Whren v. United States (1996)

But see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 ,-, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“[Court’s] cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”).

But see Whren v. U.S. ,— U.S. -,-, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“[Court’s] cases foreclose any argument that, the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”).

But see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (rejecting argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved). 5 .

State v. Inzina, 31,439, p. 12-13 (La.App. 2nd Cir.12/9/98), 728 So.2d 458, 466 (vehicle crossed right-hand fog line and nearly struck storm drain); State v. Colarte, 96-0670, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/20/96), 688 So.2d 587, 591 (without signaling vehicle veered from the left lane into the right lane and then crossed the fog line on the shoulder), writ denied, 97-1015 (La.10/3/97), 701 So.2d 197 ; see also United States v. Jones, 185 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir.1999) (vehicle mom…

State v. Inzina, 31,439, p. 12-13 (La.App. 2nd Cir.12/9/98), 728 So.2d 458, 466 (vehicle crossed right-hand fog line and nearly struck storm drain); State v. Colarte, 96-0670, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/20/96), 688 So.2d 587, 591 (without signaling vehicle veered from the left lane into the right lane and then crossed the fog line on the shoulder), writ denied, 97-1015 (La.10/3/97), 701 *536 So.2d 197; see also United States v. Jones, 185 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir.1999) (vehicle…

But see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S. Ct. 1769 , 135 L.

But see Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806 , 810-813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (subjective motivations of police are irrelevant in probable cause analysis).

But see Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806 , 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding the subjective motives of the officer are not at issue in Fourth Amendment analysis).

See id. at 148, ¶ 10 (finding the stop in that case unreasonable because the driver did not, in fact, violate a traffic law); but see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813 (1996) (holding that a traffic stop following an officer’s observation of a traffic violation is reasonable, regardless of the officer’s subjective motive). ¶13 The superior court also ruled that the search of Woods’ SUV was lawful because the State established by a preponderance of the evidence t…

Cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race”).

Cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race”).

United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Sub- jective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops” under the Fourth Amendment does not “depend[] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”).

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Not only have we never held . . . that an officer’s motivation invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”); King, 563 U.S. at 464 (concluding that “a subjective approach” fundamentally conflicts “with [the Supreme Court’s] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”); Wallen, 388 F.3d at 167 & n.7 (“[T]here is no legal requirement that an officer subje…

“As 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4094 Doc: 20 Filed: 11/24/2025 Pg: 4 of 4 a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); see also United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993) (“When an officer observes a traffic offense—however minor—he has probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.”).

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role 5 in ordinary, probable-cause . . . analysis.”); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 , 154–55 (2004) (“Subjective intent of the arresting officer . . . is simply no basis for invalidating an arrest.”).

It makes no difference that the evidence eventually led to his conviction, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978), or that the agents may have known they were potentially violating the other man’s rights, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”).

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (explaining that a Terry stop must be supported by “at least a minimal level of objective justification” for a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (emphasis added)).

The Maryland law enforcement officer who stopped Coles outside of the motel testified that he did so only to effectuate the administrative warrant and Coles’ extradition to New York: Q: And the only reason that you stopped that car was because Kevin Coles was in it and you believe that Kevin Coles would be extradited by New York, is that right? 7 See generally Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 736 (2011) (describing Fourth Amendment reasonableness as “predominantly an obje…

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

“A traffic stop constitutes an unreasonable seizure unless it is supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or proba- ble cause that a [civil] traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Andres, 960 F.3d 1310, 1317 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have proba…

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) (“The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement.”); cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (“[T]he Fourth 21 Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in…

See Fla. Stat. § 316.123 (2)(a); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”).

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent [of the arresting officer].”). 5 absence of probable cause for the arrest.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1724 (2019). “[A] narrow qualification is warranted for circumstances where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to…

That means “the officers’ subjective motivations, whatever they may have been, could not change the objective reasonableness of their actions.” Id.; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”).

However, we have made clear that when the rationale for a search relies on the ordinary, totality of the circumstances Fourth Amendment analysis, as it does here, there is no basis for examining the official purpose of the search and thus “the stalking horse theory has no applica- tion.” Price, 28 F.4th at 752 ; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in No. 21-3379 11 ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”…

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved”), citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 221 n. 1 (1973) (ruling that a traffic violation arrest was not rendered invalid by the fact it was “mere pretext for a narcotics search.”); United States v. Fuehrer, 844 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2016) (…

See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding constitutionality of traffic stop where vehicle appeared to lack two license plates, in violation of New York Vehicle and Traffic Law); see also Gomez, 877 F.3d at 86 (traffic stop is reasonable if the stopping officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the person stopped committed a traffic violation); see also United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1994) (even a “minor”…

Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); id. at 806 (“However, this Court's cases foreclose the argument that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct justified on the basis of probable cause.

Laws § 31-11-18; see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”).

Id. at 809 ("Traffic stops are seizures, so they must be reasonable under the circumstances.").

See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.”).

“Moreover, an officer who observes a traffic offense may have probable cause even where he [or she] has additional motives for the stop.” United States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

See also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Whren v. 14 United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (“[P]robable cause justifies a search and seizure.”). 15 Moreover, Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim against Federal Way under Monell v. 16 Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), fails because Plaintiff 17 has not alleged facts suggesting that any violations of his rights were part of “a longstanding 18 practice or custom which c…

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. . . . [T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”).

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”); Salcedo, 935 N.W.2d at 577 (“It is well settled that a traffic violation, however minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop a motorist and is therefore a reasonable seizure.” (cleaned up)).

See Hickman, 363 So. 3d at 219 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”)).

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”) So, although it is perfectly common and legal for police to stop a vehicle for a traffic violation when the “real” purpose of the stop is for something else, the problem here is that it is not clear that law enforcement actually observed a legitimate traffic infraction before they stopped the vehicle.

STAT. 5/12-710 ("It is unlawful for any person to operate any vehicle . . . unless such vehicle is equipped with rear fender splash guards . . . ."); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) ("As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.").

Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.40 However, if the facts demonstrate probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop, the stop is lawful even if the officer made the stop only because he wished to investigate a more serious offense.41 Although Plaintiff claims he was “driving lawfully down the street,”42 the police report filed with the Complaint states Plaintiff was pulled…

No. 1 at 7.) 47 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 48 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). 49 Id. 50 (See Compl., Doc.

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”). 4 In a selective enforcement claim, a plaintiff contends “he was treated differently because of his race.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2020).

(Doc. 41 at 24) (“Out of the multitude of people out that night, with some actively brawling, he singled out the one whom he had been previously attract to, to detain.”); see Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved . . .

On the other hand, plaintiff’s belief that Officer Sperry detained him due to his race, while understandable, lacks any support in the record.4 At the same time, “race, when considered by itself and sometimes even in tandem with other factors, does not generate reasonable suspicion for a stop[.]” United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 596 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 569-70 (2d Cir. 2005)); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) …

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

However, “[i]n general an officer’s underlying motive for obtaining the warrant is irrelevant, as ‘[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.’” United States v. Romo-Corrales, 592 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)); see also United States v. Raggeman, 279 F.3d 573 , 580 n.5 (8th Cir. 2002)(“[I]t is of no consequence ‘that the motivation for the search did not coincide with …