State v. Estevez (1974)
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Jack Howard Potts, Cross-Appellant v. Walter D. Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, C… (1984)
Thus, while the Georgia courts have held that “a crime is an included crime and multiple punishment therefor is barred if it is the same as a matter of fact or as a matter of law,” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316 , 206 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1974) (emphasis in the original), the federal courts have used a narrower test, phrasing it in the conjunctive rather than the alternative.
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Redding v. State (1988)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974); OCGA §§ 16-1-6; 16-1-7.
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Sanford v. State (1984)
In one of the leading cases as to included crimes and merger, State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319, 320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974), Justice Undercofler, speaking for a unanimous court, wrote that after the adoption of the 1968 Criminal Code a crime is an included crime and multiple punishment is barred if it is the same as a matter of fact or as a matter of law.
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In the Interest of S. L. H. (1992)
They prevent an accused from being unduly harassed by or threatened by successive criminal prosecutions.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Teal v. State (1992)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Strickland v. State (1996)
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Daniel Ray Metcalf v. State (2019)
In Estevez, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that Georgia’s statutory bar to successive prosecutions and multiple convictions for the same conduct is more expansive than the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy. 232 Ga. at 317 (1).
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Sullivan v. State (2005)
See also State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974) (“The 1968 Georgia Criminal Code has expanded the proscription of double jeopardy beyond that provided for in the United States and Georgia Constitutions.”).
“The 1968 Georgia Criminal Code has expanded the proscription of double jeopardy beyond that provided for in the United States and Georgia Constitutions.”
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Griffin v. State (1995)
OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) (formerly Code Ann. § 26-506) requires sill crimes arising from the same conduct to be prosecuted in a “single prosecution” provided they are in the same jurisdiction and are known to the prosecutor, unless the court in the interest of justice orders separate trials. 1 State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 318-319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Hancock v. State (1993)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ).
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Knight v. State (1989)
See also OCGA § 16-1-6; State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Hanvey v. State (1988)
OCGA § 16-1-7 (a); Pryor v. State, 238 Ga. 698, 700 ( 234 SE2d 918 ); State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319, 320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ). 2.
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Hogan v. State (1986)
He expressly recognizes that the Georgia statutes provide broader coverage against double jeopardy than does the U. S. Constitution, as was pointed out in State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Green v. State (1984)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ). “[A] crime is an included crime and multiple punishment therefor is barred if it is the same as a matter of fact or as a matter of law . . .” Id.
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State v. Hightower (1984)
OCGA § 16-1-6 (Code Ann. § 26-505) purports to define “included offenses.” “[OCGA § 16-1-6 (1) (Code Ann. § 26-505)] sets out the rules for determining an included crime as a matter of fact or [2] as a matter of law,” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Fears v. State (1983)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Thorpe v. State (2001)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Gooch v. State (2001)
Our holding in Division 4 renders this argument moot. 29 See OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (1). 30 Bellamy v. State, 243 Ga. App. 575, 581 (5) ( 530 SE2d 243 ) (2000). 31 See State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317-320 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974); Kinney v. State, 234 Ga. App. 5, 7-8 (2) ( 505 SE2d 553 ) (1998). 32 The trial court also sentenced Gooch to ten years for possession of methamphetamine and ten years for attempt to sell methamphetamine.
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Mathis v. State (2001)
Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 379 (2) ( 290 SE2d 442 ) (1982), overruled on other grounds, Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 204 (2) ( 476 SE2d 747 ) (1996); State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Moser v. State (2000)
Pope, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 See Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875 ( 287 SE2d 7 ) (1982). 2 Satterfield v. State, 256 Ga. 593, 595 (2) ( 351 SE2d 625 ) (1987). 3 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 89 (106 SC 433, 88 LE2d 387) (1985), citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 382 (43 SC 141, 67 LE 314) (1922). 4 State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974). 5 See also OCGA § 16-13-31 (e). 6 21 USC § 846 .
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Williams v. State (1998)
He may not, however, be convicted of more than one crime if: (1) One crime is included in the other; or (2) The crimes differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-1-7 (a); State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 (2) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Griffin v. State (1998)
However, “[t]he states may, of course, employ standards more stringent than the due process requirements pronounced in the federal precedents, but standards less stringent are outlawed.” Wig-more, supra at pp. 307-308, § 820d.; see also Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 ( 422 SE2d 426 ) (1992); State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Williams v. State (1996)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Sanders v. State (1994)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).” Teal v. State, 203 Ga. App. 440, 441 ( 417 SE2d 666 ).
