State v. Lair (1981)

App. 551, 558 , 582 P.2d 546 (1978) ("[T]he fact that an identified eyewitness informant may also be under suspicion —in this case because of her initial contact has been held not to vitiate the inference of reliability raised by the detailed nature of the information and the disclosure of the informant's identity."). 75 See State v. Lair. 95 Wn.2d 706, 711 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981) ("Since one who admits criminal activity to a police officer faces possible prosecution, it is ge…

See State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 710 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (“[E]ven if nothing is known about the informant, the facts and circumstances under which the information is furnished may reasonably support an inference that the informant is telling the truth.”).

See State v. Lair, 95 Wash.2d 706, 710 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981) ("[E]ven if nothing is known about the informant, the facts and circumstances under which the information is furnished may reasonably support an inference that the informant was telling the truth.").

State v. Lair, 95 Wash.2d 706, 712 , 630 P.2d 427, 433 (1981).

Lair, at 716, 630 P.2d 427 .

App. 1973) (holding that the street informant failed the “veracity” prong because no information was provided as to whether the street informant had passed on information before and turned out to be correct); State v. Lair, 630 P.2d 427, 430 (Wash. 1981) (en banc) (pointing out that the more frequent way to show credibility is by showing that the informant has previously supplied accurate and helpful information).

State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 483 ; State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d at 711 (1981). 13 No. 35696-5-III State v. Murillo Jenna Ross and James Whitney gave law enforcement each’s purported respective names.

State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 483 ; State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d at 711 (1981). 13 No. 35696-5-III State v. Murillo Jenna Ross and James Whitney gave law enforcement each’s purported respective names.

Arguably, ‘“there is more reason to rely upon [admissions made unknowingly to police] than admissions made directly to police, for in the latter situation there is always the chance that the informer is a stoolie who perceives he can admit to criminality without significant risk.’” State v. Lair, 630 P.2d 427, 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting 1 Wayne R.

Cf. Lair, 95 Wn.2d at 711 (“ ‘stoolie’ ” may perceive that he can admit to criminality without significant risk (quoting 1 Wayne R.

Lair, 95 Wn.2d at 711 (“Since one who admits criminal activity to a police officer faces possible prosecution, it is generally held to be a reasonable inference that a statement raising such a possibility is a credible one.”); see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.3(c) at 131-32. ¶59 King supplied the magistrate with additional facts and circumstances relevant to the commissioner’s assessment of Parker’s veracity.

Details surrounding the informal surveillance were flushed out at trial but were sufficiently revealed to the magistrate. ¶14 Both informants, Mr. Turner and Mr. Wilder, gave statements against their penal interests, thus establishing the reliability of their information as discussed in State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 710-11, 630 P.2d 427 (1981) and Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 437 .

It's all one room." Id. [38] See Bustamante-Davila, 138 Wash.2d at 969 , 983 P.2d 590 (officers in defendant's living room with his consent lawfully observed, reached, and seized a "rifle standing against the west living room wall"); Lair, 95 Wash.2d at 708, 719 , 630 P.2d 427 (officers may seize contraband discovered while executing a search warrant for marijuana); King, 89 Wash.App. at 618-22 , 949 P.2d 856 (officers executing consent search may briefly detain person and s…

See Bustamante-Davila, 138 Wn.2d at 969 (officers in defendant’s living room with his consent lawfully observed, reached, and seized a “rifle standing against the west living room wall”); Lair, 95 Wn.2d at 708, 719 (officers may seize contraband discovered while executing a search warrant for marijuana); King, 89 Wn.

State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 709, 630 P.2d 427 (1981).

App. 352, 356 , 289 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1982); State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 710-11 , 630 P.2d 427, 430 (1981); State v. Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Minn. 1980); See also 1 W.

See, e. g., State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 717-718 , 630 P. 2d 427, 434 (1981) (en banc) (holding pretextual searches invalid).

See State v. Johnson , 104 Wash. App. 489 , 501-02, 17 P.3d 3 (2001) (discussing Hicks , 480 U.S. at 328 -29 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 (manipulating stereo equipment that an officer reasonably suspects may be incriminating evidence to determine the serial number, which would give the officer probable cause, constitutes an unlawful search under the plain view doctrine)). ¶25 While we have generally recognized that "a policeman in the course of a valid search is entitled to keep his se…

See State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527 , 527 P.2d 1303 (1974); see also State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981). 5 No. 48813-2-II U.S. 730, 737, 103 S. Ct. 1535 , 75 L.

See State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 709-10 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981).

Ed. 2d 637 , 89 S. Ct. 584, 593 (1969) (White, J., concurring); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wilson, 479 F.2d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Smith, 462 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1972); State v. Yaw, 572 P.2d 856 (Hawaii 1977); compare State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 710-11 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (admission against penal interest used to establish veracity rather than basis of knowledge).

See, e.g., State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 714 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (setting forth elements of plain view).

See, e.g., State v. Lair , 95 Wn.2d 706 , 717-718 , 630 P.2d 427 , 434 (1981) (en banc) (holding pretextual searches invalid).

See State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 716-17 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981).

See also State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 716 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981).

See State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981).

See State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 711 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981).

See State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 710-11 , 630 P.2d 427 (1981). 7 At least one commentator has suggested that because of the legislative history of the federal version of ER 804(b)(3), this particular hearsay exception should not apply to inculpatory statements offered by the state against a defendant. 4 J.

The fact that Rogers was unaware that he was speaking to a police officer but, in fact, thought he was addressing a customer of his drug-trafficking activities, if anything enhances this demonstration of Rogers’ reliability (see, 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3 [c], at 652-656 [2d ed]; see also, State v Lair, 95 Wash 2d 706, 630 P2d 427, 430 ; State v Wiberg, 296 NW2d 388, 396 [Minn]; Thompson v State, 16 Md App 560, 298 A2d 458, 462 ).