State v. Stuard (1993)

See State v. Poyson, 250 Ariz. 48 , 53, 58, 475 P. 3d 293 , 298, 303 (2020) (failure to link mitigating evidence to the crime may diminish its weight); State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 608, n. 12 , 863 P. 2d 881, 900, n. 12 (1993) (“[E]vidence of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a signifcant mitigating factor”). 2 Next, Jones introduced evidence that he suffers from cog- nitive impairment caused by physical trauma that he suf- fered during his …

See State v. Poyson, 250 Ariz. 48, 53, 58 , 475 P. 3d 293, 298, 303 (2020) (failure to link mitigating evidence to the crime may diminish its weight); State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 608, n. 12 , 863 P. 2d 881, 900, n. 12 (1993) (“[E]vidence of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a significant mitigating factor”).

Id. at 900 (“With only minor variations in theme and certainty, all three experts agreed that Defendant was mentally impaired at the time of the murders and that this impairment contributed to the homicides.”).

“The identity exception to [Rule] 404(b) applies if identity is in issue, and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597 , 863 P.2d 881, 889 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he pattern and characteristics of the crimes must b…

By saying that we weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances we simply describe the process used to determine, as required by the statute, whether mitigating evidence is "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." A.R.S. § 13-703(E); State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 610 , 863 P.2d 881, 902 (1993) ("One mitigating circumstance, for example may be `sufficiently substantial' to outweigh two aggravating factors.") (citations omitted, emphasis added).

See State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 (1993) (“The broad question posed to [the witness] specifically called for the response now challenged.”); State v. Lawrence, 123 Ariz. 301 , 304–05 (1979) (holding that defense counsel’s open- ended question on cross-examination had invited error); Wilson, 185 Ariz. at 259 .

Cf. State v. Stuard , 176 Ariz. 589 , 603, 863 P.2d 881 , 895 (1993) ("Arizona law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.").

Additionally, the invited error doctrine “prevents a defendant from introducing forbidden evidence and then seeking reversal based on its erroneous introduction.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 600 (1993). ¶14 The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial, because any error was invited by Defendant.

See State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 , 863 P.2d 881, 895 (1993) (“Arizona law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.”).

And as stated earlier, neither expert testified that Prince was in a dissociative state, as Prince now claims. ¶ 117 At most, Prince proved that he has a personality disorder, not that “the disorder controlled [his] conduct.” State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 505-06 , 826 P.2d 783, 802-03 (1992) (concluding “[d]efendant’s borderline personality disorder [did] not warrant a reduction of his sentence to life imprisonment”); see State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 613 , 863 P.2d 881,…

State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582 , 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1997). ¶ 38 The identity exception to Rule 404 is applicable only where “the pattern and characteristics of the crimes ... are so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597 , 863 P.2d 881, 889 (1993) (citations omitted); see also State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 27 , 918 P.2d 1038, 1045 (1996) (“[T]he modus operandi of and the circumstances surrounding the two crimes must…

In carrying out this responsibility, "we are sometimes called upon to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment even in cases where the facts are aggravated and the tragedy immense." State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 605 , 863 P.2d 881, 897 (1993).

See State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 385 , 983 P.2d 748, 754 (1999) (stating that “[i]n every ease in which we have found the (G)(1) factor, the mental illness was ‘not only a substantial mitigating factor ... but a major contributing cause of [the defendant’s] conduct that was ‘sufficiently substantial’ to outweigh the aggravating factors present ....’”) (quoting State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 459 , 799 P.2d 785, 800 (1990) (when voices told defendant to kill he could n…

To say that all persons with a mental illness are always significantly impaired in at least one of these two specific ways is supported by neither medical evidence nor common sense. ¶ 23 In every case in which we have found the (G)(1) factor, the mental illness was “not only a substantial mitigating factor ... but a major contributing cause of [the defendant’s] conduct that was ‘sufficiently substantial’ to outweigh the aggravating factors present.... ” State v. Jimenez, 165…

See State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589 , 608 n. 12, 863 P.2d 881 , 900 n. 12 (1993) (“[E]vidence of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a significant mitigating factor.”).

