People v. Massie (1998)

In this regard, we have previously noted that “[t]he California Supreme Court has declared that the ‘ultimate task’ in statutory interpretation ‘is to ascertain the legislature’s intent.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Massie, 19 Cal.4th 550, 569 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29, 41 (1998)). “ ‘Ordinarily, the words of the statute provide the most reliable indication of legislative intent.’ ” In re First T.D. & Inv., 253 F.3d at 527 (quoting Pac.

TURNACLIFF v. WESTLY 14557 this regard, we have previously noted that “[t]he California Supreme Court has declared that the ‘ultimate task’ in statu- tory interpretation ‘is to ascertain the legislature’s intent.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Massie, 19 Cal. 4th 550, 569 , 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29, 41 (1998)). “ ‘Ordinarily, the words of the statute provide the most reliable indication of legislative intent.’ ” In re First T.D. & Inv., 253 F.3d at 527 (quoting Pac.

Ind. 2001), aff’d sub nom., Williams v. Davis, 301 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2002); Ex Parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138, 139-140 (Ala. 1997); State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997); Hill v. State, 962 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Ark. 1998) (holding that it was not cruel and unusual punishment to resentence the defendant to death even though he had been on death row for more than fifteen years); People v. Massie, 19 Cal. 4th 550, 574 (1998); People v. Frye, 18 Cal. 4th 894, 1029-31 (1998…

Our interpretation is guided by the directive in California Code of Civil Procedure § 1859 that “[i]n the construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature ... is to be pursued, if possible.” In First, we summarized the elements of statutory construction developed by the California courts, noting that the California Supreme Court “has declared that the ‘ultimate task’ in statutory interpretation ‘is to ascertain the legislature’s intent.’” In re First, 253 F.3d at 5…

We hold that it does not, because double jeopardy principles are only implicated where jeopardy has attached, see Martinez v. Illinois, U S. „ 134 S. Ct. 2070, 2074 (2014), and jeopardy does not attach where, as here, a defendant's guilty plea is found to be defective, see People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 38 (Cal. 1998) (citing authority which holds that jeopardy does not attach to a null and unlawful plea); Cox, 412 So. 2d at 356 (holding that jeopardy did not attach where th…

On appeal, the trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court’s finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent review. [Citations.] In determining whether a confession was voluntary, ‘[t]he question is whether defendant’s choice to confess was not “essentially free” because his will was overborne.’ ” (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Ca…

He emphasized that, since Justice Stevens' invitation, the lower courts have "resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless." Id. at 461 , 120 S.Ct. at 461 (citing People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183, 262 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1023 , 119 S.Ct. 1262 , 143 L.Ed.2d 358 (1999); People v. Massie, 19 Cal.4th 550 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29, 44-45 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1113 , 119 S.Ct. 1759 , 143 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Ex parte Bus…

VI, § 11(a); Leone v. Medical Board of California (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660, 667 (Leone), quoting Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision (1966) p. 91.) This distinguishes capital cases from those applying “‘regular punishment’ for felonies.” (People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 255 .) Consistent with this constitutional grant of jurisdiction, our Legislature long ago enacted section 1239, subdivision (b) (section 1239(b)), which provides: “When upon any plea a judgment …

“The California Supreme Court has declared that the ‘ultimate task’ in statutory interpretation ‘is to ascertain the legislature’s intent.’” In re First T.D. & Inv., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing People v. Massie, 19 Cal. 4th 550, 569 (1998)).

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 (Massie); People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404 (Maury) [“finding of coercive police activity is a prerequisite to a finding that a confession was involuntary under the federal and state Constitutions”].) “Under both state and federal law, courts apply a ‘totality of circumstances’ test to determine the voluntariness of a confession. [Citations.] Among the factors to be considered are ‘ “the crucial element of police coercion…

(See People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1330 [“persons convicted under the death penalty law are manifestly not similarly situated to persons convicted under the Determinate Sentencing Act and accordingly cannot assert a meritorious claim to the ‘benefits’ of the act under the equal protection clause”], citing Eric J., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 530 ; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 223 [citing Eric J. for the proposition that “the first prerequisite to [an equal …

