Central Anesthesia Associates P. C. v. Worthy (1984)

Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga.App. 150 , 325 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1984), aff'd, 254 Ga. 728 , 333 S.E.2d 829 (1985).

A statute may form the basis for a duty of care, but before a negligence claim will lie for a statutory violation, “it is necessary to examine the purposes of the legislation and decide (1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons [the statute] was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm it was intended to guard against.” Central Anesthesia Assoc., PC v. Worthy, 173 Ga.App. 150 , 325 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1984) (citations omitte…

See Central Anesthesia Associates, P.C. v. Worthy, 254 Ga. 728, 732 (2) ( 333 SE2d 829 ) (1985) (holding that statute requiring that certified nurse anesthetists operate under the direction and responsibility of licensed physicians trained and experienced in anesthesia when administering anesthesia was designed to protect against the improper administration of anesthesia causing medical complications); Central Anesthesia Associates, P.C. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 153 ( 32…

Violation of a statute is per se a tort if "`the injured person falls within the class of persons it was intended to protect and ... the harm complained of was the harm it was intended to guard against. [Cits.]'" Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984) [affirmed 254 Ga. 728 ( 333 SE2d 829 ) (1985)].

P.C. v. Worthy, 325 S.E.2d 819, 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).

In support of this contention, the majority relies on a provision of the Charter Schools Act which defines a “charter,” as follows: “Charter” means a performance based contract between a local board and a charter petitioner, the terms of which are approved by the local board and by the state board in the case of a local charter school, complained of was the harm it was intended to guard against.” (citations omitted.) Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 153…

Looking to the plain language of OCGA § 43-11-21.1, it is clear that the harm the statute is designed to guard against is not sexual assault while under the effects of anesthesia, but is instead the improper administration of anesthesia itself due to inadequate training, lack of experience, and/or the improper use of equipment, which can result in medical complications.9 As pointed out by GGS, if this statute were 9 See Central Anesthesia Associates, P.C. v. Worthy, 254 Ga. …

P.C. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984).

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984).

Center, 273 Ga. App. 355, 356-357 (2) ( 615 SE2d 166 ) (2005). 11 Odem v. Pace Academy, 235 Ga. App. 648, 657 (3) ( 510 SE2d 326 ) (1998). 12 Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984), aff'd, 254 Ga. 728 ( 333 SE2d 829 ) (1985). 13 Brown v. Belinfante, 252 Ga. App. 856, 861 (1) ( 557 SE2d 399 ) (2001). 14 Potts v. Fidelity Fruit &c.

Georgia authorizes “the adoption of a statute as a standard of conduct so that its violation becomes negligence per se. [Cit.]” Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 152-153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984).

Under both the common law and statutory theories of recovery, however, the fulfillment of the duty and breach elements depends on “(1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons [the statute] was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm [the statute] was intended to guard against.” Central Anesthesia Assocs. v. Worthy, 173 Ga.App. 150, 153 , 325 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1984); see also Hubbard, 256 Ga.App. at 350 , 568 S.E.2d at 567 ;…

Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 152-153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984), aff’d, 254 Ga. 728 ( 333 SE2d 829 ) (1985).

Hosp., 489 S2d 802 (Fla. App. 1986) (a licensed dentist may practice medical anesthesia only in connection with the practice of dentistry, as to practice medical anesthesia as a specialty would be to engage in the practice of medicine for which he did not hold a license and no amount of hospital training or education in anesthesiology would cure the legal disability of a licensed dentist to administer anesthetics). 23 See Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 254 Ga. 728, 730…

We find no support for this theory of liability in logic or in case law.”). 6 173 Ga. App. 150, 152-153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984). 7 We further note that Georgia’s public health regulations allow paramedic trainees to perform any of the functions of a certified paramedic, as long as they are acting under the direct supervision of an approved preceptor.

Cab Co. v. Atlanta Taxicabs, 104 Ga. App. 89, 92-93 (6) ( 121 SE2d 175 ) (1961) (error to charge that plaintiff could not recover from first driver who negligently stopped if any of the other drivers, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences of first driver’s negligence). 20 Herring, supra, 218 Ga. App. at 855 . 21 Id. at 856 . 22 See Central Anesthesia Assoc., P.C. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 152-153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984) (violation of statut…

They further stated that the arrangement was meant to make the CRNAs “independent contractors.” “ ‘By statute, the physician is the only one empowered to practice medicine.’ [Cit.] OCGA § 43-26-9 makes an exception in the specialty of anesthesiology and allows a nurse who meets the qualifications of the statute to administer anesthesia under particular supervision.” Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 152 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984), affirmed 254 Ga. 728 (1985…

Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984), aff’d 254 Ga. 728 (1985).

Since the Gun Control Act expressly prohibits the sale of firearms to any person who has ever been adjudicated as a mental defective or has ever been committed to a mental hospital, Brown’s mental capacity at the time appellee sold him the rifle is not determinative of his status as a mentally defective person to whom the Act forbids a sale. “ ‘In determining whether the violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se as to a particular person, it is necessary to ex…

See Central Anesthesia Assoc., P.C. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984), aff’d, 254 Ga. 728 ( 333 SE2d 829 ) (1985). 2.

Co., 165 Ga. App. 546, 547 ( 301 SE2d 903 ) (1983); see also Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150, 153 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984), aff’d, 254 Ga. 728 .

Compare Central Anesthesia Assoc., P. C. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150 ( 325 SE2d 819 ) (1984) (holding that the provisions of OCGA § 43-26-9 regarding the administering of anesthesia are intended to establish the standard of medical conduct, a deviation from which constitutes negligence per se).