Cf. State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 600 (1993) (holding that the defendant’s acquittal on some charges against him weighed against a finding of prejudice). ¶12 The State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the denial of McQueen’s opening statement did not affect the verdicts.

Cf. State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 600 (1993) (rejecting defendant’s argument that court erred in refusing to sever counts due to danger of unfair prejudice and noting that the fact that the jury acquitted defendant of several counts demonstrated that “the jury followed the judge’s instructions and considered the evidence separately on each charge”).

Two factors are particularly relevant to that inquiry: “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 (1993).

Evid. (“Rule”) 103(a)(1) (a party may only claim error in a ruling to admit evidence if the party “timely objects . . . and states the specific ground unless it was apparent from the context.”). ¶12 Under Rule 403, a court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Under Rule 404(b)(1), “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show…

In deciding whether to grant a motion for mistrial after inadmissible testimony is unexpectedly interjected, the trial court must consider “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 (1993) (quoting State v. Hallman,…

In State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 610 , 863 P.2d 881, 902 (1993), the court 4 reduced a death sentence based on mitigating evidence that the defendant suffered from 5 organic brain damage that was a “major contributing cause of his conduct.” In State v. 6 Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 15 , 775 P.2d 1069, 1079 (1989), the court reduced a death sentence 7 based on the defendant’s youth and the effects of a motorcycle accident which resulted in 8 a head injury that altered his behavi…

Although King argues that the detention officer “was a trained officer who knew that he should not reference the invocation,” the Arizona Supreme Court has rejected this argument, finding “an able lawyer conducting cross-examination can usually avoid the injection of known inadmissible testimony by using narrow, leading questions.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 (1993).

“The identity exception to [Rule] 404(b) applies if identity is in issue, and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the 3 STATE v. RODRIGUEZ Decision of the Court other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.” State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, ¶ 58 (2016) (quoting State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597 (1993)).

We do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence, State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 (1993) (citing State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 391 (1970)), or reweigh the evidence, State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552 (1981) (collecting cases).

Two factors are particularly relevant to that inquiry: “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 (1993).

Two factors are particularly relevant to that inquiry: “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 (1993).

We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 2004), or distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence, State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 (1993). ¶12 There was ample evidence that Hartwell hired women to work as “models” and told them that they would be creating legal pornography, that his business earned its revenue from the sale of sexual services, and that he kept the revenue from those…

The identity exception to Rule 404(b) applies if identity is in issue, “and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.“ State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597 (1993) (quoting Morris K.

A defendant is not prejudiced when introduction of the joined evidence would be permitted “for an evidentiary purpose anyway.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597 (1993) (quoting Morris K.

To the contrary, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated the same under Arizona law, State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 (1993), and a conspiracy may consist of, and be proven by, circumstantial evidence alone, State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 317 (1987) (“Criminal conspiracy need not be, and usually cannot be, proved by direct evidence.”). ¶56 The record contains circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy above and beyond the payments Phillips made to Young.

If anything, the record reflects that the jury followed the court’s instructions and carefully considered the charges and evidence because the jury acquitted McKinney on four charges.1 Cf. State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 600 (1993) (finding the jury’s decision to acquit the defendant on some charges evidenced that the jury followed the court’s precautionary instruction).

Indeed, the not-guilty verdicts on Counts 43, 66, 67, and 97 demonstrate that the jurors carefully considered the evidence and disproves Gehon’s contention that the jury simply convicted him out of “anger.” See State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 600 (1993) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that evidence of other acts caused him unfair prejudice, noting the jury’s acquittals on some counts showed that the 8 The court admitted evidence of prior sexual assaults under both Rule 404(…

Evid. 404(b). 4 The precise terms of the stipulation are not in the record on appeal because the parties did not inform the trial court on the record of the agreed-upon terms. 5 The court reporter did not record the contents of the exhibit when it was played for the jury, and the exhibit is not in the record. 6 To the extent defendant is arguing that the court should have sua sponte given a curative instruction, we disagree given that he has not provided any authority for hi…

State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 , 863 P.2d 881, 895 (1993).

Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a fact or facts from which you may find another fact.” “Arizona law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 , 863 P.2d 881, 895 (1993). ¶11 Sufficient evidence supports O’Neill’s conviction.

Evid. 404(b) applies if identity is in issue, ‘and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.’” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597 , 863 P.2d 881, 889 (1993) (citation omitted).

State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 , 863 P.2d 881, 895 (1993).

State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 , 863 P.2d 881, 895 (1993). ¶8 To sustain a conviction on Count 3, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, “[u]nder circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury,” Varela‟s intentional or knowing failure to seek medical care for E. for two days after her power struggle with Tricia endangered E.‟s “person or health.” See A.R.S. § 13-3623(A).

The identity exception to Rule 404(b) applies if identity is in issue and “the pattern and characteristics of the crimes . . . [are] so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597 , 863 P.2d 881, 889 (1993) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 27 , 5 STATE V.

In deciding whether to grant a motion for mistrial after inadmissible testimony is unexpectedly interjected, the trial court should consider “(1) whether the remarks called to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) the probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 , 863 P.2d 881, 893 (1993).

State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 , 863 P.2d 881, 895 (1993).

In addition, where a causal connection has been shown between mitigating evidence of mental illness, a low IQ, or a dysfunctional family background, Arizona courts give the evidence "substantial weight.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 231 , 141 P.3d 368, 406 (2006); see State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 21 , 951 P.2d 869, 886 (1997); State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 609 , 863 P.2d 881, 901 (1993). 9 .

While the evidence supporting this finding is admittedly circumstantial, “Arizona law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603 , 863 P.2d 881, 895 (1993).

(See Mem. of Decision and Order dated 3/5/03.) In State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 608 , 863 P.2d 881, 900 (1993), Dr. Scialli, although retained by the State, testified that the defendant's boxing career could have caused brain damage and that the resulting mental impairment was causally related to the murders; according to Dr. Scialli, Stuard, suffering from dementia, "reacted suddenly and overwhelmingly when he confronted and was confronted by his victims.” Id. at n. 12. 1…

Prejudice from a failure to sever is unlikely “[i]f the evidence of one crime would have been admissible in a separate trial for the others.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 596 , 863 P.2d 881, 888 (1993).

Evid. 404(b) applies if identity is in issue, ‘and if the behavior of the accused both on the occasion charged and on some other occasion is sufficiently distinctive, then proof that the accused was involved on the other occasion tends to prove his involvement in the crime charged.’ ” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 597 , 863 P.2d 881, 889 (1993) (citing Morris K.

State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 , 863 P.2d 881, 893 (1993). ¶4 “A declaration of a mistrial is the most dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 262 , 665 P.2d 972, 984 (1983).

State v. Stuard, 176 Ar iz. 589, 601, 863 P.2d 881, 893 (1993). ¶4 “A declaration of a mistrial is the most dramatic remedy for trial er ror and should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted. ” State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 262 , 665 P.2d 972, 984 (1983).

Alternatively, Phillips argues the photograph’s prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. ¶ 30 A trial court has “discretion to admit photographs and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 602 , 863 P.2d 881, 894 (1993).

P. 21.3(c); State v. Valenzuela, 194 Ariz. 404, ¶2 , 984 P.2d 12, 13 (1999). ¶ 15 Fundamental error is error “ ‘going to the foundation of the case or that which takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense.’ ” State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 601 , 863 P.2d 881, 893 (1993) (quoting State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 138 , 685 P.2d 1284, 1290 (1984)).