(Withrow v. Williams (1993) 18 507 U.S. 680, 693-694 [ 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1753-1755 , 123 L.Ed.2d 407 ].)” (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) 19 Defendant raised the voluntariness issue below, and the trial court denied his motion to suppress on this ground. 20 Although at present the state's burden is to prove the voluntariness of a confession 21 by a preponderance of the evidence, defendant's crimes occurred before the enactmen…

(See People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 564 [“‘[A]n unlawful guilty plea is null’”].) “Where a trial court is asked to approve an illegal plea bargain—illegal because it violates a policy condition established by the Legislature or the people through the initiative process—the proper course of action for the court is clear.

We hold that it does not, because double jeopardy principles are only implicated where jeopardy has attached, see Martinez v. Illinois, U S. „ 134 S. Ct. 2070, 2074 (2014), and jeopardy does not attach where, as here, a defendant's guilty plea is found to be defective, see People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 38 (Cal. 1998) (citing authority which holds that jeopardy does not attach to a null and unlawful plea); Cox, 412 So. 2d at 356 (holding that jeopardy did not attach where th…

(Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 226 (Bustamonte); People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 (Massie).) Regarding the defendant, the court takes into account his or her age, level of education, level of intelligence, physical condition, mental health, and whether he or she received advice regarding constitutional rights.

(Id. at p. 489; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ].) In determining whether a confession was voluntary, ‘ “[t]he *1250 question is whether defendant’s choice to confess was not ‘essentially free’ because his [or her] will was overborne.” ’ (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances.

Defendant’s Confession was Not Involuntary “The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15, of the state Constitution bar the prosecution from using a defendant’s involuntary confession.” (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 (Massie).

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) The determinative question “ ‘is whether defendant’s choice to confess was not “essentially free” because his will was overborne.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘When, as here, the interview was tape-recorded, the facts surrounding the giving of the statement are undisputed, and the appellate court may independently review the trial court’s determination of voluntariness.’ ” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th …

As we explained in People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ], “delay inherent in the automatic appeal process is not a basis for concluding that either the death penalty itself, or the process leading to its execution, is cruel and unusual punishment.” (Id. at p. 606, citing People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ], and People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1016 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 , 839 P.2d 984 ].…

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ]; In re Aven S., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 76 .) *535 Here, the minor points to his age, and the fact that he suffers from ADHD and other mental disabilities, to argue that he was susceptible to suggestion.

(See People v. Wilson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 839, 848-849 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 883 ] [under double jeopardy clause, premeditated murder and felony murder are different crimes]; People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 572-573 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ] *1372 [under double jeopardy clause, predicate felony is element of felony murder].) None of the theories is a lesser included offense of receiving stolen property, as each requires a killing.

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 563 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) An exception to this rule applies if the judgment of conviction is reversed as a result of a defendant’s appeal, motion for new trial, or other challenge by a defendant to his or her conviction.

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 (Massie); People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79 (Neal).) When a defendant challenges his or her statements as involuntary, the prosecution bears the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) “To determine whether a statement was voluntary or coerced, we examine the totality of the circumstances. [Citation.] Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate but does not itself compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary. [Citation.] . . .

Legal Standards “An involuntary confession is inadmissible under the due process clauses of both the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution *1401 [citation] as well as article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution [citation].” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 920 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ].) “Under both state and federal law, courts apply a ‘totality of circumstances’ test to determine the voluntariness of a confession.” (People v. Ma…

(People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 419 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182 , 99 P.3d 505 ]; People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 565-566 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) Neither party argues to the contrary.

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 (Massie).)6 In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the question is whether defendant’s will was overborne, so that his choice to confess was not essentially free.

Relevant Authority ―In determining whether a confession was voluntary, ‗[t]he question is whether defendant‘s choice to confess was not ―essentially free‖ because his will was overborne.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 (Massie).) The courts must consider the totality of circumstances in determining whether a statement was voluntary.

A "venire" is the group of prospective jurors summoned from that list and made available, after excuses and deferrals have been granted, for assignment to a "panel." A "panel" is the group of jurors from that venire assigned to a court and from which a jury will be selected to try a particular case.' [Citation.]" (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 581, fn. 7 .) 26 The juror was given the number 44, but he was in seat number eight.

