of a change in the law occurring during pendency of an appeal].) The amendment in this case benefits defendant since the enhancement can no longer be imposed for his offense within 1,000 feet of a school unless it is proven that the violation occurred in a public area…

(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ]; see also People v. Vasquez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 763 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 255 ].) As we have seen, appellant’s conviction was enhanced under section 11353.6, subdivision (b) as it read before the amendment.

(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ].) But here there was a savings clause in the amending legislation.

California has long followed the common law rule that when a criminal statute is repealed, all proceedings against an accused not reduced to final judgment are terminated unless there is a savings clause or legislative intent to the contrary. 13 (Spears v. County of Modoc (1894) 101 Cal. 303 , *1260 305 [ 35 P. 869 ]; In Re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746-747 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ]; People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 725 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205…

It held that `... the common law principles reiterated in Estrada apply a fortiori when criminal sanctions have been completely repealed before a criminal conviction becomes final.' ( People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 301 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ]; see also People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ] [`... absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of…

It held that “. . . the common law principles reiterated in Estrada apply a fortiorari when criminal sanctions have been completely repealed before a criminal conviction becomes final.” (People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 301 ; see also People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ] [“. . . absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of his appeal. . . .”].) This aut…