Browning v. Dixon (1998)

Thus,. due process requires D.M.F., and those others holding protected interests, be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the removal of his guardian and termination of the guardianship.6 "The fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard." Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217 , 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998) (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).

Due process, in relation to comity, encompasses the idea that the order was granted after "proper service or voluntary appearance of the defendant." Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 This court has stated that "Uhl elementary and fundamental requirement of due process . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections." Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 21…

Lastly, because appellant had notice of the hearing and was present and able to present evidence at the hearing, his procedural due process rights were not violated. 1 See Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217 , 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998) ("The fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard.").

These exceptions are not at issue in this case. 9 See Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217 , 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998) (noting that notice is required by due process in any proceeding that is considered final). 10 See Harris Assocs., 119 Nev. at 641, 81 P.3d at 534 . 11 See Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 616 , 119 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2005). 12 1985 Nev.

NRCP 5(a) eliminates the requirement for service on parties in default for failure to appear, "except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against them shall be served upon them in the manner provided for service of summons . . . ." Thus, "[a] default judgment not supported by proper service of process is void and must be set aside." Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 218 , 954 P.2d 741, 744 (1998).

See NRCP 60(b)(4); Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 218 , 954 P.2d 741, 744 (1998) (finding that failure to exercise due diligence rendered service of process improper and voided the default judgment); Dobson v. Dobson, 108 Nev. 346, 348 , 830 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1992).

See NRS 14.070(1), (2); Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 216 , 954 P.2d 741, 742 (1998).

Const, art. 1, § 8(5). 6 Levingston v. Washoe Co., 112 Nev. 479, 484 , 916 P.2d 163, 166 (1996), modified on rehearing, 114 Nev. 306 , 956 P.2d 84 (1998). 7 106 Nev. 100, 103 , 787 P.2d 785, 787 (1990). 8 Id. 9 Woolsey v. State, 111 Nev. 1440, 1443 , 906 P.2d 723, 726 (1995) (quoting with approval district court’s statements that “an accused person held for prosecution is in lawful custody” and that “[a]dmission to bail does not end that custody, but only changes its conditi…

See Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 218 , 954 P.2d 741, 744 (1998) (concluding that when a party obtains a default judgment through improper service of process, the judgment is void and must be set aside).

See Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213 , 954 P.2d 741 (1998) (holding that the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence by ignoring “other reasonable means” of locating the defendant such as the defendant’s known employer and insurer); 4 Gassett v. Snappy Car Rental, 111 Nev. 1416 , 906 P.2d 258 (1995) (holding that the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence, partly because it made no attempt to locate the defendant through her known attorney); Price v. Dunn, 106 Nev. 100…

See Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217 , 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998) (citing Wachter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928)) (providing that "a nonresident motorist statute that allowed service upon the secretary of the state, but contained no provision for attempted notice to a nonresident defendant, violated due process of law").

See Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217 , 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998).

Const. art. 1, § 8(5) (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 3 Maiola v. State, 120 Nev. 671, 675 , 99 P.3d 227, 229 (2004); see also Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 217 , 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998).

Inc. v. Fox Run Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 704 So. 2d 694, 696 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); see also Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213 , 954 P. 2d 741, 744 (1998).

See ECF Nos. 18, 19, 31. 16 The Due Process Clauses of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Nevada 17 Constitution guarantee a “requisite…opportunity to be heard.” Browning v. Dixon, 954 P.2d 741 , 18 743 (Nev. 1998) (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914)).