Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc. (1987)

Co. v. Goodman, 259 Ga. 339 ( 380 SE2d 460 ) (1989); Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 182 (4) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) *592 (1987); Smith v. Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga., 165 Ga. App. 565 ( 302 SE2d 124 ) (1983).

Id. at 469.

Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga.App. 175, 176 (1), 358 S.E.2d 468 (1987) (plaintiff may choose to *63 sue and recover fully from only one of the tortfeasors).

Gay v. Piggly Wiggly So., 183 Ga.App. 175, 178 (2), 358 S.E.2d 468 (1987).

Center-West, 257 Ga. 55, 56 ( 354 SE2d 417 ); Knight v. Lowery, 228 Ga. 452, 455 ( 185 SE2d 915 ); Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 178-181 (2, 3) ( 358 SE2d 468 ); Phillips v. Tellis, 181 Ga. App. 449, 450 ( 352 SE2d 630 ); Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321, 325 , supra. The two separate accidents are insufficiently connected to constitute a "series of occurrences" giving rise to plaintiff's claims.

The precise rule applicable in a case such as this was stated in Gay v. Piggly Wiggly, 183 Ga. App. 175, 179 ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987): “ ‘It is true that [the original wrongdoer] could be held liable for the aggravation of the injury caused by the other defendants’ negligence, but that liability is not the result of any concept of joint wrongs but is rather the product of the familiar rule that a wrongdoer is responsible for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his tort…

Nor does MARTA contend that Mallard was prohibited from suing it in DeKalb County for the claims against it and Scipio as joint tortfeasers.8 MARTA claims, however, that because Bryant and Scipio were not “acting in concert,” they 6 See, e.g., Gay v. Piggly-Wiggly Southern Inc., 183 Ga. App. 175, 180-181 (2) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987). 7 Because of the interconnected nature of the errors raised, we address them together. 8 See, e.g., Glover, 243 Ga. at 483 (holding that plainti…

The Court need not decide, however, if Children’s would be vicariously liable under any of these theories, as Georgia law is clear that “a negligent employee and his vicariously liable employer are not ‘joint tortfeasors’ in the classic sense, in that the employer has committed no separate and distinct act of negligence and the employee has no right of contribution against his employer.” Gay v. Piggly Wiggly S., 183 Ga.App. 175 , 358 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1987); see also PN Expre…

(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 177 (2) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987); The Kroger Co. v. Mays, 292 Ga. App. 399, 401 ( 664 SE2d 812 ) (2008).

In any event, for the sake of clarity, we refer to a single plaintiff. 2 See Timmons v. Cook, 287 Ga. App. 712 ( 652 SE2d 604 ) (2007). 3 See id. 4 Ms. Mays, who had suffered a series of strokes and was severely disabled, took Dilantin to control seizures. 5 Candler Hosp. v. Dent, 228 Ga. App. 421, 422 ( 491 SE2d 868 ) (1997). 6 See Phillips v. Tellis, 181 Ga. App. 449 ( 352 SE2d 630 ) (1987). 7 See Cole v. Webb, 267 Ga. App. 174, 177 (2) ( 598 SE2d 886 ) (2004). 8 See Phill…

See Coleman v. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, 194 Ga. App. 508, 510-511 (1) ( 390 SE2d 856 ) (1990); Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 178-179 (2) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987); Smith v. Hardy, 144 Ga. App. 168, 173 (16) ( 240 SE2d 714 ) (1977).

See generally Stone v. Radiology Svcs., P. A., supra at 852 (2); Jones v. Lamon, supra at 844-846; Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 178-180 (2) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987).

Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 182 (4) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987); Smith v. Bd. of Regents, 165 Ga. App. 565 ( 302 SE2d 124 ) (1983).

Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 180 ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987); Complete Auto Transit v. Floyd, 214 Ga. 232, 237-238 ( 104 SE2d 208 ) (1958).

Hosley argues that he is the proper party to bring an action for funeral and burial expenses of the decedents under OCGA § 51-4-5 (b), which provides, “[w]hen death of a human being results from a crime or from criminal or other negligence, the personal representative of the deceased person shall be entitled to recover for the funeral, medical, and other necessary expenses resulting from the injury and death of the deceased person.” See Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga.…

Thus, a negligent employee and his vicariously liable employer are not ‘joint tortfeasors’ in the classic sense, in that the employer has committed no separate and distinct act of negligence and the employee has no right of contribution against his employer.” Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 176-177 ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987).

“The legal concept of joint tortfeasors is classically understood to mean those individuals whose separate and distinct acts of negligence concur to proximately produce an injury. . . . [A] negligent employee and his vicariously liable employer are not joint tortfeasors in the classic sense, in that the employer has committed no separate and distinct act of negligence and the employee has no right of contribution against his employer.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ga…

Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 177-178 (2) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987).

Compare Hosley v. Davidson, 211 Ga.App. 529 , 439 S.E.2d 742, 745 (1993) (staling that "the funeral and burial expenses are debts of the estatef]”) with Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc., 183 Ga.App. 175 , 358 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1987) (concluding that O.C.G.A. § 51-4-5(b) is really a survival statute, not a wrongful death statute, except as to the provision for funeral expenses, which is an expense growing out of wrongful death).

Id. at 855-856, 857-859 (1); see Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 180-181 (2)-(3) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987) (the statutory provision authorizing an award of funeral expenses “is a true wrongful death provision,” and a claim for such expenses is “dependent upon the fact of [the decedent’s] death” and results from the injury to the decedent’s representative for the decedent’s wrongful death).

We, however, agree with the trial court’s 9 McDonald v. MARTA, 251 Ga. App. 230, n. 2 ( 554 SE2d 226 ) (2001); see Buho, 353 Ga. App. at 467, n. 4; RC Cola Bottling Co. v. Vann, 220 Ga. App. 479, 481 (2) ( 469 SE2d 523 ) (1996) (holding that the driver-employee and employer were joint tortfeasors for purposes of determining venue in a suit stemming from an automobile accident); see also Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 177 (1) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987) (“[A] ne…

See generally Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc., 183 Ga.App. 175 , 358 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1987).

See also Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175, 177 (1) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987).

See Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 183 Ga. App. 175 (1) ( 358 SE2d 468 ) (1987).

Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts Sec. 52 at 347 (5th ed. 1984); see also Gay v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 175, 181 , 358 S.E. 2d 468, 474 (1987) (citing cases which indicate death is a single and indivisible injury) and General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1190 (Ala. 1985) (death is an indivisible injury).