United States v. International Business MacHines Corp. (1996)

The Court has pointed out that stare decisis “ ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and con sistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and per ceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ” United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991)).

While ‘“stare decisis is not an inexorable command,’” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991)), particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997), “even in constitutional eases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification.’ ” United States v. International Busines…

The Court there emphasized that the “text of the Export Clause ... expressly prohibits Congress from laying any tax or duty on exports.” 517 U. S., at 852 ; see also id., at 861 (“[T]he Framers sought to alleviate ... concerns [that Northern States would tax exports to the disadvantage of Southern States] by completely denying to Congress the power to tax exports at all.”).

But we expressly overruled Low 20 years ago, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, 279 (1976), holding that the Import-Export Clause "cannot be read to accord imported goods preferential treatment that permits escape from uniform taxes imposed without regard to foreign origin for services which the State supplies," id., at 287 ; cf. United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 857-859 (1996) (distinguishing the Art.

Doing so seems inconsistent with this Court's view that it is ordinarily "inappropriate for us to reexamine" prior precedent "without the benefit of the parties' briefing," since the "principles that animate our policy of stare decisis caution against overruling a long standing precedent on a theory not argued by the parties." United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855, 856 (1996).

We do not normally override a party’s concession, see, e. g., United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855 (1996) (holding that “[i]t would be inappropriate for us to [ejxamine in this ease, without the benefit of the parties’ briefing,” an issue the Government had conceded), and doing so is especially inappropriate when, as here, the issue is unnecessary to decide the case, see infra, at 694.

IBM, 517 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1803 ("While the original impetus may have had a narrow focus, the remedial provision that ultimately became the Export Clause does not, and there is substantial evidence from the Debates that proponents of the Clause fully intended the breadth of scope that is evident in the language.").

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 851-52 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996) (“The text of the Export Clause, on the other hand, expressly prohibits Congress from laying any tax or duty on exports.”)).

Mach., 517 U.S. at 859 (“It is simply no longer true that the Court perceives no substantive difference between the two Clauses.”).

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 860 (1996) (“there is substantial evidence from the [Convention] Debates that proponents of the Clause fully intended the breadth of scope that is evident in the language”).2 II.

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 855 (1996); see also Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 476-77 (declining to pass on deference question because the agency requested no deference); cf. Spector M otor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1943) (L.

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)). 13 We have identified two circumstances in which a departure from stare decisis may be warranted.

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (citations omitted). 60 We believe that the current state of the law regarding the scope of equivalents that is available when prosecution history estoppel applies is "unworkable." In patent law, we think that rules qualify as "workable" when they can be relied upon to produce consistent results and give rise to a body of law that provides guidance to the marketplace on how to conduct its affairs.

This discretion is completely inconsistent with the doctrine of precedent; even in constitutional cases, courts "have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some 'special justification.' " United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996), quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).

This discretion is completely inconsistent with the doctrine of precedent; even in constitutional cases, courts "have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some 'special justification.' " United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996), quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 848 (1996).

The Supreme Court’s Export Clause jurisprudence has repeatedly recognized that the clause bars a tax on “goods.” See, e.g., International Business Machines, 517 U.S. at 846, 848, 849, 855, 862 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 .

I, § 9, cl. 5, states: 34 No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. 35 The Supreme Court's Export Clause jurisprudence has repeatedly recognized that the clause bars a tax on "goods." See, e.g., International Business Machines, 517 U.S. at 846, 848, 849, 855, 862 .

Corp., 517 U.S. 843 , 858 116 S.Ct. 1793, 1802 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124, 138 (1996) (internal citations omitted).

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 , 116 S. Ct. 1793, 1801 (1996) (“Though from time to time we have overruled governing decisions that are unworkable or are badly reasoned, we have rarely done so on grounds not advanced by the parties.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 855, 856 , 116 S.Ct. 1793, 1800, 1801 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996))).

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 , 116 S. Ct. 1793, 1801 (1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Beach v. State, 2015 MT 118, ¶ 29 , 379 Mont. 74 , 348 P.3d 629 (plurality).

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 , 116 S.Ct. 1793, 1801 , 135 L.Ed. 2d 124, 137 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted).

