Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)

But see United States v. Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir.2004) (noting in dicta the potential abrogation of Talk based on dicta in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 , 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003), that a COA is a "jurisdictional prerequisite”). 7 .

But cf. id. at 359, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that subsection (e)(1) applies equally to the merits of a claim under § 2254 and to the application for a certificate of appealability). 12 .

But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342 , 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”).

See Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 339 (“Credibility can be measured . . . by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are . . . .”).

See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 347 (“[A] state court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it.”); Moormann, 426 F.3d at 1055 (“[T]he trial court need not exhaustively analyze each mitigating factor ‘as long as a reviewing federal court can discern from the record that the state court did indeed consider all mitigating evidence offered by the defendant.’” (quoting Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1991))).

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“We look to the District Court’s application of AEDPA to petitioner’s constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists of reason.”).

Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. . . .

See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); accord Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2011) (“AEDPA requires that we treat the decisions of state courts with deference, but it does not insulate them totally from our review when federal constitutional rights are implicated. . .”).

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“[U]ntil a COA has been issued federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners.”). 29 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4 Doc: 66 Filed: 01/05/2024 Pg: 30 of 32 whether a COA is required, its bottom-line disposition leaves some room for arguing that Reid controls.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“[U]ntil a COA has been issued federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners.”). 28 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4 Doc: 56 Filed: 11/27/2023 Pg: 29 of 31 habeas petition combined with its incorrect choice to deny rather than dismiss the motion.

This is especially so when the court resolved issues like 15 witness credibility, which are factual determinations for purposes of 16 Section 2254(e)(1).” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see Cotto, 331 F.3d at 233 17 (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1), the fact-findings of the trial court are subject to 19 1 a presumption of correctness, a presumption that is particularly important 2 when reviewing the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility.”) 3 (quotation marks omitted…

Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) (“By enacting AEDPA . . .

Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) (“By enacting AEDPA . . .

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338-39 (2003) (" Miller-El I "). ¶37 Further, as the court scrutinizes the race-neutral reason advanced, it must ponder all of the relevant circumstances "'that bear upon the issue of' purposeful discrimination." Madrid , ¶ 34, 526 P.3d at 193 (quoting Beauvais , ¶ 23, 393 P.3d at 517). 22 The relevant circumstances include, but are not limited to, "the striking party's demeanor, the reasonableness of the proffered race-neutral explanatio…

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003) (“Miller-El I”).

See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240 (the standard is “demanding but not insatiable”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.

See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240 (the standard is “demanding but not insatiable”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.

See Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 313 (2015); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“A federal court’s collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system.”).

In addition, a state court 20 decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent “‘if the state court 21 either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context 22 where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where 23 it should apply.’” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams, 529 24 U.S. at 407). 1 With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a petitione…

See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240 (the standard is “demanding but not insatiable”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.

Moody v. United States, 958 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (“While this standard is not overly rigid, it still demands ‘something more than the absence of frivolity.’”).

See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 (“A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by the Civil No. 20-1588 (FAB) 79 AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.”).

Further, review of state court decisions under § 2254(d)(1) is “limited to the record 20 that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 21 U.S. 170 , 180-81 (2011). 22 With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner may only obtain relief by showing that the state 23 court’s conclusion was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 24 1 evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” Miller-El v. D…

Further, review of state court decisions under § 2254(d)(1) is “limited to the record 5 that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 6 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011). 7 With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner may only obtain relief by showing that the state 8 court’s conclusion was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 9 evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 5…

See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 (“A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by the AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.”).

See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 (“A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by the AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.”).

The petitioner must “demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the District Court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327 (“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragemen…

First, a federal habeas court presumes the underlying factual determinations of the state court to be correct, unless the habeas petitioner “rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003); Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004) (“As a federal habeas court, we are bound by the state habeas court’s factual findings, both implicit and explicit.”).

“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude that the issues presented here are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327 ; see also id. at 342 (“The question is the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not the resolution of that debate.”).

Where, as here, a habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of any underlying constitutional claim, “a COA should issue [only] when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 4…

To make such a showing, the “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or tha…

The trial court found Lang’s allegation that he was shown a photograph prior to 23 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 347 (2003) (“[A] state court need not make detailed findings addressing all of the evidence before it.”). 24 Obj.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) (“The holding in Slack would mean very little if appellate review were denied because the prisoner did not convince a judge … that he or she would prevail.

See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (“[A] reviewing court . . . is not as well positioned as the [state] court is to make credibility determinations.”); Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 434 (noting a prior version of § 2254(d) “gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state . . . court, but not by them.”); Nejad v. Att’y Gen., State of Ga., 830 F.3d 1280, 1292 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Determining t…

Under § 2254(e)(1), “[f]actual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); see also Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing . . . we are required to defer to the state court’s credibility findings.”).

E at 26.) In particular, the 11 superior court found Ms. Thompson and Ms. Barber were “influenced by a personal relationship 12 with petitioner and a personal interest in how the matter is decided” and their testimony was “not 13 reasonable when considered in light of the totality of evidence presented at the trial in this matter.” 14 (Id.) 15 Under § 2254(e)(1), in proceedings evaluating a prisoner’s habeas petition, “[f]actual 16 determinations by state courts are presumed…

A petitioner may obtain relief under § 2254(d)(2) “only by showing” the state court “conclusion to be ‘an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (“Miller-El II”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2)).10 This “unreasonable determination” standard in § 2254(d)(2) applies to state-court decisions and “the granting of habeas relief.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,…

“If no Supreme Court 19 precedent creates clearly established federal law relating to the legal issue the habeas petitioner 20 raised in state court, the state court’s decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable 21 application of clearly established federal law.” Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) 22 (citing Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485-86 (9th Cir. 2000)). 23 1 As to § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner may only obtain relief by showing the state court’s 2 con…

A petitioner may obtain relief under § 2254(d)(2) “only by showing” the state court “conclusion to be ‘an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (“Miller-El II”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2)).2 This “unreasonable determination” standard in § 2254(d)(2) applies to state-court decisions and “the granting of habeas relief.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, …

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 , 484– 85 (2000); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”).

Moody v. United States, 958 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (“While this standard is not overly rigid, it still demands ‘something more than the absence of frivolity.’”).

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 , 484– 85 (2000); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”).

Moody v. United States, 958 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (“While this standard is not overly rigid, it still demands ‘something more than the absence of frivolity.’”).

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2) (providing that a certificate of appealability may issue “only if the [petitioner] has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragem…

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2) (providing that a certificate of appealability may issue “only if the [petitioner] has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragem…

Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979). [petitioner] has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”…

Compton—20 Disparate questioning of prospective jurors “can be probative of discriminatory intent.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2247 (finding persuasive evidence of discriminatory intent where the State asked the black prospective jurors many more questions than seated white jurors); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 344 (2005) (“If the use of disparate questioning is determined by race at the outset, it is likely [that] a justification for a strike based on the resul…

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2) (providing that a district court may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the [petitioner] has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to d…

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2) (providing that a district court may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the [petitioner] has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (“A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to d…

When considering this third step, “the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991). “[D]etermination of the prosecutor’s discriminatory intent or lack thereof turns largely on the evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility, of which the attorney’s demeanor is often the best evidence.” State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn. 1994); see Miller-El v. Cockr…