Azbill v. Fisher (1968)

Since many — if not most — of the state-court decisions collected by the Court hold that the right to a public preliminary hearing is personal to the accused, see, e. g., State v. Porter Superior Court, 274 Ind. 408, 409-410 , 412 N. E. 2d 748, 750 (1980); Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 419 , 442 P. 2d 916, 918-919 (1968), or, more commonly, that it is overcome by a showing of potentially prejudicial publicity equivalent to or less than that required in California, see, e. g…

Op. 67 , 518 P.3d at 102 ("The timing of a hearing, if one is required, is often of fundamental importance for due process."); see also Thompson v. State, 86 Nev. 682, 683 , 475 P.2d 96, 97 (1970) ("Statutes prescribing filing tinles and "Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 418 , 442 P.2d 916, 918 (1968) ("There is no Constitutional right to a preliminary hearing."), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Davis v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 93 Nev. 511, 512 , 569 P.2d 402…

Its purpose is to determine the basis for prosecution and the issue involved in the proceedings is not the question of guilt or innocence, but whether there is sufficient evidence for probable cause to hold the accused over to answer and stand trial." Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 418 , 442 P.2d 916, 918 (1968).

Terral explained that, with larceny from the person, "the person of another has been violated and his privacy directly invaded," and the offense, unlike other larceny offenses, is a felony regardless of the value of the property. 84 Nev. at 414, 442 P.2d at 466 .

See Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414 , 442 P.2d 916 (1968).