In Washington Stevedoring, supra at 757, n 23, the Court specifically noted that it “did not reach the question of the applicability of the Michelin approach when a State directly taxes imports or *463 exports in transit.” More recently, in Int'l Business Machines, supra at 862, the Court explained that it “has never upheld a state tax assessed directly on goods in import or export transit.” Accordingly, we must conclude that Richfield Oil has precedential value.

Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 874 (1996) (Kennedy, A., dissenting) (“As the Convention records indicate, depriving the Federal Government of the power to tax . . . was a contentious issue, given the concern that it would . . . disable Congress from using . . . taxes as an instrument of policy); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 451 (1998) (Kennedy, A., concurring) (“[I]f a citizen who is taxed has the measure of the tax . . . determined by the Executive alone, witho…

Indeed, “even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.” United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (internal quotations omitted).

Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 862 (1996) (stating that Richfield had been distinguished but not overruled). 28 Itel Containers Int’l Corp., 507 U.S. at 77 ; see also Wash. Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 759 ; Kosydar, 417 U.S. at 70-71 . 29 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.

United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 8 We apply these principles when we interpret the rules and other provisions in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (MCM) as well. 8 United States v. Andrews, No. 17-0480/NA Opinion of the Court omitted).

United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 8 We apply these principles when we interpret the rules and other provisions in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (MCM) as well. 8 United States v. Andrews, No. 17-0480/NA Opinion of the Court omitted).

The Supreme Court notes that “[e]ven in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.” United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

A departure from precedent must be based on a “ ‘ “special justification.” ’ ” Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 443 ; 120 S Ct 2326 ; 147 L Ed 2d 405 (2000), quoting Int’l Business Machines Corp, supra at 856, quoting Payne, supra at 842 (Souter, J., concurring), quoting Arizona v Rumsey, 467 US 203, 212 ; 104 S Ct 2305 ; 81 L Ed 2d 164 (1984).

Whether or not we would agree with Robins’s recognition of a state constitutional right to free speech in a privately owned shopping center if we were addressing the issue for the first time, we are obliged to follow it under principles of stare decisis. “ ‘[E]ven in constitutional cases, the doctrine [of stare decisis] carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some “special justification.” ’ ” (Dickerson v. Unit…

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 855, n. 3 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996).

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 , 110 S.Ct. 2024 , 109 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990).

See, e. g., United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855 , and n. 3 (1996). [3] Because defendants removed the case from state court to District Court, plaintiffs were not initially the parties that invoked federal jurisdiction.

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855, n. 3 (1996) (the Court does not address abandoned arguments).

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855, n. 3 (1996) (finding that party abandoned issue by failing to address it in the party’s brief on the merits); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U. S. 513, 527 (1994) (same).

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); California v. FERC, 495 U. S. 490, 499 (1990).

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 866-68 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (collecting authority).

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 , 110 S.Ct. 2024 , 109 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990).

See 517 U.S. at 857 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 (“Though we have frequently interpreted the Clauses together ... our more recent ... cases ... caution that meaningful textual differences should not be overlooked.”).

Machs., 517 U.S. 843, 862 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996); see also id. at 857, 116 S.Ct. 1793 (“We have good *1386 reason to hesitate before adopting the analysis of our recent Import Export Clause cases into our Export Clause jurisprudence .... [Meaningful textual differences exist and should not be overlooked.”).

See United States v. International Business Machines Corporation, 517 U.S. 843, 861-62 , 116 S.Ct. 1793, 1803-04 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996); see also Louisiana Land and Exploration Company, 900 F.2d at 817 & 820-21; Virginia Indonesia Company v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 915 (Tex. 1995), cert. denied, Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Virginia Indonesia Co., 518 U.S. 1004 , 116 S.Ct. 2523 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1996).

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 , 135 L.

See also United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 855 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996).

See United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 851 , 116 S.Ct. 1793, 1799 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996) (noting the Court’s “rejection in Complete Auto of much of our early dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence”).

See Id., 517 U.S. at 862 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 (insurance policies); AG.

Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 372 , 23 L.Ed. 657 (1875) (citing Madison Debates, p. 456); see also IBM, 517 U.S. at 859-60 , 116 S.Ct. 1793 ; Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 292-93 , 21 S.Ct. 648 .

See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1793, 1801 , 135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996) (stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process”) (quotation omitted).