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Hardy v. State (1993)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Hoffman v. State (1993)
Page v. State, 202 Ga. App. 828, 830-831 ( 415 SE2d 487 ) (1992); State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Harmon v. State (1993)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Lewis v. State (1993)
“The first policy underlying the double jeopardy bar is to prevent harassment of the accused by successive prosecutions or the threat of successive prosecutions.” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 318 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Shuler v. State (1990)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Glisson v. State (1989)
J., and McMurray, P. J., concur. 1 The statement in State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974), regarding the reach of state statute beyond that of the double jeopardy provision of the State Constitution is not conclusive for all time, and in all circumstances.
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Moore v. State (1989)
He may not, however, be convicted of more than one crime if: (1) One crime is included in the other; or (2) The crimes differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct.” Clearly, subsection (2) is inapplicable because these two offenses do not differ only in that one is a more specific form of the other. “[A] crime is an included crime and multiple punishment therefor is barred…
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Stafford v. State (1988)
The latter holding is merely an application of the principle, set forth in OCGA § 16-1-7, that although “[a]n accused may be prosecuted for each crime arising from the same conduct, ... he may not be convicted of more than one crime if one crime is included in the other.” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Freeman v. State (1987)
The proscription is that he may not be convicted of more than one crime if one crime is included in the other.” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Givens v. State (1987)
A crime is included within another crime as a matter of law if “[i]t differs from the crime charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.” OCGA § 16-1-6 (2); State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Hambrick v. State (1986)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Sullivan v. State (1986)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ).
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Geckles v. State (1985)
“Although ‘questions of double jeopardy in Georgia must now be determined under the expanded statutory proscriptions (set forth in OCGA §§ 16-1-6, 16-1-7, and 16-1-8 [cits.]),’ State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974), the statutory provisions are triggered only after a defendant has been initially *72 placed in jeopardy. ‘A defendant is placed in jeopardy when, in a court of competent jurisdiction with a sufficient indictment, he has been arraigned, has pl…
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Bowen v. State (1985)
See OCGA § 16-1-6; State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974). 4.
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Caldwell v. State (1984)
Although “questions of double jeopardy in Georgia must now be determined under the expanded statutory proscriptions [set forth in OCGA §§ 16-1-6, 16-1-7, and 16-1-8 (Code Ann. §§ 26-505, 26-506, 26-507],” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974), the statutory provisions are triggered only after a defendant has been initially placed in jeopardy.
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Bowens v. State (1984)
The other imposes penalties to deter unauthorized persons from [distributing] such drugs.” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Chitwood v. State (1984)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ). “[A] crime is an included crime and multiple punishment therefor is barred if it is the same as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. . . .” Id.
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Griffin v. State (1983)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ).
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Hightower v. State (1983)
In Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41, 43 ( 209 SE2d 587 ), the Supreme Court propounded: “... as a matter of law, see State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ), aggravated assault and armed robbery do not differ only in that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, applies to one crime than the other, as set forth in Code Ann. § 26-505 (b).” Our court acknowledged this erudite holding but p…
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Potts v. Zant (1983)
Code Ann. § 26-507 sets out in detail when a second prosecution is barred.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 318 ( 206 SE2d 475 )' (1974).
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Talley v. State (1982)
Code Ann. § 26-506.” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 (2) ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).
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Dalton v. State (1982)
See Code Ann. § 26-505 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1267); Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603 (1) ( 244 SE2d 131 ); Gearin v. State, 127 Ga. App. 811 (1) ( 195 SE2d 211 ); Allen v. State, 233 Ga. 200, 203 (3) ( 210 SE2d 680 ); Krist v. State, 227 Ga. 85, 89 ( 179 SE2d 56 ); State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319-320 (1) ( 206 SE2d 475 ); Zilinmon v. State, 234 Ga. 535, 539 (8) ( 216 SE2d 830 ); Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 244, 246 (7) ( 232 SE2d 238 ).
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Kitchens v. State (1981)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 318-320 ( 206 SE2d 475 ).
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Williams v. State (1980)
“These sections establish alternative rules for determining when one crime is included in another as a matter of fact or as a matter of law so as to bar conviction and punishment for more than one crime ... [A] crime is an included crime and multiple punishment... is barred if it is the same as a matter of fact or as a matter of law...” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974) .
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State v. Anil (1980)
Slye v. State, 42 Md.App. 520, 524-25 , 401 A.2d 195, 198 (1979); Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 264 , 373 A.2d 262, 265-66 (1977). *1375 We conclude that defendant could have been convicted of either possession with intent to deliver or delivery — but not of both- See, e. g., United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210, 214-15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948 , 99 S.Ct. 2172 , 60 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1979); United States v. Hernandez, 591 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 , (5th Cir. 1979); United …
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Griffeth v. State (1980)
State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 ( 206 SE2d 475 ) (1974).