College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (1999)
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Sossamon v. Texas (2011)
I, §8, cl. 1, Congress may secure a State’s consent to suit as a condition, of the State’s receipt of federal funding. 1 See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 686 (1999) (“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and . . . acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions”); Atasca…
“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and . . . acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions”
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Sossamon v. Texas (2011)
I, § 8, cl. 1, Congress may secure a State’s consent to suit as a condition of the State’s receipt of federal funding. 1 See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 , 119 S. Ct. 2219 , 144 L.
“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and . . . acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions”
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Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif (2015)
See, e.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 686 (1999) (“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207 (1987) (same).
“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take”
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Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif (2015)
See, e.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 686 (1999) (“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207 (1987) (same).
“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take”
See College Savings, 527 U.S. at 680 ("Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled."); id. ("We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden 15 was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it.").
"Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled."
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Clemente Properties, Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia (2026)
Anyway, because we affirm the district court's dismissal of the false advertising claim on the merits, we need not address sovereign immunity as to false advertising here, and we need not wrestle with the significance (if any) of that dictum. - 78 - of property."); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642, 647 ("Patents, however, have long been considered a species of property.").
"Patents, however, have long been considered a species of property."
See College Savings, 527 U.S. at 680 ("Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled."); id. ("We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it.").
"Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled."
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Chavez v. Arte Publico Press (2000)
See 1 Neil Boorstyn, Boorstyn on Copyright § 12.15 (2d ed. 1999) (“Although defendant’s innocent intent is no defense to an infringement action, it may affect recoverable damages”); compare Florida Prepaid, 119 S.Ct. at 2209 (“Actions predicated on direct patent infringement ... do not require any showing of intent to infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect to damages.”).
“Actions predicated on direct patent infringement ... do not require any showing of intent to infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect to damages.”
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Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Wis. v. Phoenix Intern. (2010)
"Generally, we will find a waiver either if the State voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction, or else if the State makes a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction." College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675-76 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) ( "College Savings" ) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"College Savings"
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Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Phoenix International Software, Inc. (2011)
“College Savings ”
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Antonio Passaro, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2019)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (“clear declaration”); Ligon v. Cty. of Goochland, 689 S.E.2d 666, 670 (Va. 2010) (“explicit and express waiver”).
“explicit and express waiver”
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In Re: Harry H. Mitchell (2000)
See 517 U.S. at 72-73 ; see also Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205 ("Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers . . . .").
"Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers . . . ."
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Pense v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. (2019)
Expense Bd. , 527 U.S. 666 , 675-76, 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Allen v. Cooper , 895 F.3d 337 , 347 (4th Cir. 2018) ("As the Supreme Court has made clear, a State must expressly consent to suit in federal court to waive its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment."), cert. granted , No. 18-877 (U.S. June 3, 2019).
"As the Supreme Court has made clear, a State must expressly consent to suit in federal court to waive its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment."
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“Congress has no obligation to use its Spending Clause power to disburse funds to the States”).
“Congress has no obligation to use its Spending Clause power to disburse funds to the States”
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Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Wis. v. Phoenix Intern. (2011)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) (“College Savings”).
“College Savings”
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Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Wis. v. Phoenix Intern. (2011)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) (“College Savings”).
“College Savings”
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Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Lsi Corporation (2019)
Expense Bd. , 527 U.S. 666 , 685, 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) ("[A] suit by an individual against an unconsenting State is the very evil at which the Eleventh Amendment is directed-and it exists whether or not the State is acting for profit, in a traditionally 'private' enterprise, and as a 'market participant.' "). 5 To the extent the estoppel provisions in 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (d)(3), prevent a patent owner from obtaining a patent on claims that are patentably ind…
"[A] suit by an individual against an unconsenting State is the very evil at which the Eleventh Amendment is directed-and it exists whether or not the State is acting for profit, in a traditionally 'private' enterprise, and as a 'market participant.' "
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Nelson, Coralynn F. v. La Crosse County Dis (2002)
See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 16 No. 01-1261 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (“Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I.”); Kimel, 528 U.S, at 79 (“Under our firmly established precedent then, if the ADEA rests solely on Congress’ Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today’s cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers.”); Alde…
“Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause.”
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Romeu v. Cohen (2001)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) ("[T]he term `enforce' [in § 5] is to be taken seriously--... the object of valid § 5 legislation must be the carefully delimited remediation or prevention of constitutional violations."). 39 It could be argued that because a large segment of the population of the territories is Latino, black, or of Pacific Islander or Asian extraction, the exclusion of U.S. citizens residing in the territories from the vote for electors to the electoral…
"[T]he term `enforce' [in § 5] is to be taken seriously--... the object of valid § 5 legislation must be the carefully delimited remediation or prevention of constitutional violations."
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Michael Montgomery, Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Mary L. Nave, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee… (2000)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) ("The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others."); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (describing the right to exclude others as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property") (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 28 Moreover, although one usually does not think of a driveway as an independently marketable …
"The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others."
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Ali v. Carnegie Institution of Washington (2013)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 , 686 n. 4, 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“[S]tate sovereign immunity, unlike foreign sovereign immunity, is a constitutional doctrine that is meant to be both immutable by Congress and resistant to trends.”).
“[S]tate sovereign immunity, unlike foreign sovereign immunity, is a constitutional doctrine that is meant to be both immutable by Congress and resistant to trends.”
“The FLSA does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.”
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 , 119 S. Ct. 2219 , 144 L.