(People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 630 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 , 199 P.3d 535 ]; People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 942 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ]; People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 500; People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1267 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 , 64 P.3d 762 ]; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 606 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ]; People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ]; People v. Frye,…

(Id. at p. 489; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ].) In determining whether a confession was voluntary, “ ‘[t]he question is whether defendant’s choice to confess was not “essentially free” because his [or her] will was overborne.’ ” (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances.

(People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 298 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877 , 96 P.3d 170 ]; People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) With respect to the interrogation, among the factors to be considered are “ ‘ “the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity” ....’” (People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576 .) With respect to the defendant, the relevan…

(See People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 566-567 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) *124 We do not equate the consequences to Griffin with the possible consequences to Grimes.

As we have explained, “the delay inherent in the automatic appeal process ‘is not a basis for finding that either the death penalty itself or the process leading to it is cruel and unusual punishment.’ (People v. Hill [(1992)] 3 Cal.4th [959,] 1016 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 , 839 P.2d 984 ]....)” (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ], italics omitted; see People v. Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1267 ; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4…

California Code of Civil Procedure § 1859 provides that “[i]n the construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature ... is to be pursued, if possible.” The California Supreme Court has declared that the “ultimate task” in statutory interpretation “is to ascertain the legislature’s intent.” People v. Massie, 19 Cal.4th 550, 569 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29, 41 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1113 , 119 S.Ct. 1759 , 143 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999).

(See People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 741 ; People v. Boyette, 29 Cal.4th at p. 466; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 859; People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 317.) A successful equal protection claim must show that “ ‘ “the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” ’ ” (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 571 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) “[B]y definition, a defendant in a n…

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 570 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ], and cases cited therein.) He argues nonetheless that “[e]volving due process standards and requirements of reliability of the death sentencing procedure have undermined the Court’s analysis in those cases.” “We have repeatedly stressed . . . that a defense counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase does not make the proceeding unreliable in constitutional terms so lo…

We have rejected substantially identical contentions in several recent cases (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 462-464 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 , 28 P.3d 78 ]; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 605-606; People v. Frye [(1998)] 18 Cal.4th [894,] 1030-1031 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ]) and find no cause to reconsider those decisions here.” (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 127; accord, People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 942 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23…

(E.g., People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 942 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ]; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 606 ; People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) We do so again.

He acknowledges we have previously rejected this contention (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 606 ; People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ]), but asks us to reconsider our view.

In reviewing this claim, “the trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court’s finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent review.” (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) *472 Defendant argues that when he was admitted to the hospital, he was suffering from acute psychosis, was under the influence of drug…

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 571 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) Appellant’s argument is that SVP’s are similarly situated to mentally disordered offenders (MDO’s).

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 565-566 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) Accordingly, defendant’s contention fails.

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 571 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) The analysis will not proceed beyond this stage if the groups at issue are not “ ‘similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law,’ ” or if they are similarly situated, but receive “ ‘like treatment.’ ” Identical treatment is not required.

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 568 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ].) Therefore, a possible interpretation under the Attorney General’s approach would be to construe “location” as a place without an address where the offender “spends the night” for more than five working days.

I, § 28, subd. (d); ...)... fl[] Under both state and federal law, courts apply a ‘totality of circumstances’ test to determine the voluntariness of a confession. [Citations.] Among the factors to be considered are ‘ “the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity” as well as “the defendant’s maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental health.” ’ […

I, § 2; U.S. CONST, amend XIV; see Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688-89 (1993); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-110 (1985); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 46 (Cal. 1998).

Justice Thomas has concluded that after the resounding rejection by courts of Lackey claims that the Supreme Court "should consider the experiment concluded." Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 , 120 S.Ct. 459, 461 , 145 L.Ed.2d 370, 872 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certio-rari); see, e.g., Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir.1998); Ex parte Bush, 695 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.1997); State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238 , 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997); People…

(People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ]; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1030-1032 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) III.

(See People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 , 967 P.2d 29 ]; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1030-1031.) Moreover, as we have frequently held, matters bearing on the legality of the execution of sentence, rather than the validity of the sentence itself, are no basis for reversal of the judgment.