In Re Pearson (1947)

(In re Pearson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 871, 874 [ 186 P.2d 401 ].) Here, there is no claim the trial court did not consider the relevant principles of law in deciding the issue of severance.

Skelton admits the joinder of offenses satisfied the requirement “‘there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission’” (I n re Pearson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 871, 874 [ 186 P.2d 401 ]) but suggests the consolidation of grand theft with the conspiracy count prejudiced him because of the relaxed hearsay rule of Evidence Code section 1223 applicable by virtue of the conspiracy charged.

Section 954 of the *264 Penal Code fortified by In re Pearson, 30 Cal.2d 871, 873-874 [ 186 P.2d 401 ], persuades us of the propriety of the trial court’s proceeding.

Code, § 459.) Thus petitioner has established that his Washington conviction could have been based on acts not constituting burglary in California and he has therefore shown that "the least adjudicated elements of the Washington offense are not equivalent to the elements of the similarly denominated California offense enumerated in section *392 644 of the Penal Code and the Washington conviction is not competent to support a determination of habitual criminality under that s…

Code, § 459.) Thus petitioner lias established that his Washington conviction could have been based on acts not constituting burglary in California and he has therefore shown that “the least adjudicated elements of the Washington offense are not equivalent to the elements of the similarly denominated California offense enumerated in sec tion 644 of the Penal Code and the Washington conviction is not competent to support a determination of habitual criminality under that sect…

“Consonant with this theory as to the purpose of the law, and as a natural corollary of the view previously stated, it has been held in the great majority of eases that two or more convictions on the same day, or on different counts under the same indictment, or convictions at the same term of court cannot be cumulated so as to count as two or more previous convictions within the meaning of habitual criminal statutes, although, as specifically held in some cases, one of such…

Code, § 954.) In People v. Thorn, 138 Cal.App. 714, 734-735 [ 33 P.2d 5 ], cited with approval in People v. Duane, 21 Cal.2d 71, 77 [ 130 P.2d 123 ], the reviewing court, in discussing the meaning of the phrase “the same class of crimes or offenses,” stated: “The legislature .. . meant by the use of the words . . . offenses possessing common characteristics or attributes. ...” The cases construing Penal Code section 954 have uniformly allowed joinder of several offenses for …

(See In re Pearson (1947), 30 Cal.2d 871, 873-874 [1, 2] [ 186 P.2d 401 ]; People v. Scott (1944), 24 Cal.2d 774, 778 [5] [ 151 P.2d 517 ] ; People v. Duane (1942), 21 Cal.2d 71, 76-78 [ 130 P.2d 123 ]; People v. Kelly (1928), 203 Cal. 128, 133-135 [ 263 P. 226 ].) Here the element of intent to feloniously obtain property runs like a single thread through the various offenses, and we cannot see how defendant was prejudiced by joinder of the simple robberies and robbery-kidna…

(In re Pearson, 30 Cal.2d 871, 874 [ 186 P.2d 401 ], and cases cited.

Nor has he shown that others demonstrably guilty of violating that section have not been prosecuted, or that the section is administered discriminatorily against a class to which he belongs (See In re Pearson, 30 Cal.2d 871, 876-878 [ 186 P.2d 401 ] ; Snowden v. Hughes, supra, 321 U.S. 1, 8 ; Southern Ry.

(In re Pearson, 30 Cal.2d 871, 874 [ 186 P.2d 401 ].) It is not required that two crimes should have occurred on the same day or have been aimed against the same person or group.

See, also, People v. Richardson, 74 Cal.App.2d 528, 540 , 169 P.2d 44 ." (Notes omitted.) 12 Justice Shinn (author of the opinion in Taylor ) then followed with the statement quoted above by appellant ( 155 Cal. App.2d at 28 , 317 P.2d 167 ), and pointed out that the case was required to be remanded for further proof of the nature of the convictions taking place under Oklahoma law. 13 As authority that there can be no waiver of the burden of proof resting on the prosecution,…

(People v. Leete, 130 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [ 279 P.2d 769 ]; see also In re Pearson, 30 Cal.2d 871, 873-874 [ 186 P.2d 401 ].) Defendant’s fourth ground for reversal, in relation to the possession charge (count four), raises the most serious question.