“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others. That is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”
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Fuld v. The Palestine Liberation Organization (2022)
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 686 (“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and that acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions.”), Defendants do not cite, and the Court has not found, any case holding that such receipt of a benefit is a necessary condition.
“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and that acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions.”
Expense Bd. , 527 U.S. 666 , 670, 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) ("[A] State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.") (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 , 447-448, 2 S.Ct. 878 , 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883) ).
"[A] State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit."
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”).
“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“The assets of a business (including its good will) unquestionably are property, and any state taking of those assets is unquestionably a ‘deprivation’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
“The assets of a business (including its good will) unquestionably are property, and any state taking of those assets is unquestionably a ‘deprivation’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 , 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”); Kafka v. Mont.
“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”).
“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”
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Dent v. State (2013)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”), and transferability, see Boss Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the City of Atlantic City, 40 N.J. 379, 385 , 192 A.2d 584, 587 (1963) (“qualities of property” include monetary value and transferability). 6 The court should consider whether the right at issue has been treated as a property right in other contexts and whether…
“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others”).
“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others”
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Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass'n ex rel. First Security Bank, N.A. v. Southeastern New Mexico Affordable Hous… (2012)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“We have even held that a State may, absent any contractual commitment to the contrary, alter the conditions of its waiver and apply those changes to a pending suit.”).
“We have even held that a State may, absent any contractual commitment to the contrary, alter the conditions of its waiver and apply those changes to a pending suit.”
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Campbell v. University of Louisville (2012)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”).
“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) ("The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.
"The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others. That is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."
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Hornberger v. Tennessee (2011)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.”).
“Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.”
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Bergemann v. Rhode Island (2009)
Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675 , 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2226 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999) (“Generally, we will find a waiver either if the State voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction ... or else if the State makes a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to jurisdiction.”)(internal citations omitted).
“Generally, we will find a waiver either if the State voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction ... or else if the State makes a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to jurisdiction.”
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 681-682 , 119 S.Ct. at 2229 (“State sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally protected.”).
“State sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally protected.”
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Farmer v. Troy Univ. (2022)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (“[A] state does not . . . consent to suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to ‘sue and be sued.’ ”).
“[A] state does not . . . consent to suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to ‘sue and be sued.’ ”
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Farmer v. Troy Univ. (2022)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (“[A] state does not . . . consent to suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to ‘sue and be sued.’ ”).
“[A] state does not . . . consent to suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to ‘sue and be sued.’ ”
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Farmer v. Troy Univ. (2022)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (“[A] state does not . . . consent to suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to ‘sue and be sued.’ ”).
“[A] state does not . . . consent to suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to ‘sue and be sued.’ ”
Bd., 527 U.S. at 675 (“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”).
“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”
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Dennis v. Ohio State Teachers Retirement Board (2020)
Id. 527 U.S. at 678 (“there is ‘no place’ for the doctrine of constructive waiver in our sovereign- immunity jurisprudence.’”); accord Akers v. Cty of Bell, 498 Fed.
“there is ‘no place’ for the doctrine of constructive waiver in our sovereign- immunity jurisprudence.’”
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“trademarks” are a “constitutionally cognizable property interest[]” and “are the ‘property’ of the owner because he can exclude others from using them”); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (holding that trade secrets are property under applicable state law and subject to federal takings clause); see also Schneider, 1998 WL 834346 , at *2 (“Clearly, a trademark is property.”). 10 ownership of a copyright may be trans…
“trademarks” are a “constitutionally cognizable property interest[]” and “are the ‘property’ of the owner because he can exclude others from using them”
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Stevenson v. City of Chicago (2018)
Bank, 527 U.S. at 680 (“The whole point of requiring a ‘clear declaration’ by the State of its waiver is to be certain that the State in fact consents to suit.”).
“The whole point of requiring a ‘clear declaration’ by the State of its waiver is to be certain that the State in fact consents to suit.”
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Leon v. Rockland Psychiatric Center (2017)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 , 119 S.Ct. 2219 , 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999); see also McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]here are two recognized exceptions to the [Eleventh Amendment] bar: when Congress authorizes a suit through enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and where a state consents to being sued.”).
“[T]here are two recognized exceptions to the [Eleventh Amendment] bar: when Congress authorizes a suit through enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and where a state consents to being sued.”
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Peterson v. Florida, Department of Revenue, Office of Child Support Enforcement (In Re Peterson) (2000)
See 517 U.S. at 72-73 , 116 S.Ct. at 1131-32 ; see also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-37 , 119 S.Ct. at 2205 (“Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers-”)• The Bankruptcy Clause is in Article I of the constitution.
“Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers-”
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Fox v. Faison (2023)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”).
“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation.”
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999) (“We have long recognized that a State’s sovereign immunity is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure…The decision to waive that immunity, however, is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty.”).
“We have long recognized that a State’s sovereign immunity is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure…The decision to waive that immunity, however, is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty.”
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SAVAGE v. MILLS (2020)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999) (“business in the sense of the activity of doing business, or the activity of making a profit is not property in the ordinary sense.”). 4 Plaintiffs have failed to state a procedural due process claim that would entitle them to injunctive relief lifting existing restrictions on the operation of their businesses.
“business in the sense of the activity of doing business, or the activity of making a profit is not property in the ordinary sense.”
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SUPPORT WORKING ANIMALS INC v. DESANTIS (2020)
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999)); cf. Helm v. Liem, 523 F. App’x 643, 645 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he right to work in a specific profession is not a fundamental right.”); Vickers v. Egbert, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1358 , 1361–62 (S.D.
“[T]he right to work in a specific profession is not a fundamental right.”