Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala (1994)

But see id. at 525, 114 S.Ct. 2381 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("giving substantive effect to ... a hopelessly vague regulation ... disserves the very purpose behind the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies"); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum.L.Rev. 612 (1997)(urging reexamination of the principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations).

But see id. at 525, 114 S.Ct. 2381 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“giving substantive effect to ... a hopelessly vague regulation ... disserves the very purpose behind the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum.L.Rev. 612 (1997)(urging reexamination of the principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations).

But see id. at 525 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“giving substantive effect to ... a hopelessly vague regulation ... disserves the very purpose behind the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum.L.Rev. 612 (1997) (urging reexamination of the principle of judicial deference to agency Interpretations of regulations.).

Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216 , 221 (3d Cir.2003); see also Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”).

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“Our task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 506-07 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“Subject to a few exceptions, Congress authorized the [Secretary] to issue regulations defining reimbursable costs and otherwise giving content to the broad outlines of the Medicare statute.”).

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“Our task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose.”). 5 .

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) ("We must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations."). 74 We defer to the DOJ's reasonable interpretation of the statute, as is proper under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”).

In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations .... [T]he agency…

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”).

See Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512 ("[W]e must defer to the Secretary's interpretation unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language."). 32 The correctness of this conclusion is underscored by the difficulty of implementing such a retroactive rate-setting determination.

See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 , 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1919 , 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (“[P]rovided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneo…

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. , 512 U.S. at 512 (“[T]he agency’s interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”) (quotations omitted); New Mexico Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Department of Health & Human Servs. , 4 F.3d 882 , 884 (10th Cir. 1993). -3- The offset statute itself does not authorize the exclusion of any amounts from the offset.

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 517 (1994) (“[T]he mere fact that . . . a fiscal intermediary may have allowed reimbursement to petitioner for [graduate medical education] costs that appear to have violated [a regulation] does not render the Secretary’s interpretation of that [regulation] invalid.”); Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51 , 63–64 (1984) (stating that the agency isn’t bound by a contractor’s erroneous advice).

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“Our task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose.

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) ("Our task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose.").

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”).

See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) ("We must give substantial deference to an agency's interpre- tation of its own regulations."); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) ("[P]rovided an agency's interpretation of its own regula- tions does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.").

Accord Thomas Jefferson, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2387 ("because [the anti-redistribution clause's] application suffices to deny reimbursement of the disputed costs in this case, we need not pass upon the Secretary's interpretation of the community support language").

Thus, a plaintiff challenging an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations carries a “heavy burden in advancing [that] claim” because an “agency’s interpretation of its own regulations ‘must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous.’” In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig. — MDL No.1993 (In re Polar Bear Litig.), 709 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.Cir.2013) (internal citations omitted); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 - 62, 117 S.Ct. 905…

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations”); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 , 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (an agency is created for purpose of applying a statute in the first instance).

See APSCU I, 870 F.Supp.2d at 149-50 ; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515-16 , 114 S.Ct. 2881 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“Petitioner’s attempt to infer from that silence the existence of a contrary policy fails because the [agency’s] letter did not purport to be a comprehensive review of all conditions that might be placed on reimbursement of educational costs.”). 6 *189 The Association persists that the legislative history undermines the Department…

Succinctly stated, in the face of inconsistent interpretations of a regulation, there is no basis to defer to the Secretary's proffered interpretation, see Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994) ("[A]n agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view . . . .") (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting INS v. Ca…

Coop., 2004 MT 316, ¶ 26 , 324 Mont. 30 , 101 P.3d 301 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) ("We must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.")).

Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588 (“But Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.”); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512 (“[W]e must defer to the Secretary's interpretation unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.”)(internal citations omitted).

Ctr., 568 U.S. 597 , 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1337 , 185 L.Ed.2d 447 (2013) (quoting Chase Bank USA, N. A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195 , 131 S.Ct. 871, 880 , 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011)); see also Christopher v. Smith-Kline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 , 132 S.Ct. 2156, 2166 , 183 L.Ed.2d 153 (2012); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“[W]e must defer to the [agency]’s interpretation unless an ‘alternative reading is compelled by the …

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“[A]n agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency view.”).

Thus, a plaintiff challenging an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations carries a “heavy burden in advancing [that] claim” because an “agency’s interpretation of its own regulations ‘must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous.’ ” In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section Jf(d) Rule Litig. — MDL No. 1993, 709 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.Cir.2013) (internal citations omitted); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 463 , 117 S.Ct. 905 ; Thomas Jefferson Univ. v…

That complexity adds to the deference which is due to the Secretary’s decision.” Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento, 38 F.3d at 1229 (giving heightened deference to the Secretary’s policy of denying retroactive effect to a revised wage index); see also Robert Wood Johnson, 297 F.3d at 282 (edits in original), quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“The broad deference of Chevron is even more appropriate in cases tha…

“In situations in which the meaning of [regulatory] language is not free from doubt,” an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations must be given effect “so long as the interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations.” Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 , 111 S.Ct. 1171 , 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512…

As the Supreme Court has held, an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 , 117 S.Ct. 905 , 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (citation omitted); accord Chase Bank USA N.A. v. McCoy, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 871, 880 , 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference t…

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”).

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.”).

See also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386-87 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations ... must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ”) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 , 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217 , 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)).

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“[W]e must defer to the [agency’s] interpretation unless an ‘alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language ....’”) (citations omitted).

Standard of Review Defendants argue that “the first part of the Court’s query reflects the USDA’s longstanding interpretation of the agency-wide exclusion set forth in 7 C.F.R. § lb.4, and USDA’s interpretation should be accorded ‘controlling-weight.’ ” Defs.’ Opp’n at 13 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”)).

See See Difelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 397 F.Supp.2d 758 , 776 n. 18 (E.D.Va.2005) (citing numerous examples of the DOL’s interpretation of § 404(c) as inapplicable to fiduciary investment decisions); see also, Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”).

See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 , 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1919 , 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (“[Provided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or i…

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.... [T]he agency’s interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”) (citations omitted).

F (ADA regulations); 49 C.F.R. § 27.19 (Section 504 regulations “shall comply with all applicable requirements” of the ADA) which are af *254 forded substantial deference by this Court. 22 See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.... [T]he agency’s interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneo…

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“[w]e must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations”). 7 Here, however, the hearing officer did not comply with the plain terms of the “reasonable doubt” regulation, but instead adopted a myopic view of that regulation which deprived it of any vitality.

See Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 , 114 S.Ct. 2381 , 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (“This broad deference is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns ... ‘the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.’ ”) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 , 111 S.Ct. 2524 , 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991)).

See Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“[Courts] must defer to [an agency’s] interpretation unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

That complexity adds to the deference which is due to the Secretary's decision.” Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento, 38 F.3d at 1229 ; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“The broad deference of Chevron is even more appropriate in cases that involve a ‘complex and highly technical regulatory program,’ such as Medicare, which ‘require[s] significant expertise and entail[s] the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.’”). 10 III.

See generally Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“[A federal court] must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”).

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“[w]e must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations”).

See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations”). b.

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) ("We must give -9- substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation.").

"An employer who fails to provide such timely notice will lose its right to deny restoration even if substantial and grievous economic injury will result from reinstatement." 29 C.F.R. § 825.219 (a); see 60 F.R. 2180 , 2217 (1995) (clarifying that "such timely notice" refers to both the notice of status as a "keyemployee" and notice of decision not to restore) ; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) ("the agency's interpretation must be given c…